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How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of





The conventional understanding of fundamental rights in consti-
tutional law recognizes three distinct conceptual issues. First, there is
the question of whether a right exists. Second, it must be determined
whether the right has been infringed. Third, there is the problem of
whether any infringement can be justified.
Typically, each of these issues has its own frame of reference that
requires an independent inquiry. In identifying a right and defining its
scope, the inquiry is directed at the nature of (and, perhaps, the mo-
tive behind) the actions of the individual that constitute the exercise
of the right. Thus, we ask whether a person has the right to distribute
leaflets on a street corner' or to ingest peyote during a religious cere-
mony.2 Resolving the question of whether particular behavior in-
volves the exercise of a right is a complex undertaking involving
historical, political, and philosophical analysis.
In determining whether a right has been infringed, the inquiry is
directed at the state's conduct and its effect. Accordingly, assuming
we have initially decided that people have a right to express their
political opinions, we ask whether a particular law prevents people
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1969, Antioch College;
J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Dianne
Pothier, and Kevin Johnson for reading drafts of this Article and for providing helpful
criticism.
1. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (upholding the right to distribute
leaflets).
2. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(finding no constitutional right to use peyote as part of a religious ritual).
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from exercising this right.3 Finally, if an infringement exists and the
state attempts to justify its conduct, the inquiry shifts to the state's
purpose in taking the challenged action. We evaluate both the impor-
tance of the state's objective and the degree to which that objective is
furthered by the state's conduct. Thus, in reviewing the law in the
previous example, we might ask whether a content-based law banning
political speech serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to accomplish that objective.4
The convention of treating these issues as independent inquiries,
however, may not accurately reflect the reality of the case law. Judi-
cial inquiries regarding these categories of right, infringement, and
justification often seem indistinct and intrinsically connected to each
other. It is not simply that the categories merge together, but rather
that they may in some basic sense be differing aspects of one unitary
legal phenomenon. Thus, the case law generally reflects a behavior/
state action/state purpose totality that the Constitution either permits
or prohibits depending on how one describes the right/infringement/
justification construct applied to it.
Some examples may clarify this point. Consider the free exercise
of religion as interpreted in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith.5 According to the holding of Smith, the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause is limited to those situations in
which the state prohibits individual or group practices "only when
they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the reli-
gious belief that they display."' 6 Thus, the purpose of the state's ac-
tion-to suppress a religious practice-is not only relevant to the
state's justification for its action, but also determines both the nature
and scope of the right of religious freedom, and whether that right has
been infringed in a particular instance.7
3. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (holding that an interpretation
of a disorderly conduct statute that permits punishment of provocative opinions violates
the First Amendment).
4. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (overturning a law that prohibited
hostile demonstrations in front of embassies because the content-discriminatory restriction
on political expression did not narrowly further a compelling state interest).
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. Id. at 877.
7. Thus, the Smith case holds that when the state does not single out religious prac-
tice for discriminatory treatment, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pros-
cribes)."' Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). Similarly, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113
S. Ct. 2217 (1993), the Court implicitly collapsed its analysis of the scope of plaintiffs' free
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Alternatively, consider the right of privacy and personal auton-
omy as it applies to procreational freedom. How do we understand
the distinction that constitutional doctrine seems to draw between
contraception, early abortions, and late abortions? 8 Does the wo-
man's right change as her behavior progresses from pre-conception
acts to decisions made much later in the gestation period? 9 Is there
less of an infringement of the woman's right when the state prohibits
late abortions than when it prohibits early abortions or the use of con-
traceptives?' 0 Or does the woman's right remain constant throughout
her pregnancy, with the state's interest becoming more compelling
over time?" More importantly, is the doctrinal rubric that is used to
explain a court's holdings on this issue a matter of real significance, or
is each inquiry an alternative way of looking at essentially the same
question, but from a different perspective?
Thus, closely examining the way that courts determine whether a
right has been infringed may be very relevant to defining the scope of
the right and to evaluating the state's justification for impairing the
right. Indeed, it may be an essential aspect of resolving these latter
questions. At a minimum it will inform our understanding of them.
exercise rights with the issues of whether those rights were infringed by the challenged
ordinance and whether that infringement could be justified. Thus, Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion begins by stating, "[T]he protections of the Free Exercise Clause [only] per-
tain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." Id. at 2226. Then Ken-
nedy explains that a law discriminating against a particular religion infringes the free exer-
cise rights of religious practitioners of the targeted faith. Id. at 2226-27. Finally, Kennedy
concludes that a law that "restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and
fails.., to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same
sort" cannot meet strict scrutiny and must be struck down. Id. at 2234.
8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (invalidating only those
pre-viability abortion regulations that unduly burden a woman's decision to have an abor-
tion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (upholding prohibition of third trimester
abortions except for those situations in which an abortion is necessary to preserve a wo-
man's life or health); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down restric-
tions on the distribution or use of contraceptives).
9. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 792 n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fundamental right to make
childbearing decisions prior to conception does not extend to the decision to have an abor-
tion after conception has occurred).
10. See Alan E. Brownstein & Paul Dau, The Constitutional Morality of Abortion, 33
B.C. L. Rnv. 689, 749-59 (1992) (suggesting that a woman's interest in terminating her
pregnancy and the value of her right to do so declines as pregnancy progresses).
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64 (holding that the state interest in protecting potential life
increases as pregnancy progresses until such time as it outweighs a woman's right to
privacy).
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Moreover, in practical terms, the grounds for establishing that an
infringement has occurred may be the determinative factors in adjudi-
cating constitutional violations and protecting rights. Courts and liti-
gators evaluate statutory language, state purposes, and the effects of
state action to determine if these factors, either alone or in combina-
tion, constitute the infringement of a fundamental right. These are the
doctrinal parameters that describe what the state cannot do, or, alter-
natively, what individuals are protected in doing, under the Constitu-
tion. In a very real sense, that doctrinal picture represents the
practical definition of a constitutional right.
Perhaps surprisingly, in deciding and discussing constitutional
cases, courts and commentators have directed their attention to the
first and third of these inquiries, determining whether a right exists
and, if it does, whether a state infringement is justified.12 With rare
exceptions,13 the question of what constitutes an infringement of a
right is treated as a secondary concern. The Court's recent decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,14 however, departs from this tradition.
A three-justice plurality viewed the issue of infringement as disposi-
tive, determining the constitutionality of particular abortion regula-
tions on the basis of whether or not the regulations imposed an
"undue burden" on the right to an abortion.15 In response, dissenting
12. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (limiting strict scrutiny
review to laws that directly and substantially interfere with the right to marry, but failing to
provide guidance as to how such regulatory burdens are to be distinguished from other
restrictions on marriage that will not be subject to rigorous review); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969) (recognizing a right to travel and rejecting the state's asserted
justification for penalizing the exercise of that right without ever describing the nature or
magnitude of the regulatory burden that will be found to constitute a penalty).
The nature of what constitutes a burden on the right to have an abortion was left so
unclear after Roe that states were not even certain they could prosecute a person who
performed abortions without any medical training. The Court had to formally rule in Con-
necticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975), that "prosecutions for abortions conducted by
nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy secured by the Constitution."
Similarly, the voluminous literature discussing the right to have an abortion focuses pri-
marily on the question of whether a right to have an abortion exists or whether the state's
interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus justifies the prohibition of most, if not
all, abortions. See generally Brownstein & Dau, supra note 10, and commentary cited
therein.
13. For an example of one such relatively rare analysis, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights
Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933
(1989). As an introduction to his article, Lupu correctly notes, "One question upon which
little attention has been focused, however, is the character of government activity neces-
sary to constitute a 'burden."' Id. at 934.
14. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
15. Id. at 2818-21.
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justices vehemently challenged the plurality's reasoning as both un-
precedented and unprincipled. 16
The purpose of this Article is to examine the "undue burden"
standard utilized in Casey and to use it as a prism through which the
broader question of the nature of constitutional infringements can be
analyzed. Initially, the "undue burden" standard set out in Casey's
plurality opinion will be evaluated to determine whether it is an unor-
thodox ploy, as its critics contend, or whether it is rooted at least im-
plicitly in prior precedent. Given the intensity of this dispute on the
Court and the importance of its resolution for the future of abortion
rights, this relatively narrow issue deserves careful attention in its own
right.
Resolving this ostensibly limited issue, however, cannot be ac-
complished without addressing the broader and more difficult ques-
tion of how, as a general matter, the Court identifies an infringement
of a fundamental right.17 As will be seen, often the Court does not
isolate the issue of infringement, but rather implicitly subsumes it
within an analysis that focuses on the scope of the right and the state's
justification for any purported impairment.'8 Judicial opinions seldom
directly identify whatever principles, or at least patterns, of decision
making there are that might help explain why certain state action in-
16. See id. at 2855, 2866-67 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2873, 2876-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist technically concur with the judgment of the plurality with
regard to all but one of the provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute under review,
they dissent from the plurality's reasoning as it is applied throughout the joint opinion. For
the sake of convenience and readability, I refer to Scalia and Rehnquist as dissenting Jus-
tices in the text, rather than repeatedly describing their more accurate but complicated
status. Since the focus of this Article is on the plurality's reasoning, not the specific conclu-
sions of the joint opinion, it should be clear that when I refer to Scalia and Rehnquist as
dissenting Justices, I am only alluding to their opposition to the plurality's arguments -and
analysis in adopting the undue burden standard.
17. While the identification of any constitutionally protected right or interest as "fun-
damental" may be subject to debate, there is general agreement that the abridgment of a
right determined to be fundamental requires serious judicial review. Thus, when Justice
Scalia protests that the adoption of an undue burden standard in Casey places all constitu-
tional rights at risk, see infra note 282 and accompanying text, he accepts arguendo the
premise that there is a fundamental right to abortion despite his obvious disagreement with
that conclusion. What makes the undue burden standard problematic to Scalia is that an
inappropriate standard is being used to review laws that purportedly burden the exercise of
a fundamental right. Scalia's concern is that the undue burden standard will continue to be
applied in cases involving other rights that, unlike the right to have an abortion, do deserve
to be recognized as fundamental.
18. The ballot access cases are a good example of this lack of specificity, as are the
durational residency cases. See infra notes 172-228 and accompanying text.
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fringes a fundamental right in some circumstances and not in others.19
Thus, these principles and patterns, the potential roots of the "undue
burden" standard, remain to be unearthed, and that can only be
achieved through a careful study of how the Court has treated the
problem of infringements of rights in a variety of contexts.
That is the task of this Article. Its thesis is fourfold: First, the
"undue burden" standard of the Casey plurality is reflected in one
form or another throughout the fundamental rights case law of the
past forty years. Second, the only aspect of the plurality opinion in
Casey that is unique and unprecedented is its forthrightness in con-
fronting directly the issue of what constitutes an infringement and its
explicit recognition that the resolution of this issue may be the domi-
nant and controlling perspective in determining the scope of a funda-
mental right. Third, the undue burden standard helps to explain how
the Court has used its resolution of the question of what constitutes an
infringement of a constitutional right in order to define the scope of
rights and to determine the standard of review to be applied to state
attempts to justify right-impairing actions. Fourth, by recognizing dis-
tinctions among kinds of infringements, just as we routinely identify
different rights and different standards of review of state justifications
for impairing rights, the case law is significantly clarified.
Part I of this Article describes the Casey decision and the strong
disagreement between the joint opinion and its critics on the Court as
to the legitimacy of the undue burden test. This Part interprets and
rationalizes the undue burden standard in terms of its definition and
application in the joint opinion. Part II demonstrates that, contrary to
the protests by the Casey dissenters, the undue burden test is firmly
rooted in fundamental rights jurisprudence. In support of this conten-
tion, explicit and implicit frameworks developed by the Court for de-
termining whether a right has been infringed are identified and
compared to the undue burden standard. Part II also suggests how an
analysis of what constitutes an infringement of a right can be used to
explain, in doctrinal terms, both the result in Casey and a great deal of
the Court's fundamental rights case law that would otherwise appear
to be unprincipled and inconsistent. This Article concludes, in Part
III, by arguing that a focus on the infringement of rights is necessary
to accommodate the movement toward a more expansive and inclu-
sive definition of rights reflected in the case law of the last four de-
19. The case law does not explain, for example, why imposing a $1.50 poll tax in-
fringes the right to vote, while much greater monetary burdens do not infringe free speech
rights. See infra notes 231-246, 258-266, 344-353 and accompanying text.
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cades. By carefully considering what constitutes an infringement of a
particular right, courts can more precisely and effectively define the
constraints imposed by the Constitution on state power and the pro-
tection provided by the Constitution to individual rights.
I. The "Undue Burden" Test
A. The Casey Debate-The Preliminary Conflict
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,20 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter authored a joint, plurality opinion for the Court in which
they used an "undue burden" test to evaluate the constitutionality of
various abortion regulations. 21 In brief, the test requires the Court to
invalidate only those regulations found to unduly burden the right to
have an abortion.22 The "undue burden" standard appears to reflect
20. 112 S. Ct. 2721 (1992).
21. Id. at 2818-21. In Casey, the plurality evaluated the following seven provisions of
a Pennsylvania statute regulating abortion services:
1. Informed consent regulations require that a patient seeking an abortion must
be provided information relating to "the nature of the procedure, the health risks
of the abortion and of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age of the unborn
child."' Id. at 2822 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)). The patient must
also be provided information regarding "the availability of printed materials pub-
lished by the State describing the fetus," medical assistance for childbirth, child
support from the father, and adoption agencies. Id.
2. Informed consent requires that a physician rather than an otherwise qualified
member of a clinic's staff provide certain information to a woman seeking an
abortion. Id. at 2824.
3. There must be a 24-hour waiting period "between the provision of the infor-
mation deemed necessary to informed consent and the performance of an abor-
tion." Id. at 2825.
4. A minor must obtain the informed consent of one parent or utilize a judicial
bypass procedure before she can obtain an abortion. Id. at 2832.
5. Physicians providing abortion services are required to comply with various re-
cordkeeping and reporting requirements. Id.
6. A married woman must sign a statement that she has notified her spouse of
her decision to terminate her pregnancy before she can obtain an abortion. The
spousal notification requirement can be avoided, however, if the woman signs an
alternative statement certifying that she cannot locate her husband, that her hus-
band is not the father of the fetus, that her pregnancy is the result of a reported
spousal sexual assault, or that she believes that notifying her husband will pro-
voke him or someone else to cause her bodily injury. Id. at 2826.
7. The statute defines, in specific terms, a medical emergency that would permit
the performance of an abortion without complying with the statute's substantive
regulations. Id. at 2822.
22. Id. at 2818-21. Three of the Pennsylvania regulations at issue received relatively
cursory attention. First, the plurality rejected the argument that the definition of a medical
emergency was too narrow. Deferring to the construction of the statute provided by the
court of appeals, the plurality interpreted the provision broadly to include any serious risk
to the life or health of the mother. Under that construction, the substantive abortion regu-
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lations would be waived whenever compliance would constitute a significant threat to the
woman's health, and the medical emergency definition could be upheld as constitutional.
Id. at 2822.
Second, with regard to the requirement that certain information relating to a woman's
informed consent can only be provided by a physician, the plurality concluded that there
was no evidence on the record before it that this regulation constituted a substantial obsta-
cle to women seeking abortions. Accordingly, the requirement was upheld under mini-
mum rationality review. Id. at 2824-25. The Court's prior holding to the contrary in City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 448 (1983), was overruled.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823, 2825.
Third, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements were also upheld. Id. at 2832-33.
While these regulations might increase the cost of some abortions by a "slight amount," the
plurality determined on the record before it that there was no basis for concluding that the
provision imposed "a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice." Id. Of more significance,
the joint opinion indicated that the collection of information relating to abortions served
the state's general interest in health and medical research. See infra notes 51-55, 290-296
and accompanying text. In light of that legitimate goal, it could not be said "that the [re-
cordkeeping] requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult."
Thus, the regulations were constitutional. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2833.
The four other regulations raised more substantial concerns. The informed consent
requirements were found to be constitutional since the provision of "truthful, nonmislead-
ing information" served the legitimate purpose of ensuring that a woman's decision to have
an abortion is "mature and informed." Id. at 2823-24. The fact that the state expressed a
preference for childbirth over abortion in mandating the communication of information
did not by itself create a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortion or unduly burden
their choice. Id. at 2824. Again, the holdings of prior cases-Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45,
and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762-
65 (1986)-were overruled.
The plurality also had little difficulty in upholding the parental consent requirement
on the authority of prior precedent. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832. The fact that Pennsylvania
required "informed" parental consent raised no additional issues not already addressed
and dispensed with in the plurality's discussion of the more general informed consent re-
quirements. Id.
The 24-hour waiting period was also upheld, although the plurality conceded that the
issue was a "troubling" one. Id. at 2825. While the plurality found the purpose of the
regulation to be reasonable in that "important decisions will be more informed and delib-
erate if they follow some period of reflection," it was apparent that the practical impact of
this requirement would be burdensome to many women, as the district court had con-
cluded. Id. Because a 24-hour waiting period often necessitated a second visit to a physi-
cian before an abortion could be performed, the regulation resulted in delaying an
abortion and increasing its cost. It also exposed women to additional risks of harassment
by anti-abortion picketers and made it more difficult for some women to maintain the
confidentiality of their decision. Id.
The plurality responded to these findings by explaining that although the district court
had determined that these consequences would be "particularly burdensome" for certain
women, it did not find that the regulation created a substantial obstacle to women seeking
an abortion. Id. at 2825. Without additional information on the magnitude of the burden
falling on even those women who were most severely affected by the waiting period, the
plurality was unwilling to conclude, on the record before it, that the regulation unduly
burdened the right to have an abortion. Id. at 2825-26.
The only abortion regulation the plurality found unduly burdensome and unconstitu-
tional was the spousal notification requirement. Id. at 2829-30. Because of the potential
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Justice O'Connor's dissenting arguments in earlier abortion cases,23
but the plurality in Casey claims earlier and more extensive roots for
its approach. Indeed, the joint opinion maintains it is conforming the
judicial review of abortion regulations to the standards of review that
are generally applied in other fundamental fights cases. 24
Justices Blackmun and Stevens challenged several of the joint
opinion's conclusions.Z5 Blackmun, in particular, insisted that any reg-
ulation imposing more than a de minimis burden on the exercise of
the right to have an abortion must receive strict scrutiny.26 Both of
these Justices' criticisms of the joint opinion's position, however, were
subdued and explicitly respectful.27
The dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, in contrast, scathingly denounced the joint opinion's reasoning.
Rehnquist wrote:
While we disagree with [the standard applying strict scrutiny to
abortion regulations], it at least had a recognized basis in constitu-
tional law at the time Roe was decided. The same cannot be said for
the "undue burden" standard, which is created largely out of whole
cloth by the authors of the joint opinion....
risks of physical and psychological abuse, a woman in an abusive family relationship would
often be afraid to either notify her husband of her decision to have an abortion or to
inform the state of the reasons for her concern. Since women in this circumstance would be
deterred from obtaining an abortion, the plurality reasoned, the spousal notification re-
quirement would operate as a substantial obstacle to these women's choice. Id. at 2826-30.
Moreover, the state purpose in imposing this burden on women could not be analogized to
the state's goal in requiring parental consent before a minor obtains an abortion. Id. at
2830. Adult married women cannot be treated as subordinate wards of their husbands by
being required to consult with their marital partners before they make important medical
decisions on their own behalf. Id. at 2830-31.
23. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
24. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 ("As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save per-
haps abortion has recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise
is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right.").
25. See id. at 2838-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2843-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Blackmun and
Stevens both rejected the plurality's reasoning and decision in upholding Pennsylvania's
informed consent requirements and 24-hour waiting period. Both Justices also rejected the
plurality's reasoning with regard to the parental consent requirements, but only Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the plurality's decision to uphold this provision as constitutional.
26. Id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our prece-
dents and the joint opinion's principles require us to subject all non-de minimis abortion
regulations to strict scrutiny.").
27. See id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The por-
tions of the Court's opinion that I have joined are more important than those with which I
disagree."); id. at 2843-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Make
no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an act of per-
sonal courage and constitutional principle.").
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.. [B]ehind the facade [of adhering to precedent], an entirely
new method of analysis, without any roots in constitutional law, is
imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating
abortion.2 8
Justice Scalia's rejection of the joint opinion's approach was even
more condemnatory. After criticizing the lack of clarity of the "undue
burden" test,2 9 Scalia went on to argue:
The ultimately standardless nature of the "undue burden" inquiry is
a reflection of the underlying fact that the concept has no principled
or coherent legal basis. ... The "undue burden" standard is not at
all the generally applicable principle the joint opinion pretends it to
be; rather, it is a unique concept created specially for this case, to
preserve some judicial foothold in this illgotten territory.30
Thus far, the terms of the debate seem to be clearly set forth by
the participants. The dissenters claim that the plurality opinion trans-
gresses accepted norms of constitutional interpretation by foisting this
new and bizarre mechanism for resolving fundamental rights litigation
on the Court. O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter contend that the "un-
due burden" test is not only appropriate for the review of abortion
regulations, but it represents a generally accepted framework for eval-
uating laws that allegedly violate fundamental rights. Presumably,
one group of Justices must be substantially in error. Either the "un-
due burden" standard is unprecedented and wholly artificial, or it is
firmly grounded in the Court's traditional fundamental rights
jurisprudence.
The clear dissonance between these apparently polar positions is
muddied somewhat by a basic ambiguity in the dissenters' positions.
While Scalia and Rehnquist clearly think that an "undue burden" test
has no foundation in the case law, they do little to explain or identify
the ostensibly correct line of authority from which the joint opinion
supposedly deviates so dramatically. But without establishing that
background, the propriety of the plurality's contentions cannot rea-
sonably be evaluated. It is not clear, for example, that a single, uni-
form approach to reviewing alleged infringements of fundamental
rights has ever commanded the Court's allegiance. Arguably, the cur-
rent fundamental rights case law demonstrates a range of methodolo-
gies of judicial review that vary depending on the nature of the right
that is at issue.31 If that is the case, an "undue burden" test might be
distinct, but well within the range of permissible approaches. It might
28. Id. at 2866-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. Id. at 2876-78 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. See infra notes 82-256 and accompanying text.
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be substantively analogous to several conventional standards; indeed,
it might synthesize previously disparate case law into a more formal
framework of review.
Justice Rehnquist says almost nothing about existing standards of
review in his dissent, other than to recognize and reject the strict scru-
tiny standard of Roe and to endorse his own view. He argues that
since abortion is not a fundamental right, abortion regulations that are
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest must be upheld.32 At
best, one may tentatively infer from this argument a commitment to a
basic two-tier model under which all laws that burden fundamental
rights to any extent are strictly scrutinized, while laws that regulate
any other interests are upheld so long as they are rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.
Scalia is marginally more helpful. He identifies one kind of a bur-
den on fundamental rights that should not invoke strict scrutiny-an
incidental burden on a right imposed by a law of general applicabil-
ity.33 But Scalia does not contend, nor could he, that the Court has
adopted this position as a general rule for all fundamental rights.34
Scalia goes on to suggest that not all laws that "consciously and
directly" regulate constitutionally protected conduct will be routinely
upheld under deferential review simply because the magnitude of the
burden they impose is nominal.35 But this is not a clear statement that
all laws "consciously and directly" burdening any fundamental right
must be strictly reviewed in all circumstances. Scalia's language may
reflect the much more limited claim that prior precedent demonstrates
that the Court will strictly scrutinize certain laws that directly but only
32. Id. at 2858-60, 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Scalia states only that he has "forcefully urged that a law of general applicability
which places only an incidental burden on a fundamental right does not infringe that
right." Id. The Court accepted this principle as the basis for defining the scope of free
exercise rights in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 2456 (1991), however, Justice Scalia urged the Court to adopt a similar approach for
freedom of speech with regard to laws of general applicability that do not target expres-
sion, but only incidentally restrict conduct that is engaged in for expressive purposes. See
id. at 2463-68 (Scalia J., concurring). Significantly, no other justice in Barnes endorsed
Scalia's approach or joined his concurrence.
It is also worth noting that in the Court's most recent free exercise case, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), Justice Souter force-
fully urged the Court to reexamine the rule it had adopted in Smith that neutral laws of
general applicability may incidentally burden religious practices without ever infringing
free exercise rights. See id. at 2240-50 (Souter, J., concurring).
35. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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minimally burden the exercise of particular rights. Thus, the undue
burden test cannot account for a discrete class of cases in which the
Court will invalidate a law as an abridgement of a fundamental right
despite the fact that the law does not substantially interfere with the
exercise of the right. This criticism, that the "undue burden" standard
cannot explain all of the Court's prior fundamental rights decisions,
however, is a far cry from establishing that the joint opinion's analysis
is manufactured out of whole cloth.
While the Rehnquist and Scalia dissents fail to document the un-
precedented nature of the "undue burden" test or to explain the "cor-
rect" framework of review that the plurality has erroneously ignored,
the joint opinion's side of the argument presents comparable uncer-
tainties. To answer the question of whether the undue burden stan-
dard is consistent with the case law, it is necessary to understand what
the joint opinion means by an "undue burden." Only then will it be
possible to determine whether or not the criticism of the plurality's
analysis is justified.
B. Understanding the "Undue Burden" Test
(1) Undue Burdens-Threshold Inquiry or Constitutional Standard?
The description of the "undue burden" test in the joint opinion is,
unfortunately, not free from ambiguity. The opinion states:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-
viable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the
means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life
must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.
And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or
some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a
permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.36
This language raises several crucial questions of interpretation.
To begin with, it is not clear whether the "undue burden" standard of
the joint opinion reflects the same framework of review endorsed by
Justice O'Connor in her prior dissents in abortion rights cases. In City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, O'Connor ex-
plained, "The 'undue burden' required in the abortion cases repre-
sents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before
this Court can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the
36. Id. at 2820.
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exacting 'compelling state interest' standard. '37 Thus, the Court was
directed to determine if the right to an abortion was unduly burdened
in order to identify the correct level of review to apply to the chal-
lenged law. Laws that did not impose undue burdens would receive
minimum rationality review; laws that did impose undue burdens
would be evaluated under strict scrutiny.
The Casey opinion, however, suggests what at first glance appears
to be a startling revision of O'Connor's prior position. Instead of us-
ing the "undue burden" test as a threshold inquiry to determine the
appropriate standard of review to apply, the Casey plurality utilizes
the undue burden test itself as an independent standard of review.
Repeatedly, the plurality suggests that unduly burdensome laws are
invalid while laws that do not impose undue burdens are constitu-
tional.38 No further analysis involving either strict scrutiny or some
form of rational basis test seems to be required.39 The Court's evalua-
tion of the burden imposed on the right to an abortion is simply ele-
vated to a formal standard of judicial review without explanation.
Despite its outward appearance, however, this formal modifica-
tion of the undue burden standard may not represent a substantive
departure from the earlier O'Connor dissents. There are good rea-
sons to argue that the joint opinion's reasoning still reflects the core of
O'Connor's original position. The descriptive content of abortion
rights remains the same-it is only the doctrinal perspective that has
shifted.
The substitution of the question of what constitutes an infringe-
ment on the right-that is, what constitutes an undue burden-as the
operative inquiry in place of the more traditional standard of review is
grounded on a particular substantive foundation. It is a result of the
plurality's fairly rigid vision of the nature of abortion rights, the kinds
of interests a state might assert in attempting to justify abortion regu-
lations, and the weight to be assigned to those interests. It is this dis-
37. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that strict scru-
tiny should be used only when the state has imposed an undue burden on the right to an
abortion).
38. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 ("In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an
unconstitutional burden."); id. at 2830 (describing the effect of the spousal notice require-
ment and concluding that "it is an undue burden, and therefore invalid").
39. For example, the plurality answers the question "whether a law designed to fur-
ther the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's deci-
sion before fetal viability could be constitutional" without applying any standard of review.
The opinion simply states, "The answer is no." Id. at 2820-21.
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tinct understanding of the right/infringement/justification interrelation
in the abortion context that permits the plurality to collapse and
refocus the review of abortion regulations on the question of whether
the right is unduly burdened. 40
The critical language in this regard is the joint opinion's state-
ment, "Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to
support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial
obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure."' 41 This
language implicitly recognizes that laws imposing undue burdens on
the right to an abortion must be strictly scrutinized. However, be-
cause of the discrete and limited nature of the right to have an abor-
tion, and the consequent restricted range of state interests that might
reasonably be furthered by regulating abortions, the plurality is will-
ing to conclude that no state objective furthered by pre-viability abor-
tion restrictions could constitute the kind of compelling state interest
that strict scrutiny requires. Accordingly, once a court determines
that an undue burden exists, the law creating that burden must be
invalid, since the plurality cannot imagine any sufficiently compelling
40. The joint opinion does clarify a fundamental ambiguity in O'Connor's earlier dis-
sents, but this does not represent a change in O'Connor's position as much as it does a
resolution of her uncertainty as to the scope of abortion rights. In her dissents in Akron
and Thornburgh, O'Connor argued that the state had "compelling interests in ensuring
maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist 'through-
out pregnancy."' Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron,
462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
In theory, the state's compelling interest in protecting potential life should permit the
state to impose severe and undue burdens on women seeking abortions without violating
the constitution, notwithstanding the strict scrutiny review O'Connor recognized that such
laws must receive. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, a compelling interest in protect-
ing potential life from the moment of conception should justify the complete prohibition of
all abortions (or at least all nontherapeutic abortions).
O'Connor, however, never formally accepted that ostensibly logical consequence.
Thus, she explained that "if a state law does interfere with the abortion decision to an
extent that is unduly burdensome, so that it becomes 'necessary to apply an exacting stan-
dard of review' . . . the possibility remains that the statute will withstand the stricter scru-
tiny." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at
467) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). The ambivalence reflected in the use of the term "possi-
bility" in this context left open the question whether O'Connor believed that egregiously
burdensome laws restricting abortion should be upheld as constitutional.
The joint opinion in Casey answers that question explicitly: "The answer is no."
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. By finally resolving the result of applying strict scrutiny to un-
duly burdensome abortion regulations in a way that invalidates such laws, however,
O'Connor is not abandoning the basic principle expressed in her earlier dissents. That
principle requires that laws that unduly burden the right to have an abortion, and only
those laws, must receive close judicial scrutiny.
41. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
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state interest that would justify that level of interference with a wo-
man's choice.42
(2) The Problems of Purpose and Effect
The plurality's analysis is slightly more complicated with regard
to laws that do not impose an undue burden on the right to an abor-
tion. Basically, the "undue burden" standard also subsumes the appli-
cation of a rational basis standard of review to regulations that do not
impose undue burdens. The direct application of the rational basis
test is not necessary because the "undue burden" standard includes an
analysis of the state's purpose in enacting any challenged law as well
as an evaluation of the law's effect. In essence, the "undue burden"
standard serves as a filter through which abortion regulations will be
screened to identify and invalidate those laws serving impermissible
purposes or producing unacceptable effects (or some combination of
the two).43 From the plurality's perspective, whatever remains-any
law held not to be unduly burdensome-must necessarily survive min-
imum rationality review.
This point requires further elaboration because it underlies per-
haps the greatest uncertainty and ambiguity in the joint opinion.
Even if one agrees that the undue burden analysis effectively sub-
sumes both the threshold inquiry of determining the appropriate stan-
dard of review and the application of that standard (collapsing these
conceptually distinct questions into the language of "infringement" in
the joint opinion), that still leaves open the question of how a court
can identify an undue burden in the first place. On this issue, Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist on the one hand profess to be entirely mystified
by the plurality's reasoning, yet on the other seem to read the undue
burden standard as nothing more than a simplistic effects test.44
One can have some sympathy for the former criticism, but the
latter argument is difficult to accept as a good faith reading of the
joint opinion. Any fair reading of the language in the joint opinion
42. This conclusion is unremarkable. The plurality implicitly determined that neither
the state's interest in protecting potential human life, nor its interest in protecting the
health of the mother, justifies substantial interference with the right to have an abortion
beyond the requirements of accepted medical practice. Id. at 2821. Thus, to withstand
rigorous review, a state law would have to further a more compelling interest than protect-
ing fetal life or maternal health. The list of relevant state interests that might meet this
requirement is very short.
43. See infra notes 44-78 and accompanying text.
44. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.I, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2876-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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quoted earlier45 demonstrates that the "undue burden" standard does
not simply require a reviewing court to evaluate the magnitude of a
burden to determine if it is sufficiently heavy to be undue. Rather, the
plurality is proposing a fluid and complex analysis in which both the
purpose and the effect of the challenged law must be considered to
determine if it is constitutional. 46 The joint opinion's use of the term
"substantial obstacle" 47 may have contributed to the dissenters' confu-
sion, since that expression would most typically be used to describe an
effects test. Nevertheless, the repeated references to statutory pur-
pose both within the joint opinion48 and in Justice Blackmun's de-
scription of the plurality's position49 make it difficult to understand
the dissenters' reluctance to grapple with this aspect of the "undue
burden" standard.50
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. This approach may create obvious problems in its application. See infra notes 66-
78 and accompanying text. Indeed, the dissenters may reasonably argue that the undue
burden test not only lacks a foundation, but also lacks sufficient clarity of content to be
reasonably administered by the lower courts. However, these two challenges must be kept
separate. If the undue burden standard does not provide clear guidelines to the lower
courts that will have to apply the test, it would hardly be the first constitutional standard to
be vulnerable to that criticism. Vague and indeterminate standards may deserve to be
condemned, but that failing does not make them unprecedented. In a strange sense, the
dissenters profess not to understand what the undue burden test requires, but nonetheless
are convinced that "whatever it is" it has no parallel in constitutional law.
47. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2820 (describing as unduly burdensome any state law that has
"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion"). See infra note 53 and accompanying text for additional discussion regarding
the confusion caused by the plurality's use of the term "substantial obstacle" in discussing
abortion regulations intended to serve an impermissible legislative purpose.
48. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
49. Id. at 2845 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Certainly, Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), can hardly claim to
be unfamiliar with the idea that the state's purpose in restricting the exercise of a right may
determine whether state law will be held to impose a constitutionally cognizable burden on
the right. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. In his concurrence in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2239-40 (1993), Scalia rejects
any analysis of legislative purpose in applying the Smith rule if such an inquiry relates to
the subjective motives of lawmakers. While rejecting a purpose analysis, however, Scalia
seems to endorse the Court's examination of the "design, construction, or enforcement" of
a challenged law as well as the "object" of a statute. Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
This distinction suggests that Scalia's primary concern is with the propriety of the evidence
used to establish a law's purpose, not with the consideration of purpose itself.
Even more ambiguously, Scalia argues that an analysis of legislative motive or pur-
pose is unnecessary, since a law intended to target and suppress a religious faith that in-
eptly fails to accomplish its goal would not violate free exercise guarantees. Id. at 2240.
Even if Scalia's contention is correct, however, his argument certainly misses the point.
The rationale for inquiring into legislative purpose and motive is to identify and invalidate
laws that are intended to target and suppress the practice of a particular religion, but which
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Recognizing that an undue burden standard requires an examina-
tion of a law's purpose as well as its effect, however, tells us little
about how these factors are to be considered either independently or
together. Here, the joint opinion can be criticized for providing few
guidelines or explanations. Thus, we are left with the unenviable task
of determining the standard's content by studying the way the joint
opinion applies the test and inferring rules of decision from the plural-
ity's reasoning and holdings. What follows is an attempt to rationalize
the plurality's analysis by expanding on its argument and filling in
missing premises and connecting principles.
(a) Reviewing Laws That Serve Presumptively Valid or Invalid Purposes
As an initial premise, the plurality suggests that some state pur-
poses are presumptively invalid. Specifically, abortion regulations are
presumptively unconstitutional if they are intended to make it sub-
stantially more difficult for women to choose to have abortions.5 1 It is
critical to understand here that the plurality is extending an examina-
tion of the state's purpose to include both the state's goal and the
means by which that goal is to be furthered. Thus, the state's ultimate
goal of protecting potential life, in the abstract, is a constitutionally
legitimate one. However, the state cannot attempt to further that goal
by substituting its choice favoring birth over abortion for the choice of
the woman by deliberately hindering her ability to effectuate a con-
trary decision and obtain an abortion.5 2 Thus, a law requiring five
doctors to be present during an abortion procedure for the purpose of
dramatically increasing the cost of abortions would be struck down as
unduly burdensome, despite the argument that it furthers the state's
legitimate purpose of protecting potential life.53
are drafted in sufficiently general terms that some unimportant secular activities are also
prohibited. The issue is not whether a law is unconstitutional solely because of its motive.
Rather, it is whether a law that burdens a fundamental right, enacted for that specific
purpose, can escape constitutional scrutiny if the impact of the law falls upon unprotected
as well as protected activities.
51. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
52. The plurality states this explicitly: "A statute with [the purpose of making it more
difficult for women to obtain abortions] is invalid because the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice,
not hinder it." Id. at 2820.
53. This interpretation of the joint opinion is partially contradicted by the plurality's
use of the same "substantial obstacle" language to describe both the magnitude of an effect
and the kind of a purpose that may be found to constitute an undue burden. It is difficult
to understand, however, what this "substantial obstacle" language means in the context of
evaluating the state's purpose. Is the plurality suggesting that if a state's primary (or exclu-
sive) purpose in enacting a law is to discourage or hinder women from obtaining an abor-
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Under this analysis, in theory, even a law imposing a minor bur-
den on the ability of a woman to have an abortion may be struck
down if it can be shown that its purpose is to hinder the exercise of
this fundamental right.54 Such a purpose by itself may create an "un-
due burden" because the state's interference with the exercise of the
right is by definition unwarranted.5 5 In practice, however, it may be
tion, that purpose will not be recognized as impermissible and the law struck down unless
the state is intending to substantially hinder the exercise of the right? It cannot be that the
goal of imposing an unnecessary and bothersome burden on the right to have an abortion
will be upheld as legitimate as long as the state thinks the obstacles it is deliberately creat-
ing are not substantial.
Indeed, if the plurality had seriously intended to accept as legitimate the state objec-
tive of hindering women seeking abortions as much as possible without creating substantial
obstacles to the exercise of the right, it is hard to understand why they bothered to con-
sider the state's purpose to be relevant to identifying an undue burden at all. Since state
laws that have the effect of substantially interfering with the right to have an abortion
would already constitute undue burdens, the plurality's purpose inquiry would be largely
redundant. The only circumstance in which a purpose inquiry would be useful would be
when a state law was intended to create a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions,
but somehow failed to further this objective. That law would not technically produce an
unduly burdensome effect, but could be invalidated on the grounds of its purpose alone. It
is simply untenable to believe, however, that the authors of the joint opinion intended such
an absurd result.
The more plausible interpretation of the joint opinion suggests that any law solely
intended to prevent women from obtaining abortions by burdening their choice serves an
impermissible purpose. The Court repeatedly refers to abortion regulations that serve a
"valid purpose," id. at 2819, to abortion restrictions that are not designed to "hinder" a
woman's choice, id. at 2820, and to "[u]nnecessary health regulations," id. at 2821. This
language serves as a counterweight to the "substantial obstacle" terminology and provides
a sound basis for reading the joint opinion as rejecting any state goal of burdening the right
of women to have an abortion in order to make that decision more difficult and less
frequent.
54. Strong support for this conclusion can be found in the plurality's evaluation of
Pennsylvania's recordkeeping and reporting requirements. The plurality notes that far
from imposing a "substantial obstacle to a woman's choice," Pennsylvania's requirements
will only "increase the cost of some abortions by a slight amount." Id. at 2833. Despite
this conclusion, the joint opinion also explains that Pennsylvania's reporting regulations
further the state's legitimate interest in medical research, "so it cannot be said that the
requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult." Id. The
implication, of course, is that even a slight increase in the cost of having an abortion would
be constitutionally problematic if the regulation causing that increase in cost had "no pur-
pose other than to make abortions more difficult."
55. The plurality essentially equates the terms "unwarranted" and "undue" in ex-
plaining the error of post-Roe abortion decisions that subjected virtually all restrictions on
abortion to strict scrutiny. Thus, these earlier decisions departed from the original under-
standing in Roe that the right to an abortion was a right "to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion" into procreational decisions. Id. at 2819 (quoting Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). The plurality explained, "The very notion that the state
has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all [abortion]
regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy will be undue." Id. at 2820. From this foundation it can be easily
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difficult to establish that a regulation that does not create a substantial
obstacle to obtaining an abortion was adopted for the purpose of in-
terfering with the exercise of this fundamental right. In many cases,
the more minor the burden, the easier it will be to rationalize its impo-
sition as serving legitimate state interests.
In addition to suggesting that some state purposes are presump-
tively invalid, the plurality also implies that some state purposes are
presumptively valid. "Regulations designed to foster the health of a
woman seeking an abortion" 56 and regulations promoting the state's
interest in potential life by "inform[ing] the woman's free choice" 57
are of this character. These purposes are uniquely relevant to and
consistent with the Court's understanding of the nature of the right to
have an abortion itself.5 8 Accordingly, the burden created by a law
serving these purposes is not "undue" unless the actual effect of the
law is to substantially interfere with a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion.
As was true of laws allegedly serving impermissible purposes in
other contexts, there may be a connection between the effect of the
challenged law and a court's understanding of the law's purpose. The
mere recitation of a presumptively valid purpose should not be al-
lowed to mask an impermissible state goal. Thus, a law requiring a
inferred that a law serving no legitimate purpose (or a law serving an impermissible objec-
tive) imposes an unwarranted and, therefore, undue burden on the right to have an
abortion.
56. Id. at 2821.
57. Id. at 2820.
58. The Court's understanding of the nature of the right to have an abortion strongly
influences its evaluation of regulations that are alleged to burden the exercise of the right.
Thus, since the Court grounds the right to have an abortion in part on the woman's interest
in her health and bodily integrity, the right can be characterized as the woman's interest in
obtaining a safe abortion consistent with sound medical practice. Under that interpreta-
tion, abortion regulations that are designed to assure that abortions are provided by com-
petent medical personnel may be viewed as promoting the right rather that interfering with
its exercise. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975).
The plurality in Casey appears to adopt a similar position with regard to laws that are
allegedly intended to inform the woman's choice. The right to have an abortion is con-
strued to be a woman's right to make a deliberate, informed, and reflective choice about
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. See generally Brownstein & Dau, supra note
10, at 753-54 (suggesting that adequate time and information to make a careful and delib-
erate choice about abortion reinforces and protects a woman's autonomy); Ronald Dwor-
kin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. Cm. L.
RFv. 381, 408-11 (1992) (arguing that Roe does not forbid the states from encouraging
responsibility in a woman's decision). Accordingly, laws designed to further such decision
making, in a sense, support the exercise of the right and are only invalid if the means
selected to further this right enhancing objective severely limit a woman's ability to effectu-
ate her choice.
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woman considering an abortion to consult with everyone in her neigh-
borhood before making that decision could not be successfully justi-
fied as serving the purpose of informing the woman's free choice.
Such a law not only creates a substantial obstacle to exercising the
right to have an abortion; its egregious impact significantly under-
mines the state's credibility as to the law's asserted purpose.
The three substantively significant Pennsylvania provisions up-
held in Casey-the twenty-four-hour waiting period,59 the informed
consent requirement, 60 and the parental consent requirement 6 1-
were all construed to have the particularly permissible purpose of in-
forming the woman's choice, with special regard to her understanding
of the value of the potential life inside her.62 While one may disagree
with the joint opinion's evaluation of the purpose of these provi-
sions,63 and even more strenuously challenge the conclusion that these
restrictions do not create substantial obstacles to the exercise of the
59. Id. at 2825-26; see supra note 22.
60. Id. at 2822-25; see supra note 22.
61. Id. at 2832; see supra note 22.
62. See id. at 2824 (upholding informed consent provisions that ensure that a woman's
decision to have an abortion is "mature and informed" even though the information pro-
vided "expresses a [state] preference for childbirth over abortion"); id. at 2825 (arguing
that a 24-hour waiting period may reasonably result in "more informed and deliberate"
decisions on the part of women seeking abortion); id. at 2821, 2832 (holding that parental
consent requirements parallel informed consent requirements by ensuring that a woman's
decision to have an abortion is properly informed regarding the life of the unborn).
63. In contrast to the plurality's conclusion that the Pennsylvania 24-hour waiting pe-
riod and informed consent requirements were intended to inform the woman's decision,
not to hinder it, Justice Blackmun, in describing a similar Pennsylvania statute, had argued:
States and municipalities have adopted a number of measures seemingly designed
to prevent a woman, with the advice of her physician, from exercising her freedom
of choice .... The States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal
health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies ...
Close analysis of those provisions ... shows that they wholly subordinate consti-
tutional privacy interests... in an effort to deter a woman from making a decision
that ... is hers to make.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986) (emphasis added) (striking down informed consent provision as unconstitutional
interference with the woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy).
Similarly, the district court's opinion in Casey noted, "The hostility of Pennsylvania's
legislature to the protection of a woman's right of privacy to choose abortion is apparent
from the history of the legislation purporting to regulate abortion in Pennsylvania." Casey,
744 F. Supp. 1323, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1990). One may certainly argue that such a history of.
hostility suggests a legislative purpose to hinder women and prevent them from obtaining
abortions, rather than to inform women about the choices available to them in order to
assist them in making a reflective and sound decision. See Linda C. McClain, The Poverty
of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 144 n.118 (1992) ("Pennsylvania's Abortion
Control Act and similar acts have been regarded, certainly by pro-choice advocates but by
other observers as well, as attempts by opponents of legal abortion to erode abortion rights
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right to choose,64 the analysis used in the joint opinion to uphold these
regulations seems clear. The state's purpose in adopting these regula-
tions was presumptively valid, and, on the record before the Court,
the impact of the regulations was found not to be sufficiently disrup-
tive of a woman's rights to preclude the furthering of the state's objec-
tives through the means it had chosen. 65
(b) Evaluating Laws That Serve Legitimate Purposes
The plurality's invalidation of the spousal notice provision 66 is
more difficult to understand. If the spousal notice requirement was
understood to serve the purpose of informing the adult woman's
choice in the same way that the parental consent regulation was inter-
preted to inform the decision of a minor considering an abortion, it
would be impossible to reconcile the plurality's conclusions that the
spousal notice provision creates a substantial obstacle to obtaining an
abortion while the parental consent rule does not. If anything, of the
two regulations, the parental consent requirement probably creates a
more substantial obstacle to the exercise of abortion rights. Certainly,
incrementally, an alternative and complementary strategy to recriminalizing abortion
through more restrictive statutes.").
64. Justice Stevens argues in his concurrence, for example, that the "findings of the
District Court establish[ing] the severity of the burden that the 24-hour delay imposes on
many pregnant women" demonstrate that this requirement constitutes an undue burden on
the right to have an abortion. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
65. With regard to the informed consent and parental consent requirements, the plu-
rality's conclusions do not seem susceptible to further argument based on additional empir-
ical evidence. The constitutionally of informed consent provisions seems to depend far
more on the plurality's intuition regarding the relevance and propriety of the information
to be provided to women than it does on the effects that delivering such information may
produce. See id. at 2822-24. As to the parental consent provision, the plurality was well
aware from prior cases of the burden this type of requirement imposes on minor women.
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 437-44 (1990) (summarizing the district
court's findings regarding the effects of parental notification laws). The joint opinion's
terse conclusion that "we have been over most of this ground before," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2832, suggests that it is highly unlikely that the plurality would ever regard the burdens a
minor will endure in undertaking a judicial bypass procedure as undue. Presumably, the
plurality believes that the state has a uniquely legitimate purpose in ensuring that minors
have adequate information and advice before they obtain an abortion, and that the impor-
tance of this purpose makes almost any burden associated with obtaining such advice rea-
sonable and not undue.
Only the consequences of the 24-hour waiting period seem open to further analysis,
since the plurality limited its judgment on that issue to the record before it in the context of
a facial challenge. Id. at 2826.
66. Id. at 2826-31.
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its impact is at least comparable to the spousal notice requirement.67
Yet, only the spousal notice requirement is struck down as an undue
burden.
The implication of these contrasting evaluations is that the pur-
poses of the two laws are different and that this difference is what
accounts for the plurality's inapposite conclusions regarding these reg-
ulations. Whatever the Pennsylvania legislature's actual purpose
might have been in adopting the spousal notice provision, the plurality
would not accept this law as one designed to inform the woman's
choice. Indeed, any such construction of this regulation would deni-
grate the woman's status as an equal and independent individual, and
imply that she had a subordinate status in the family to that of her
husband.68 In fact, if informing the woman's choice was the only ob-
jective of the spousal notice requirement, the law would be unconsti-
tutional by virtue of the antiquated stereotypes underlying its alleged
purpose even if it had a less than egregious effect on women's rights.69
The lengthy discourse in the joint opinion on the substantial conse-
quences of the spousal notice rule would have been an unnecessary
and redundant argument.
The spousal notice requirement could not be declared unconstitu-
tional with such ease, however, because the state argued that it fur-
thered the husband's interests as well as those of his spouse. In
considering this alternative purpose, the plurality determined that the
state's goals were, in some limited sense, legitimate. The joint opinion
explicitly recognizes the husband's "'deep and proper concern and in-
67. Justice Rehnquist is justifiably perplexed when he wonders why, "while striking
down the spousal notice regulation, the joint opinion would uphold a parental consent re-
striction that certainly places very substantial obstacles in the path of a minor's abortion
choice." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Note, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv.
163, 206-10 (1992) (arguing that the Court's conclusion that spousal notification, but not
parental consent, imposes substantial obstacles is illogical).
68. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31. From the plurality's perspective, any attempt to
justify the spousal notice requirement as an attempt to inform the woman's choice must be
based on the impermissible assumption that the pregnant wife is a ward of her husband,
having the comparable status of a child in need of adult advice. The state may not ground
a constitutionally legitimate goal on such a suspect foundation.
69. An attenuated analogy might be drawn here to gender discrimination cases in
which a relatively minor, or even benign, gender classification is invalidated because it is
based on antiquated sex-role stereotypes. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that denying males entrance to a state-supported nursing
school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating federal law which paid social security benefits
to a widower only if he received at least half of his support from his deceased wife).
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terest ... in his wife's pregnancy. and in the growth and development
of the fetus she is carrying."' 70 Thus, the state's objective of protect-
ing the husband's "concern and interest" in.the fetus, while certainly
not a presumptively valid purpose, would at least seem to be a barely
permissible one. A statute is not unconstitutional solely because it
affirms a husband's interest in his wife's pregnancy.71
Accepting the furtherance of the husband's interest in the fetus as
a legitimate state interest does not conclude the constitutional evalua-
tion of the spousal notice requirement, however. As we have seen,
the state's otherwise legitimate goal of protecting potential life be-
comes impermissible if the state attempts to further this goal by delib-
erately creating substantial obstacles to block women from choosing
to have abortions. 72 Accordingly, if the state is attempting to further
the legitimate goal of protecting the husband's interest in the growth
and development of the fetus by adopting a regulatory scheme in-
tended to substantially interfere with his wife's ability to obtain an
abortion, the state's purpose would be constitutionally impermissible
and the law serving that purpose struck down.
Unfortunately, at this point in the analysis, the joint opinion
seems to. straddle two inconsistent rationales for its holding. On the
one hand, the plurality argues that any attempt by the state to require
a wife to advise her husband "before she exercises her personal
choices" is a violation of her liberty.73 The implication is that a law of
this kind would either be predicated on unconstitutional assumptions
or directed at unconstitutional goals, and would therefore be invalid
regardless of the actual degree of interference with the woman's fun-
damental rights. Spousal notification requirements relating to repro-
ductive choices are intrinsically unconstitutional under this reasoning
70. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
69 (1976)).
71. While promoting or protecting the husband's interest in the fetus his wife is carry-
ing may be a permissible state objective, the plurality makes it clear that the state cannot
use its regulatory power to further that interest at the expense of the woman's superior
privacy rights. Id. at 2830 (noting that when husband and wife disagree, view of wife
prevails). Accordingly, there will be relatively few situations in which the state could act
affirmatively to further the husband's interest. One assumes, for example, that the state
could provide information, education, and other assistance to husbands to enable them to
aid their wives in obtaining adequate prenatal care. There may also be situations in which
the wife is incapacitated and the husband's interest in the fetus becomes relevant for medi-
cal purposes. Id. at 2831.
72. Under the plurality's analysis, the state's intent in selecting the means to further
its goal is as relevant to a regulation's constitutionality as the ultimate goal itself. See supra
notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
73. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
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because of the distorted vision of family roles that such regulations
reflect.74
The problem with this argument is that it seems totally divorced
from the empirical data the plurality reviewed in determining that a
spousal notification requirement relating to abortion "will operate as
a substantial obstacle" to a woman seeking to terminate her preg-
nancy. Under this approach, again, what appears to be the factual
foundation of the plurality's review of the spousal notice provision is,
surprisingly, rendered irrelevant. If spousal notices are an inherently
irrational or illegitimate means for furthering a husband's interest in
his wife's pregnancy, nothing further needs to be said about the conse-
quences of these requirements.75
On the other hand, the plurality also seems to suggest that the
real problem with the means adopted by the state to further the hus-
band's interest in the growth and development of the fetus is the ef-
fect of the spousal notice regulation, not its purpose. The implication
is that it may be reasonable to support the husband's desire to be in-
formed about his wife's decision to terminate her pregnancy, but the
consequences of requiring this notification are unacceptable. The plu-
rality recognized that the spousal notice provision would create a sub-
stantial obstacle for many women seeking an abortion since "[f]or the
great many women who are victims of abuse inflicted by their hus-
bands, or whose children are the victims of such abuse, a spousal no-
tice requirement enables the husband to wield an effective veto over
his wife's decision.."76
This latter argument provides a more intellectually coherent
foundation for the plurality's holding since it is the only rationale that
justifies the lengthy discussion of spousal abuse in the joint opinion.
Under this approach, the spousal notice provision is understood to
serve a permissible purpose in promoting the husband's interest in the
fate of the fetus. This state objective is not one of the presumptively
valid purposes the plurality has identified, such as informing women
74. Id. (rejecting view of woman's role in the family that is "reminiscent of the com-
mon law").
75. The more general criticism of the spousal notice requirement may have been in-
tended to provide a supplementary basis for invalidating Pennsylvania's provision. Thus,
the plurality may have had overlapping concerns relating to the spousal notice require-
ment, and included all of them in the joint opinion to strengthen its overall conclusion that
the Pennsylvania provision is unconstitutional. What remains unclear, however, is whether
these more general concerns would be an adequate basis for invalidating the spousal notice
requirement if the more specific and empirical challenge relating to the provision's effect
had not been presented.
76. Id.
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about the choices available to them. But the spousal notice provision
also cannot be challenged as a deliberate attempt to hinder a woman's
decision regarding abortion. Thus, the spousal notice law is found to
have a purpose that is neither presumptively valid nor conclusively
impermissible; its purpose is merely legitimate.
A regulation in this third purpose category is only unconstitu-
tional if its effect creates a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the
right to have an abortion. In the case of the spousal notification pro-
vision, the joint opinion concluded that such an effect existed and on
that basis invalidated the regulation. The critical point here is that
both the purpose and effect of a statute are relevant in determining
whether the statute imposes an undue burden on the right to an abor-
tion. Thus, the plurality will construe a less severe impact to be an un-
due burden if the purpose of the law creating that effect is of marginal
legitimacy and importance, while a burden of greater magnitude will be
held not to be undue if it is the result of a law that serves a particularly
valid or compelling objective. Accordingly, since the objective of the
spousal notice requirement was merely legitimate, perhaps only barely
permissible, the plurality held that the effect of the law was undue and
unconstitutional. However, it would accept and uphold a similar im-
pact resulting from a regulation that furthers a presumptively valid
goal.7 7 Thus, the plurality could uphold the parental consent provi-
77. The idea that certain state purposes are presumptively valid, other state objectives
are presumptively invalid, while still other state goals are merely legitimate or permissible,
may be analogized to dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
It has long been recognized that state regulations designed to protect the public health
and safety "carry a strong presumption of validity." Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520, 524 (1959); see also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 442-46
(1978) (noting that courts have long been deferential to state highway safety regulations).
The presumption, however, is rebuttable; it can be overcome by a sufficiently strong show-
ing that the law at issue unduly burdens interstate commerce. Thus, in Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), Justice Powell, writing for a four-justice
plurality, explained that "the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or
safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack. Regulations designed
for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the purpose so marginally, and interfere
with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 670.
While other state interests may be legitimate in the sense that they are not donstitu-
tionally impermissible, the Court extends less deference to regulations intended to further
such merely permissible goals. In these circumstances, the Court is more willing to balance
the resulting burdens on interstate commerce against the derived benefits and strike down
the law. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the "height-
ened degree of deference" extended to safety regulations in comparison to the Court's
willingness "to balance asserted burdens against intended benefits" in other regulatory ar-
eas); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 143-46 (1970) (holding that the state's pur-
pose of protecting the reputation of its cantaloupe growers is too insubstantial to justify the
burden on interstate commerce created by the challenged regulation).
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sion while striking down the spousal notice provision, despite the com-
parable burdens imposed by each law, because it attaches special
value to the goal underlying the former regulation.78
The above model of fundamental rights review is both compli-
cated and indeterminate. It requires a threshold inquiry as to both
means and ends into the state's purpose in adopting a challenged law,
and then, depending on the nature of the state's purpose, an evalua-
tion of the impact of the law to see if it constitutes an "undue burden."
The complexity of this model cannot be blamed on the authors of the
joint opinion, however, if the "undue burden" standard they utilize in
Casey accurately describes how the Court has been operating in decid-
ing fundamental rights cases, or at least is substantively analogous to
some accepted method of review. Determining if that is the case is
the task of the second Part of this Article.
Finally, the Court recognizes that regulations serving a protectionist motive are pre-
sumptively invalid. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't
of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1989) (explaining the decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), to strike down a state tax exemption because it "was motivated
by an intent to confer a benefit upon local industry not granted to out-of-state industry");
see also Kassel, 450 U.S. at 685-87 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that if the actual pur-
pose of state regulation is protectionist in nature, the regulation is unconstitutional and
must be struck down).
The reasoning and the objectives of dormant Commerce Clause cases do not relate
directly to the burdening of fundamental rights, and, in that sense, these decisions do not
provide a precedential foundation for the joint opinion's analysis in Casey. The approach
used by the Court to resolve dormant Commerce Clause issues helps to explain the plural-
ity's opinion, however, by demonstrating in at least one context how the Court distin-
guishes among various state purposes in evaluating the effect of challenged regulations.
78. Similar reasoning can be used to explain the apparent discrepancy between the
plurality's evaluation of the burden created by the 24-hour waiting period and the burden
created by the spousal notice requirement. Justice Rehnquist, for example challenged the
plurality's willingness to uphold the 24-hour waiting period, despite the "particular bur-
den" it imposed on certain women, while at the same time striking down the spousal notice
requirement on the grounds that a significant "fraction" of women affected by the law
would be substantially burdened. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
The plurality's decision with regard to these two provisions may depend more on the
Justices' evaluation of the purposes of the two regulations than on the provisions' effects.
Thus, because the 24-hour waiting period furthers the presumptively valid objective of in-
forming the woman's choice, the plurality will insist on particularly strong evidence of in-
terference with a woman's ability to obtain an abortion before it will hold that this
regulation constitutes an undue burden. By contrast, because the spousal notice require-
ment serves a marginally permissible goal, the plurality will be less tolerant of burdens
imposed on the right to have an abortion in furtherance of that objective.
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H. What Constitutes an Infringement
of a Fundamental Right?
The Constitution is not silent on the issue of infringement. There
is textual language regarding enumerated rights that, in theory, might
contribute to our understanding of the kinds of burdens on rights that
courts must take seriously. Thus, in literal terms, freedom of speech is
protected against abridgement, the free exercise of religion is shielded
against prohibitions, religious freedom and equality are protected
against state establishments, property cannot be taken without the
payment of just compensation, and contract obligations cannot be im-
paired.79 One may argue that each of these terms has independent
meaning that controls the review of laws that are challenged as violat-
ing specific constitutional guarantees. In fact, however, this textual
language is rarely dispositive for enumerated rights, and there are, of
course, no textual references to consider with regard to the infringe-
ment of non-enumerated rights. Instead, the Court, without regard to
the terms of the text itself, has developed implicit or explicit
frameworks for determining how the power of judicial review should
be applied to laws that allegedly burden particular rights.
It is clear that in determining whether a right has been infringed,
the Court examines the purpose and the effect of the challenged regu-
lation or administrative action.80 A constitutionally cognizable in-
fringement may be defined in terms of effect or purpose alone, or it
may be identified less clearly on the basis of some combination of
purpose and effect. While the process of defining infringements in
terms of these factors often appears to be ad hoc, it is not entirely
without pattern or principle.
As the next Subparts demonstrate, the Court's fundamental
rights jurisprudence utilizes at least three different frameworks in ap-
plying some form of an undue burden standard. The first, and sim-
plest, approach concentrates exclusively on the effect of state action.
Under this framework, the Court applies a two-tier standard of re-
view: strict scrutiny, if the burden on the right is found to be substan-
tial, or minimum rationality review, if the resulting burden is of some
lesser degree of severity. The second framework-the one that is
most similar to the standard adopted by the Casey plurality-evalu-
79. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses);
amend. V (Takings Clause); art. I, § 10 (Contract Clause).
80. See infra notes 82-353 and accompanying text; see also Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit




ates both the effect and the purpose of challenged laws. This infringe-
ment model adds a third, intermediate level of review, typically an ad
hoc balancing test, to the more inflexible strict scrutiny and minimum
rationality standards of review of the first framework. The third
framework-which might be more accurately described as a corollary
or subset of the first two models-is needed to explain those cases in
which the burden on the exercise of a right is minimal, but the chal-
lenged regulation is nonetheless struck down. As will be seen, the
primary reason for the invalidation of these minimally burdensome
laws is that they are identified as serving impermissible state
purposes. 81
A. The Substantial Effect Threshold-The Basic Two-Tier Model
The most basic framework for identifying infringements focuses
solely on the effect of state action. Under this approach, the Court
restricts its evaluation of effect to two possible conclusions. Either the
burden on the right is sufficiently severe or substantial to warrant
close scrutiny, or it is not, and the challenged state action receives
only minimum rationality review.
Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's dissents in Casey interpret
the "undue burden" standard of the joint opinion to be an effects test
of this kind and argue that, as such, it is without precedential sup-
port.82 The dissents are in error on both counts. As explained previ-
ously, the "undue burden" test represents a more complex standard
that requires consideration of purpose as well as effect in determining
whether the right to have an abortion is infringed.83 Moreover, even a
simple undue burden test directed solely at the severity of the burden
on the right has significant precedential support in the case law. Even
a cursory survey of Supreme Court case law examining such diverse
areas as the right to marry, the right of political association, property
rights, the free exercise of religion, freedom from the establishment of
religion, and procedural due process demonstrates that the Court has
81. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINoS L.J. 711 (1994).
82. Neither Rehnquist nor Scalia explicitly state that they interpret the undue burden
standard to be an effects test. However, that inference may be drawn from the language
employed by both Justices in criticizing the undue burden standard. See Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2876-80 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). To be fair, the inferences can be more confi-
dently drawn from Scalia's opinion, but neither Justice gives any indication that he consid-
ers the purpose of a law to be an important consideration in identifying an undue burden.
83. See supra notes 44-78 and accompanying text.
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frequently employed a basic undue burden analysis to evaluate laws
alleged to abridge a wide range of constitutionally protected interests.
(1) The Right to Marry
In Zablocki v. Redhail,s4 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a
Wisconsin law that prevented any "resident having minor issue not in
his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court
order or judgment" from marrying without court approval.8 5 A state
court order permitting the marriage could not be issued unless the
court affirmed that the prospective bride or groom had been meeting
the requisite support obligation and that the children in question
would not become public charges.86 Justice Marshall's majority opin-
ion invalidating this marital condition explicitly adopted a substantial
obstacle approach to justify the application of strict scrutiny to the
challenged law. Marshall reasoned that not "every state regulation
which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for mar-
riage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny;" s only those that "inter-
fere directly and substantially with the right to marry" would be
strictly reviewed.88
Zablocki is a particularly important precedent for the Casey plu-
rality's "undue burden" test for two reasons. First, there is no ques-
tion that the majority opinion adopted a substantial burden threshold
in this case. If the language in the majority opinion was not clear
enough, Justice Powell's concurrence criticizes the majority for predi-
cating the appropriate level of review (strict scrutiny or mere reasona-
bleness) on whether a regulation "substantially" or "significantly"
interferes with the exercise of the right.8 9 An analytic model debated
in fundamental rights case law in 1978 can hardly be fairly criticized as
being invented out of whole cloth in 1992.
Second, Zablocki clearly focuses on the magnitude of the burden,
not on its allegedly indirect or incidental nature. As Justice Powell
noted with concern, most regulations of marriage "are direct in nature
and operate as barriers to the exercise of the right." 90 Thus, the criti-
cal variable of the Zablocki test will necessarily be the degree of inter-
ference created by the challenged law.
84. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
85. Id at 375.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 386.
88. Id. at 387.
89. Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 397.
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This latter point is confirmed by the way the Zablocki majority
distinguished Califano v. Jobst,91 an earlier case in which the Court
used a minimum rationality standard of review to uphold a provision
of the Social Security Act that cut off a dependent disabled person's
benefits if he married someone not separately entitled to benefits
under the Act.92 Clearly, a law eliminating benefits to which a person
would otherwise be entitled upon their marriage directly burdens the
exercise of the right to marry. 93 The only reason for the more rigor-
ous scrutiny applied in Zablocki is the fact that the burden on the
right to marry in that case was more severe than it was in Califano.
(2) Rights of Political Participation
a. Anti-Raiding Primary Voting Requirements
In Rosario v. Rockefeller94 and Kusper v. Pontikes,95 the Court
evaluated regulations on primary elections intended to prevent the
members of one party from cross-registering and voting in the primary
of the opposing party. These rules served the constitutionally permis-
sible goal of preventing members of one party from unfairly influenc-
91. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
92. Id. at 54-58. The majority in Zablocki explained, "The directness and substantial-
ity of the interference with the freedom to marry distinguish the instant case from Califano
v. Jobst." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12. The discussion that follows this statement dem-
onstrates that substantiality was the critical factor. In Jobst, the couple intending to marry
risked the loss of $20 per month in federal benefits, a consequence that had not "signifi-
cantly discouraged, let alone made 'practically impossible' any marriages." Id.
93. Although the terms "direct" and "indirect" are imprecise, their meaning cannot
be extended without limit. Most typically, an indirect effect is an attenuated result, one
that occurs after intervening events as opposed to a more immediate consequence. Proba-
bly the best definition the Court has given this concept is stated in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), a decision that had nothing to do with the burdening of funda-
mental rights. In discussing the permissible scope of federal power under the Commerce
Clause in Carter Coal, the Court explained, "The word 'direct' implies that the activity or
condition invoked or blamed shall operate proximately-not mediately, remotely or collat-
erally-to produce the effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or
condition. And the extent of the effect bears no logical relation to its character." Id. at
307-08.
In any case, it seems clear that denying a person a benefit she would otherwise be
entitled to because she exercises a constitutional right imposes a direct burden on the exer-
cise of the right. Thus, if a pregnant woman who is eligible for welfare is told that she will
be denied future welfare payments if she elects to have an abortion, the woman's right to
have an abortion is directly burdened. Similarly, if a welfare recipient is told that her
benefits will be eliminated if she registers to vote, the woman's right to vote is directly
burdened. The right to marry is also directly burdened, but far less severely, in Califano.
94. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
95. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
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ing the candidate selection process of their political opponents.96 In
Rosario, the Court upheld a New York law that required voters to
register in the party of their choice thirty days prior to a general elec-
tion in order to vote in the subsequent primary election. In practical
terms, this rule forced potential primary voters to declare their alle-
giance to a party some eight to eleven months before the primary
election, a period during which they were effectively locked into that
choice.97
The majority opinion in Rosario implicitly applied a deferential
standard of review to this anti-raiding law on the theory that the state
was not denying the franchise to anyone, but merely limiting the time
period during which political party associational choices might be
made.98 Justice Powell and three other Justices dissented from this
characterization of the impact of the New York law, however. They
argued that forcing individuals to defer their associational choices for
a time period of almost a year was a "facially burdensome require-
ment" that constituted a substantial restriction on the right to vote.99
Accordingly, strict scrutiny, not deferential review, of the primary reg-
ulation was appropriate.1°°
Any doubt that the majority in Rosario had utilized something
like an "undue burden" type of analysis in reaching its decision is
eliminated by the Court's subsequent opinion in Kusper. At issue was
an Illinois statute that prevented an individual from voting in. the pri-
mary of one political party if she had voted in the primary of any
other party within the proceeding 23-month period.101 The Court
struck down the Illinois law'under strict scrutiny, distinguishing Rosa-
rio in the process. The New York scheme, it explained, did not pre-
vent voters from exercising their constitutional freedom to associate
with the political party of their choice as severely as the Illinois system
did.'0 2
Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in both Rosario
and Kusper, conceded that "administration of the electoral process is
96. See Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760-62 (explaining that registration and party enrollment
time limitations serve the "particularized legitimate purpose" of inhibiting "party
raiding").
97. Id. at 753-54, 760. The majority argued that the New York law did not "lock" a
voter into his party affiliation from one yearly primary to the next, tacitly recognizing that
the voter was locked into his party affiliation for at least an eight month period. Id. at 759.
98. Id. at 757-58, 761-62.
99. Id. at 763-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 767-68.
101. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 52.
102. Id. at 59-61.
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a matter that the Constitution largely entrusts to the States."'103 He
also recognized, however, that "unduly restrictive state election laws
may so impinge upon freedom of association as to run afoul of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments."'104 Statutes challenged in prior
freedom of association cases, such as Bates v. Little Rock'0 5 and
NAACP v. Alabama, 06 had been found to involve a "substantial re-
straint" on and "significant interference" with the right to freedom of
association.10 7 According to Stewart, the Illinois law in Kusper consti-
tuted just such a substantial restriction on protected activity, while the
New York law upheld in Rosario did not.
The dissenting justices in Kusper, who argued that the election
laws before the court, like those in Rosario, should be upheld, echoed
Justice Stewart's analytic approach, although they disagreed with his
conclusion. The dissenters opposed the application of strict scrutiny
to the Illinois law because they did not understand it to impose an
undue or substantial burden on associational freedom or the right to
vote. To Justice Blackmun, the burden on the petitioner was no more
than a "meager restraint," 08 a "limited statutory restriction"'0 9 that
"lightly brushes upon the right to vote and the right of association."'"1
In prior cases, "[t]he level of intrusion was markedly significant,"
while here, "the intrusion is so minor" that it does not merit denying
the states the discretion they need to police the electoral process."'
b. Ballot Access
The first ballot access case, Williams v. Rhodes,112 involved a
challenge to various election statutes in Ohio that made it "virtually
impossible" for a new political party to get on the presidential bal-
103. Id. at 57.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
106. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
107. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58.
108. Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 62.
110. Id.
111. Id. Justice Rehnquist also wrote a dissent suggesting, at least implicitly, that anti-
raiding restrictions of this kind should be reviewed under a more deferential standard of
review than strict scrutiny. Rehnquist noted that the impact of the laws at issue in Rosario
and Kusper were largely indistinguishable, that both laws "restrict voters' freedom to asso-
ciate with the political party of their choice," and that there was only an imperfect fit
between the laws' requirements and their objective. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
Given these acknowledgments, Rehnquist's conclusion that both laws should be upheld
can only be based on the application of a deferential standard of review.
112. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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lot.1 3 Although the majority recognized that Ohio's election frame-
work interfered with two overlapping fundamental rights, political
association and the right to vote,"14 Williams was decided on equal
protection grounds. Since Ohio permitted the established parties to
obtain their ballot positions under far less onerous restrictions than
the state imposed on a new party, the Court considered the state's
electoral scheme to be invidiously discriminatory. 115 Accordingly, it
was reviewed under strict scrutiny and struck down."16
Although it adopted an equal protection analysis in Williams, the
Court emphasized the "heavy burden" 1 7 and "crippling impact""18 of
Ohio's regulations in justifying the application of strict scrutiny to the
state's election laws. The use of this terminology strongly suggested
that less severe restrictions on ballot access would receive more leni-
ent review. That expectation was realized three years later in Jenness
v. Fortson."9
In Jenness, the Court upheld Georgia's requirement that a candi-
date for office may only appear on the ballot if she either wins a party
primary or obtains supporting signatures equal in number to five per-
cent of the votes cast in the last general election for that office. 20
Although the Court did mention that Georgia's law served an impor-
tant state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of support
before a candidate would be placed on the ballot, the majority opinion
focused on the effect of the law. Georgia's regulations were far less
burdensome than the "suffocating restrictions" condemned in Wil-
liams.'2' Accordingly, they did not violate constitutional
guarantees.122
This emphasis on the impact of electoral regulations was repeated
in Bullock v. Carter,-3 a case in which the Texas system of financing
certain primary elections through the imposition of substantial filing
fees on candidates was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.124
The Court explained that not every burden on or barrier to a potential
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id. at 30.
115. Id. at 34.
116. Id. at 31.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 33.
119. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. at 438.
122. Id. at 438-40.
123. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
124. Id. at 149.
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candidate's access to the ballot would receive strict scrutiny. In some
cases, rational basis review would be appropriate. 125 To determine the
correct level of scrutiny in a particular case, the Court must carefully
examine "the extent and nature of [the challenged regulation's] im-
pact on voters."'1 26 In Bullock, the burden on lower income voters was
found to be not only substantial, but exclusionary in that a class of
office seekers for all practical purposes was denied access to the bal-
lot. Further, the impact of the law fell unequally on the poor. Ac-
cordingly, the fee system received strict scrutiny and was struck
down.127
While these ballot access cases do not explicitly use "undue bur-
den" terminology in their reasoning, there can be little question that
they utilize a two-tier effects test. The equal protection focus of the
decisions requires the Court to evaluate the relative impact of the
challenged laws as well as the degree to which the laws directly impair
voting and associational rights. Nevertheless, the Court's primary
concern is resolving whether the extent of the burden imposed on the
disadvantaged group requires strict scrutiny review. This analysis
would ultimately prove to be inadequate, and a different doctrinal ap-
proach to ballot access issues was adopted in more recent cases. 28 As
a matter of historical record, however, these early cases extend the
precedential foundation for applying an undue burden standard to
laws abridging fundamental rights.
(3) Free Exercise Rights
The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith, 29 as noted previously, limited the
application of the Free Exercise Clause to those laws that single out
and suppress religious practices. 3 Prior to this recent and radical
transformation of free exercise rights, however, the Court recognized
that facially neutral laws of general applicability might also violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty. Indeed, in these earlier
cases, the Court used an undue burden standard of sorts to review
general laws that incidentally interfered with religious practices to de-
termine whether these laws should receive close scrutiny.
125. Id. at 142-43.
126. Id. at 143.
127. Id. at 143-44.
128. See infra notes 198-228 and accompanying text.
129. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
130. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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Wisconsin v. Yoder' 31 is a particularly strong illustration of the
pre-Smith Court's implicit commitment to an undue burden threshold
requirement in the free exercise area. In defending the right of Amish
parents to challenge a state law requiring them to send their children
to public high school, Chief Justice Burger's lengthy opinion repeat-
edly emphasizes the magnitude of the burden that compulsory high
school education laws imposed on the Amish faith.132 What was at
stake, according to the Court, was the total undermining of the Amish
way of life and the religious beliefs on which it was based.133 Only in
such sensitive circumstances would courts be justified in intruding into
a state's educational prerogatives in defense of the religious exemp-
tions sought by one group of parents and children. 34
Sherbert v. Verner, 35 another seminal free exercise case that was
distinguished but not overruled in Smith, may also be characterized as
supporting an undue burden approach although it does so far less di-
rectly than Yoder. In Verner, South Carolina refused to provide un-
employment compensation benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who
could not find work because she was unwilling to work on Saturday,
her sabbath. The Court held this denial of benefits was unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that petitioner could not be forced to choose
between abandoning benefits to which she would otherwise be enti-
tled and obedience to the obligations of her faith.136
Although the majority opinion does not explicitly raise the issue,
the magnitude of the temptation created by the threatened loss of un-
employment benefits must be relevant to the Court's decision in Ver-
ner. There are simply too many governmental activities and decisions
that incidentally encourage individuals to violate the sanctity of their
sabbath or some other religious obligation for all such conflicts to be
reviewed under strict scrutiny. Surely it is not always unconstitutional
for the state to offer double time pay or other incentives to all em-
ployees including Christians who work on Sunday, or to schedule a
popular public school program on a day that is a religious holiday for
children of a minority faith. If the holding in Verner is to provide a
manageable rule, courts must recognize that not every struggle be-
131. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder was distinguished but not overruled by Smith. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
132. Id. at 209-13.
133. Id. at 211-13, 218-19.
134. Id. at 235.
135. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
136. Id. at 403-06.
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tween religious conscience and material benefit or convenience is suf-
ficiently burdensome to warrant rigorous constitutional review. 137
Other, more recent cases also provide support for the proposition
that the Court utilized an undue burden threshold requirement in the
free exercise area prior to its decision in Smith. In Hernandez v. Com-
missioner, 38 for example, the Court described its general approach to
freedom of religion claims by explaining, "The free exercise inquiry
asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the ob-
servation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the burden."'1 39 Similarly,
in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 40 the Court
held that subjecting the distribution of religious materials by the peti-
tioner to generally applicable sales and use taxes would not ordinarily
violate free exercise principles.' 4 ' Under the facts of the case, the re-
sulting burden on petitioner of having less money available to support
its religious activities was not constitutionally significant. 142 However,
the Court also noted that "a more onerous tax rate ... might effec-
tively choke off an adherent's religious practices," and would presum-
ably raise a different and, perhaps, more difficult constitutional
question.143
137. Verner implicitly utilizes an undue burden standard in another way. The doctrinal
principle that strict scrutiny applies whenever the availability of a benefit is conditioned on
the recipient's willingness to forbear from engaging in constitutionally protected activity is
not enforced uniformly for all fundamental rights. If an individual declined employment
because it interfered with the novel they were writing or conflicted with the political cam-
paign they were engaged in, and a state, accordingly, denied them unemployment compen-
sation benefits, it is difficult to believe that the state's decision would be invalidated as
unconstitutional. See Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres:
The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 132 (1990). But certainly, forcing a political activist to choose between
losing benefits or not engaging in free expression in the context in which it may count the
most, a pre-election political campaign, coerces her forbearance from engaging in pro-
tected activity in the same way that Mrs. Sherbert was coerced. Thus, Verner implicitly
demonstrates that what constitutes a sufficient burden to invoke strict scrutiny vis-A-vis one
right will not invoke serious review when some other right is similarly affected. The Court
must be making a judgment on a right by right basis as to the nature and extent of the
burdens it recognizes as substantial or undue.
138. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
139. Id. at 699.
140. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
141. Id. at 389-90.
142. Id. at 390-91.
143. Id. at 392. The Court expressed no view on this issue, since there was no evidence
that the tax under review was so high that it would destroy the petitioner.
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(4) Establishment Clause Rights-Primary Effects and Entanglements
There may be some debate about whether the Establishment
Clause involves the protection of a fundamental right in the tradi-
tional sense. The right has amorphous content and might be loosely
defined as a right against the state promoting religion in unacceptable
ways. While the form of this right may be atypical, however, courts do
recognize the standing of individuals to challenge Establishment
Clause violations. Thus, some personal interest exists that the Estab-
lishment Clause shields from injury.144 Certainly, in specific situa-
tions, the right becomes more concrete. For example, the
Establishment Clause protects a taxpayer's interest in not having tax
revenues expended to subsidize religious institutions' 45 and the inter-
est of a member of a minority religion in not suffering the stigmatic
consequences or implicit coercion that result from the state's endorse-
ment of the majority faith. 46
Equally problematic for our inquiry, the Court does not apply a
traditional fundamental rights standard of review in Establishment
Clause cases. Neither strict scrutiny nor a deferential rational basis
standard is utilized; nor does ad hoe balancing occur. Instead, the
Court commonly applies a complex three-pronged standard, referred
to as the Lemon test, the failure of any element of which is a sufficient
basis for declaring a law unconstitutional without any opportunity for
the state to justify its transgression. 47 However, two of the compo-
144. The Court is not always explicit in describing the nature of the injury that gives
the plaintiff standing to raise an establishment clause claim. See, e.g., County of Allegheny
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (containing no discussion of plaintiff's
standing to challenge city's display of religious symbols). The injury on which plaintiff's
claims are grounded, however, can usually be inferred from the Court's analysis. See infra
note 151.
145. See, e.g., Fast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968).
146. See generally Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The actual situation in Weis-
man is slightly different than the statement in the text since the plaintiffs in that case ob-
jected to the generic event of a state-sponsored prayer at a high school graduation, without
regard to the specific religion involved in the invocation and benediction or the faiths held
by students and parents in the audience. Also, according to the majority, "[tihe injury
caused by the government's action" resulted from the plaintiff's being "required [to partici-
pate] in a religious exercise." Id. at 2659.
147. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),.the Court summarized the criteria
used in prior cases to review statutes alleged to violate the Establishment Clause. "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;... finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (citation omitted)). The Court has frequently
departed from the Lemon test in particular cases and various Justices have criticized its
continued application. See Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
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nent elements of the Lemon test identify Establishment Clause viola-
tions primarily by examining the effects of state action. In that sense,
Lemon seems to fit within the two-tier effects test model.
The Lemon test provides in part that laws which have the primary
effect of advancing religion are unconstitutional. 148 In attributing
meaning to "primary effect," the Court has directed its attention to
particular consequences that it views as constitutionally problematic.
Specifically, if the effect of state action is understood to involve the
endorsement of a religious faith or the coercion of individuals into
participating in religious practices, the state's action is
unconstitutional. 49
What constitutes coercion or endorsement, however, is a matter
of degree. Not all symbolic promotions of religion are constitutionally
unacceptable endorsements, for example, since the sectarian message
communicated by a religious display can often be diluted by the con-
text in which it appears. 50 Thus, it does not stretch Establishment
Clause doctrine unreasonably to recognize a basic symmetry with the
"undue burden" standard. When the Court concludes that a particu-
lar promotion of religion has a sufficiently coercive or endorsing effect
that it must be struck down, the Court can be understood as saying
that the offending law "unduly burdens" the individual interests the
Establishment Clause protects.151
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993), in which he referred to the
Lemon test as a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried." Notwithstanding Scalia's con-
tention, six Justices joined the majority opinion in Lamb's Chapel, which both employs the
Lemon test and includes a footnote explicitly noting that Lemon has not been overruled.
Id. at 2148 n.7.
148. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (holding that state aid to religious schools has the primary effect of advancing
religion).
149. See, e.g., Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655-61; County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-97.
150. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Thus, in County of Allegheny, Justice Blackmun determined that the display of a
creche in a county courthouse communicated a message of religious endorsement that the
state "supports and promotes the Christian praise to God that is the cr~che's religious
message." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600. The continued display of the creche was
prohibited, since government promotion of religious symbols producing such an effect was
held to violate the Establishment Clause. Conversely, however, Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that the state's display of a Christmas tree and Chanukah Menorah, along with an
explanatory sign saluting liberty, communicated a more diffuse and secular message that
was unlikely to be perceived as an endorsement of any faith or combination of faiths. Id.
at 612-21. Thus, the display of these symbols did not violate Establishment Clause princi-
ples and was permitted to continue.
Obviously, however, by evaluating the extent to which the government promotion of a
display relating to religion "endorses" a religious faith, the Court is, at the same time,
[Vol. 45
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Another prong of the Lemon test requires the invalidation of
laws that foster an "excessive entanglement" between church and
state. 152 The focus here is on whether government aid to religious
institutions will require unacceptably intrusive monitoring of the re-
cipient to determine that public funds are not being used to promote
sectarian religious goals. 153 This prong of Establishment Clause doc-
trine explicitly distinguishes "routine regulatory interactions" between
the government and religious entities,154 which raise no constitutional
difficulty, from "'detailed monitoring and close administrative con-
tact' between the state and religious bodies, which is constitutionally
problematic. 55 Only those subsidy or regulatory arrangements in
which government monitoring would "intrude unduly in the day-to-
day operation of the religiously affiliated... grantees" are prohibited
entanglements. 5 6
(5) Takings, Contract Impairments, and Deprivations Without Procedural
Due Process
Certain constitutional guarantees, including the Takings Clause,
the Contract Clause, and the procedural component of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, 57 protect interests that escape easy classification. These
interests may receive only intermittent protection, or they may receive
determining that the state is communicating a message of disapproval to non-adherents "of
their individual religious choices." Id. at 597 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
390 (1985)). It is this message of disapproval that constitutes the harm or burden that a
plaintiff bringing an Establishment Clause claim to court is seeking to avoid. Similarly, it
should be clear that a burden of this kind and magnitude, that is, a burden of constitutional
significance, will not be found each time that a government activity might suggest support
or approval of religious beliefs. Rather, the Court must review "a series of... fact patterns
that fall along the spectrum of government references to religion" in order to determine
when the burden is sufficiently likely and sufficiently severe to require judicial interven-
tion. ML at 607.
The intensity of Justice Kennedy's concurring and dissenting opinion in County of
Allegheny, id. at 655-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting), demonstrates that there
is serious disagreement on the Court on the question of when the government's display of
religious symbols should be considered unduly burdensome to non-adherents of the faith
being celebrated. Even under Kennedy's analysis, however, a range of burdens is recog-
nized that at some point becomes sufficiently substantial that they must be rejected as
unconstitutional. See id. at 659-63.
152. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982).
153. See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408-14.
154. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989).
155. Id. at 697 (quoting Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414).
156. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988).
157. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (Takings Clause); art. I, § 10 (Contract Clause); amend.
XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause).
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only procedural safeguards. While they may be described using
"rights" terminology, they can be conceptually distinguished from the
kinds of fundamental rights previously discussed. Still, these are con-
stitutionally recognized interests, and as such, the way the burdening
of these interests is defined is relevant to an examination of the al-
leged artificiality of the "undue burden" standard. While one must be
careful not to overstate the case, the Casey plurality receives some
support from the fact that the Court uses some form of a two-tier
effects test to at least some extent in protecting all of these interests.
In the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence, if the challenged
state action involves a regulatory limitation on the use that an owner
may make of her property, what is referred to as a regulatory taking, a
pure effects test is applied. 158 A taking only occurs if the regulation
goes "too far" in limiting the owners interests.159 Thus, to receive just
compensation under current case authority, the owner must demon-
strate that she has been denied "all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use" of her land.160 In brief, she receives a constitutional remedy
only by establishing that her property has been so unduly burdened
that it is rendered valueless.161
158. The Court also evaluates the "character" of the state's action as well as the sever-
ity of its impact in adjudicating Takings Clause claims. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). If property is physically invaded, appropriated, or
destroyed, the Court routinely determines that a taking has occurred and just compensa-
tion is due. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-
27 (1982); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871). This qualitative
analysis is also a form of effects test, although it is distinct from the quantitative effects test
described in the text, since the purpose of the state's action in invading property is largely
irrelevant to the Court's determination that the property has been taken. See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (stating that permanent inva-
sion constitutes a taking "no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it").
159. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922).
160. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94.
161. The Court has noted on occasion that a land use ordinance will be held to be a
taking if law does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). This standard is rarely applied in takings cases, how-
ever, and even when it is applied, the Court defers to the legislature's determination that a
legitimate state interest is advanced by the challenged law. See id. at 260 (upholding with-
out serious discussion a regulation limiting owner to the construction of one to five houses
on a five acre parcel on the grounds that the restriction serves the legitimate purpose of
protecting the community from the ill effects of "urbanization"); see generally Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (holding that Fifth Amendment re-
quirement that property may only be taken for a public use is satisfied if taking is "ration-
ally related to a conceivable public purpose").
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The constitutional prohibition against the impairment of private
contracts, the Contract Clause, is rarely enforced today.162 As with
the Takings Clause, however, an effects test determines the existence
of a Contract Clause violation and the availability of a remedy. "Min-
imal alteration of contractual obligations" will be routinely upheld. 63
"Severe impairment[s],"' 64 however, particularly "severe disruption of
contractual expectations,"' 65 will require "a careful examination of
the nature and purpose of state legislation" if the challenged statute is
to be upheld. 66 Again, only unduly burdened contract rights invoke
serious constitutional attention.
There is also a strong historical foundation for looking to the im-
pact of government action on an individual as the critical factor in
determining whether procedural due process protection applies to an
alleged deprivation of liberty or property. However, the current state
of the law is equivocal at best on this point. For the last twenty years,
most procedural due process cases have turned on the nature, not the
magnitude, of the individual's injury.' 67 Only deprivations of those
162. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). The Court has expressed greater
willingness to review and restrict the impairment of contracts between private parties and
public entities. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The distinc-
tion is not germane to the purposes of this Article, however.
163. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).
164. Id. at 245.
165. Id. at 247.
166. Id. at 245.
167. In earlier cases, the Court typically considered both the nature and the weight of
the interest at issue in determining whether due process requirements applied to govern-
ment action, but the emphasis seemed to be on the degree of harm suffered by the claim-
ant. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (stating that immutable
principle of American jurisprudence requires due process "where governmental action se-
riously injures an individual"); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-65 (1970)
(holding that a "crucial factor" in requiring a hearing before welfare recipient can be de-
nied benefits is that the loss of welfare may leave the individual in a "desperate" situation
lacking the "means by which to live"). The Court appeared to revise that priority in order
to expand the scope of procedural due process protection in cases such as Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972). Thus, the limited value of the consumer goods being
repossessed in that case did not justify the denial to a debtor of a due process hearing
before the goods in his possession were reclaimed by creditors. The consumer goods were
still "property," and their deprivation, however modest the injury might be, invoked due
process.
In subsequent cases, however, the Court shifted direction and used this same principle
to deny hearings to aggrieved individuals. The Court argued that it could ignore the weight
of the claimant's interest and the severity of his loss on the grounds that the nature of the
deprivation did not involve a loss of "liberty" or "property." The case of Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976), in which the Court held that stigmatizing an individual by publicizing false
accusations of criminal activity about him did not constitute a deprivation of "liberty" or
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interests recognized to be "liberty" or "property" under a narrow and
formalistic interpretation of these terms invoke constitutionally man-
dated process requirements. 168
Prior to the mid-1970s, however, the Court understood due pro-
cess to have a different, more elusive meaning. Under the old rule,
the magnitude of the individual's alleged deprivation seemed to play a
more commanding role in the Court's decision as to what process if
any might be due. Justice Frankfurter described this operating princi-
ple as "the right to be heard -before being condemned to suffer griev-
ous loss of any kind,"'1 69 and this "grievous loss" standard was
regularly applied in the case law.170 Identifying a grievous loss, of
course, required a determination that the individual's interests were
being substantially burdened by the state.
B. The Tempering of Significant Effects and Non-Invidious Purposes-
The Three-lier Model
It is tempting to conclude from the prior discussion that in the
battle of precedent between the Casey plurality and its critics, the plu-
rality's position is substantially vindicated. To coin a phrase, it seems
as though the only thing "manufactured out of whole cloth" in the
various Casey opinions is the exaggerated rhetoric of Justice Rehn-
quist's and Justice Scalia's comments. That temptation must be re-
sisted, at least temporarily, however. While the use of a two-tier
effects test in prior cases demonstrates that an "undue burden" ap-
proach to defining the infringement of constitutionally protected in-
terests is neither new nor artificial, that precedent does not establish
that the version of an undue burden test adopted by the joint opinion
is supported by significant authority. The joint opinion's standard, as
explained previously, involves a complex inquiry directed at both pur-
pose and effect, not a straightforward evaluation of the magnitude of
"property" for due process purposes, probably represents the most dramatic use of this
doctrine to limit procedural due process protection. See sources cited infra note 168.
168. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTTurIONAL LAW 694-704 (2d ed.
1988); Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 86-105 (1976).
169. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
170. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
263; see also TRIBE, supra note 168, at 678-79. The Court will occasionally employ the
grievous loss standard to invoke procedural due process protection in contemporary cases.
See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (holding that involuntary transfer of
prison inmate to mental hospital constitutes grievous loss of liberty requiring procedural
due process safeguards).
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a burden. It remains to be seen whether this more intricate model is
grounded in precedent.
An undue burden standard that evaluates both the purpose and
effect of challenged regulations has support in the case law, but it re-
flects a three-tier model of analysis. Unlike the prior model, this ap-
proach provides for an additional level of scrutiny. In addition to
strict scrutiny and minimum rationality review, there is an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny that usually involves some form of balancing test.
In theory, the Court could elect to utilize a three-tier model of
this kind while continuing to focus exclusively on the effects of state
action. Laws imposing de minimis burdens would receive minimum
rationality review, regulations resulting in a more substantial impact
would be reviewed under an ad hoc balancing test, and strict scrutiny
would be reserved for egregious restrictions such as total prohibitions
on the exercise of a right. 171 But judicial opinions reflect a different
pattern in which the purpose of the cha*lenged law seems to play an
essential role in determining the standard of review to be applied.
While the Court is not always clear or forthright in explaining how the
purpose of a challenged regulation relates to the determination that a
middle-tier balancing test should be utilized, two basic approaches are
suggested by the case law.
(1) Significant Effects in the Context of Regulatory Legitimacy
The first approach is grounded on the premise that the glaring
need for some governmental response to a problem, combined with
the prudent and reasonable regulatory option that the state chooses to
resolve its legitimate concerns, requires the application of a balancing
test to review a right-infringing statute rather than strict scrutiny. In
these cases, the Court recognizes that some significant, but not pro-
hibitive, burden on the exercise of the right appears unavoidable.
171. Strict scrutiny review involves balancing in the sense that only a "compelling"
state interest is of sufficient weight to justify the substantial abridgment of a fundamental
right. The determination of what constitutes a compelling state interest inevitably requires
a value judgment by the reviewing court. The balancing intrinsic to strict scrutiny review,
however, operates within a formal methodology of review. A heavy presumption of inva-
lidity must be rebutted by the state if the challenged law is to be upheld. Not only must the
law further a compelling state interest, it must also use the least burdensome means to
accomplish that goal.
The ad hoc or indeterminate balancing utilized as the second tier of a three-tier in-
fringement model is less rule-governed in its application. It provides greater discretion to
courts charged with weighing the competing interests at issue. It also permits the legisla-




Further, in imposing that burden, the state is attempting to serve some
legitimate governmental objective; it is not deliberately trying to dis-
courage the exercise of the right. Accordingly, the Court elects to
permit the legislature some limited flexibility in fine tuning its regula-
tory response. Since that kind of limited flexibility can seldom survive
strict scrutiny, but may well be upheld under a balancing test, the
Court utilizes a middle tier of review.
Probably the clearest examples of this approach are a series of
decisions evaluating the constitutionality of durational residency re-
quirements, although the Court has never adequately explained the
standard of review it applies in these cases.
a. Durational Residency Requirements
i. The Right to Vote
In Dunn v. Blumstein,172 the Court invalidated Tennessee's state
and county residency requirements for exercising the franchise on the
grounds that the challenged laws burdened both the right to vote and
the right to travel.173 Applying strict scrutiny,174 the Court recognized
that the state's goal of obtaining accurate voting rolls and avoiding
fraud were important and legitimate interests.175 However, a one-
year residency requirement, or even a three-month requirement, was
not a sufficiently tailored regulation to be accepted as a means for
achieving these objectives. 176 One year later, however, in Marston v.
Lewis177 and Burns v. Fortson,178 the Court upheld similar fifty-day
residency requirements for voting.
How are these latter cases to be understood? There is some lan-
guage at the end of the per curiam opinion in Lewis that implies the
fifty-day requirement withstands strict scrutiny. The Court does state
that these requirements are "necessary" to promote the state's "im-
portant" interest in preparing adequate voting records. 179 On the
other hand, as Justice Marshall's dissent makes abundantly clear, the
evidence before the district court demonstrated that a fifty-day re-
quirement saved the state from no more than modest administrative
172. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
173. Id. at 338-42.
174. Id. at 353.
175. Id. at 345.
176. Id. at 353-54. The challenged laws required one year of residency in the state and
three months of residency in the county in which the voter would register. Id. at 331-33.
177. 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
178. 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
179. Lewis, 410 U.S. at 681.
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inconvenience and expense in comparison to a 30-day requirement.8 0
Thus, it is difficult to believe that the Court's uncritical acceptance of
the state's administrative convenience justification constituted the
same kind of rigorous review that the Court has applied in other fun-
damental rights cases.
More plausibly, Lewis and Fortson suggest that the Court did not
find that a fifty-day residency requirement imposed a sufficiently un-
due burden on the right to vote. Accordingly, the challenged laws
received a much more deferential standard of review. Indeed, the
Court in Lewis justified its decision by explaining that the state
scheme at issue "stands in a different light" than the Tennessee law
invalidated in Dunn because "[t]he durational residency requirement
is only fifty days, not a year or even three months.' 8'
Moreover, the Court argued that a fifty-day residency require-
ment coincided with the state's closing of general election registration
fifty days prior to the election and seemed particularly defensible in
light of other time-consuming registration and voting procedures uti-
lized in the state.' 82 This analysis strongly implies that the modest
scope of the burden, in conjunction with the prima facie legitimacy of
the state's interest, supports a lower level of scrutiny in cases of this
kind. If the resulting burden does not substantially interfere with the
exercise of the right, and the state is furthering presumptively reason-
able concerns (a meaningful vote requires effective election proce-
dures), then the Court will tolerate some range of legislative
flexibility. It is only when the burden on the right is more pronounced
or the connection between the challenged law and the state's legiti-
mate goals is so attenuated that it suggests inadequate respect for the
protected activity that strict scrutiny is warranted.
ii. The Right to Travel
Ever since the Court recognized the right to travel in Shapiro v.
Thompson,8 3 a case invalidating a year-long residency requirement
for the receipt of welfare benefits, it has struggled with the question of
exactly what kind of a burden on the exercise of that right justifies
strict scrutiny of the offending statute. Shapiro itself left open the is-
180. Id. at 682-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 680.
182. Id. at 680-81.
183. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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sue of how residential waiting periods to obtain a license to hunt, fish,
or even practice a profession in a state would be reviewed' 84
In Vlandis v. Kline,8 5 the Court suggested that, despite the hold-
ing of Shapiro, significant residency requirements for in-state tuition
at state universities would be constitutional.8 6 Still later, in Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 87 the Court invalidated a one-year
waiting period for non-emergency subsidized medical care for indigent
persons. In reaching that decision, however, the Court admitted that
the uncertainty of Shapiro remained unabated: "The amount of im-
pact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not
made clear" in recent cases.' 88 On balance, however, the majority
concluded that access to medical care was more like the welfare pay-
ments denied petitioners in Shapiro, a necessity of life, than the more
minor deprivations, such as delay in obtaining reduced tuition at state
universities, evaluated in Kline.'8 9
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Maricopa County is notable for the
clarity with which it seems to insist on the application of an "undue
burden" or "substantial obstacle" test before strict scrutiny should be
applied. Rehnquist writes:
It seems to me that the line to be derived from our prior cases is
that some financial impositions on interstate travelers have such in-
direct or inconsequential impact on travel that they simply do not
constitute the type of direct purposeful barriers struck down in...
Shapiro.... I would think that this standard is not only supported
by this Court's decisions, but would be eminently sensible and
workable .... [T]he Court should examine, as it has done in the
past, whether the challenged requirement erects a real and pur-
poseful barrier to movement, or the threat of such a barrier, or
whether the effects on travel, viewed realistically, are merely inci-
dental and remote' 90
184. Id. at 638 n.21; see also id. at 627, 632-33.
185. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
186. Id. at 452-53. The Court invalidated a Connecticut requirement that anyone ap-
plying to a state university who had an out-of-state address during the preceding year had
to be classified as a non-resident subject to higher tuition fees. The law violated due pro-
cess because it created "a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence." Id.
at 452. The Court explained, however, that its decision was not intended to deny states the
right to impose "a reasonable durational residency requirement" to limit the availability of
preferential tuition rates. Id. A one-year residency requirement was explicitly noted with
approval. Id. at 452 n.9.
187. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
188. Id. at 256-57.
189. Id. at 259-60.
190. Id. at 284-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Despite Rehnquist's use of the terms "indirect" and "incidental"
in his dissent, it should be clear that he is not describing a category of
laws deserving lenient review that can be defined by some formal
characteristic, for example, laws of general applicability that make
participation in a variety of activities, including the exercise of funda-
mental rights, more difficult. The line between Shapiro and Maricopa
County, to Rehnquist, seems to be one based on purpose and effect,
not facial neutrality. Only laws erecting real barriers to travel, or
which are intended to accomplish that impermissible result, should be
rigorously reviewed.1 91
Justice Rehnquist had the opportunity to implement his own ap-
proach to right-to-travel cases in Sosna v. Iowa,192 a decision uphold-
ing a one-year residency requirement for obtaining a divorce. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court applied a balancing test, an indeter-
minate but clearly less rigorous standard of review than the strict scru-
tiny of Shapiro and Maricopa County. 93 Rehnquist justified this
lower standard of review with two related arguments. First, the state's
interest in seeking to avoid becoming a "divorce mill" was so transpar-
ently legitimate that it could not plausibly be inferred that it concealed
an invidious motive to discourage the migration of new residents. 94
Second, the burden on newcomers was of a different kind and magni-
tude than that of prior cases. Here, petitioner "was not irretrievably
foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought."' 95
191. The forms of the laws challenged in Shapiro and Maricopa County are essentially
indistinguishable. The only difference involves the nature and purpose of the deprivation
as it relates to the distinction between welfare benefits and non-emergency medical care.
192. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
193. While the majority opinion in Sosna does not explicitly state the standard of re-
view it applies, the analysis presented seems to involve a balancing of interests. The Court
explains that durational residency requirements in prior cases were "struck down" because
the states' "budgetary or recordkeeping [justifications] ... were held insufficient to out-
weigh the constitutional claims of the individuals." Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406. The opinion
then goes on to discuss why the State's justification in Sosna is stronger and the burden on
the claimant less onerous, thereby justifying a different result. Id. at 406-09. Justice Mar-
shall's dissent characterizes this standard as "an ad hoc balancing test." Id. at 419 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 406-09.
195. Id. at 406. The burden of delay in obtaining a divorce, as opposed to a complete
denial of benefits, not only distinguished Iowa's law from the residency requirements
struck down in prior cases, it also distinguished Iowa's law from the statute invalidated in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), which imposed an administrative fee on indi-
gents attempting to file for divorce. The law in Boddie, Rehnquist concluded, involved a
"total deprivation," not mere delay, and therefore merited more serious review. Sosna,
419 U.S. at 410.
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The majority in Sosna never explicitly states that the Court is ap-
plying an "undue burden" test. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine
any other explanation for the reduced level of review utilized by the
Court given the limited doctrinal discussion in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. Certainly, Justice Marshall had no doubts on this point when
he argued in dissent, "The Court cannot mean that Mrs. Sosna has not
suffered any injury by being foreclosed from seeking a divorce in Iowa
for a year. It must instead mean that it does not regard that depriva-
tion as being very severe."'1 96
b. Ballot Access Cases Revisited
As discussed previously, the Court's initial reaction to ballot ac-
cess issues was to apply a two-tier model under which a challenged
law received either strict scrutiny if its effect was particularly burden-
some or discriminatory, or rational basis review if the law was found
to have a less severe impact.197 These early decisions focused primar-
ily on the magnitude of the burden imposed by the challenged law.
The purpose of the law only became relevant after the Court deter-
mined the standard of review to be applied and began to evaluate the
state's justification for its statutory scheme. In a series of cases begin-
ning with Lubin v. Panish,198 that approach began to change, although
the full extent of the change would not become clear for several years.
In Lubin, the Court's attention shifted from its initial, almost ex-
clusive, interest in the impact of a challenged law to a more immediate
threshold examination of the state's purpose in adopting the regula-
tion. At issue was California's requirement that all candidates pay a
$700 filing fee in order to obtain a ballot position in an election for
county supervisor. 99 Rather than viewing the filing fee solely as an
impediment to the exercise of a fundamental right, the Court recog-
nized that this "burden" also facilitated the achievement of "an effec-
tive, representative political system. 1200 Too many candidates of
doubtful seriousness on the ballot "would make rational voter choices
more difficult"20' and could, ultimately, "undermine the process of
giving expression to the will of the majority. '20 2 Thus, the goal of in-
196. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 422 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. See supra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
198. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
199. Id. at 710.
200. Id. at 714.
201. Id. at 715.
202. Id. at 714.
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creased ballot access had to be reconciled with the need to protect
"the integrity of the electoral system. '20 3
In light of this conflict between the state's uniquely legitimate
need to restrict ballot access and the intrinsic burdens such regulations
imposed on voting and political association rights, the. Court began to
shift its orientation away from monitoring the effect of ballot access
barriers. The critical question was not simply the magnitude of the
impact of the law on ballot access, although that remained an impor-
tant consideration. The Court also focused its attention on whether a
regulation "unfairly or unnecessarily" burdened a candidate's electo-
ral opportunities.204 Pursuant to that dual inquiry, California's filing
fee requirements were not only of dubious constitutionality because
they limited the ballot access of indigent candidates. California also
infringed the right to vote because its decision to rely exclusively on a
financial test, effectively denying indigent persons any alternative
mechanism to demonstrate that they were not spurious candidates,
such as obtaining a substantial number of signatures on a nominating
petition, did not further the state's legitimate interests in maintaining
the integrity of its baot.20 5
This shift in orientation seemed to collapse the question of
whether a right was being burdened or infringed and the question of
whether any purported infringement could be justified. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, to note that the standard of review applied in
Lubin was unclear. Certainly the Court utilized something other than
traditional strict scrutiny to reach its conclusion. California's filing fee
requirements were struck down because they were not "reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate election in-
terests," an obvious departure from the compelling state interest and
least drastic means standard strict scrutiny required.206
The defining importance of the state's purpose, initially recog-
nized in Lubin, continued in Storer v. Brown.20 7 Unfortunately, so did
the Court's apparent indecision and uncertainty as to the appropriate
standard of review to apply. In Storer, the Court considered both First
Amendment and equal protection challenges to a variety of California
electoral regulations, including one that denied ballot access for the
general election to any independent candidate who had a registered
203. Id.
204. Id. at 716.
205. Id. at 716-18.
206. Id. at 718.
207. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
April 1994]
affiliation with a qualified political party within one year prior to the
immediately preceding primary.20 8
The petitioners challenging California's regulations, citing Wil-
liams v. Rhodes209 and other precedent, argued for the application of
the traditional two-tier model. Under this authority, they claimed, all
"substantial burdens" on the right to vote and political association
must receive strict scrutiny.210 The Court, however, explicitly rejected
this contention. Not "every substantial restriction on the right to vote
or to associate" could be invalidated per se, since "as a practical mat-
ter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be
fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to ac-
company the democratic processes."'211
This conclusion left open the question of how a regulation impos-
ing substantial burdens on ballot access should be reviewed. The
Court's answer involved a mixture of strict scrutiny and a more inde-
terminate balancing test. Decisions in this context were described as
"very much a 'matter of degree'. . . very much a matter of 'con-
sider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who
are disadvantaged by the classification."' 212 After considering the
purposes and effects of California's electoral requirements, the Court
used this analytic framework to determine that the one-year disaffilia-
tion provision was constitutional. The state's ultimate interest in the
stability of its political system was considered to be "not only permis-
sible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate
and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early
decision to seek independent ballot status. '213
Subsequent cases did little to clarify the standard of review ap-
plied to ballot access restrictions. Indeed, one case, Clements v. Fash-
ing,214 added to the doctrinal confusion. Clements involved an equal
protection challenge to two Texas constitutional provisions that effec-
tively prevented an individual serving in one elected office from run-
208. Id. at 726-27.
209. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
210. Storer, 415 U.S. at 729.
211. Id. at 729-30.
212. Id. at 730 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335,348 (1972), and Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
213. Id. at 736. The ambiguous nature of the standard of review applied is demon-
strated by the Court's use of the term "compelling," which suggests strict scrutiny, in con-
junction with other language indicating that the state's interest outweighs that of the
plaintiffs, a conclusion that suggests the outcome of a conventional balancing test.
214. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
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ning for another office prior to the expiration of his term. The state's
objective in Clements did not involve the kind of critical, First Amend-
ment-related interests that states had attempted to serve in prior bal-
lot access cases. Texas simply did not want office holders to get
caught up in election campaigns and neglect their duties, a legitimate
but hardly commanding goal.215
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, upheld both provi-
sions under rational basis review. Ballot access restrictions should
only receive heightened scrutiny as a matter of course, he argued, if
they create either of two particularly problematic kinds of burdens.
Only laws that fall with disproportionate severity on lower economic
classes and laws that burden small or new parties or non-establish-
ment candidates clearly merit close scrutiny.216 Since the constitu-
tional requirements at issue did not fall in either category, and did not
significantly limit a candidate's access to the ballot, they need only be
examined under a highly deferential standard of review.21 7
These issues were finally clarified in two cases, Anderson v. Cele-
brezze,218 which invalidated an early filing deadline for independent
candidates, and Burdick v. Takushi,219 which upheld Hawaii's determi-
nation not to permit or tabulate write-in votes. Both cases evaluated
ballot restrictions from a First Amendment rather than an equal pro-
tection perspective. More importantly, both decisions endorsed and
relied on a three-tier model: strict scrutiny for severely burdensome
restrictions, a balancing test for less problematic laws serving particu-
larly legitimate objectives, and rational basis review for other regula-
tions.220 Although the Court did not use the exact language of an
undue burden standard, there is a marked similarity in approach be-
tween these cases and the joint opinion in Casey.22'
215. Id. at 959-61, 968.
216. Id. at 964-65.
217. Id. at 963-68. It is unclear why Justice Rehnquist believes that requiring a poten-
tial candidate to wait up to two years before he can run for the office he seeks constitutes a
"de minimis" burden on the candidate's "political aspirations." Id. at 967. One suspects
that Rehnquist is not simply evaluating the magnitude of the burden but is also considering
the context in which it is imposed as well as the state's purpose in creating this barrier to
candidates seeking office. From that perspective, the burden on a person currently holding
office, in being asked to complete his or her term before seeking another position, does not
seem to be an excessive demand by the state.
218. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
219. 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
220. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89; Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063-64.
221. Indeed, the joint opinion in Casey explicitly refers to the ballot access cases and
Anderson in making the point that "not every law which makes a right more difficult to
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The discussion of Justice White, writing for the majority in Bur-
dick, is especially revealing. White first builds on prior authority to
argue that the state must burden voting and associational rights if it is
to provide equitable and efficient elections. Further, the state's ability
to further these goals would be hamstrung if all of its regulatory
choices had to withstand close scrutiny. 222 Accordingly, a more flexi-
ble standard that considers both the purpose and effect of election
statutes must be employed. Under this distinct standard, White
explains,
the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election
law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation bur-
dens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights .... [W]hen those
rights are subjected to "severe" restrictions, the regulation must be
"narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance. '223
Justice White's analysis thus far directly parallels an undue bur-
den standard. Moreover, as in Casey, the distinguishing characteristic
of the undue or severe burden is not defined by the magnitude of the
law's effect alone. The nature and purpose of the burden must also be
considered. Thus, in describing the second tier of review, White states
that "when a state election law provision imposes only 'reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of voters, 'the State's important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions. '224
The important distinction here is between "severe" restrictions
on the one hand, and "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions," as
opposed to insubstantial restrictions, on the other. The unacceptably
burdensome election regulation that invokes strict scrutiny is not de-
termined solely by measuring the impact of the law. That level of re-
view is also reserved for laws that serve impermissible (i.e.,
discriminatory) goals or that burden rights beyond the state's legiti-
mate need to manage the conduct of elections. Of course, identifying
laws that must receive strict scrutiny in this way makes the result of
the application of that standard of review a foregone conclusion. All
severely or unduly burdensome laws by definition will fail strict scru-
tiny and be struck down, just as all unduly burdensome abortion regu-
exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818, and in
arguing that this same principle should apply to the right to have an abortion. Id. at 2819.
222. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063.
223. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992)).
224. Id. at 2063-64 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
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lations in the joint opinion in Casey are declared to be
unconstitutional.
The balancing test Justice White describes as a second tier of re-
view permits the Court to evaluate the close cases in which the state's
law furthers legitimate electoral concerns (and, accordingly, does not
discriminate against the poor or against new or non-establishment
parties or candidates), but also burdens ballot access to some signifi-
cant degree. The majorities in Anderson and Burdick suggest that
laws furthering the state's recognized regulatory interest in maintain-
ing the integrity and stability of its election system will usually be up-
held under this level of review, even if they significantly burden voting
and political association rights.225 By analogy to Casey, such laws are
not unduly burdensome, just as state laws directed at informing wo-
men about the nature and ramifications of abortion decisions are not
unduly burdensome despite their impact on access to abortion
services. 226
In theory, this second tier of review should be limited to laws
serving some uniquely important interest, such as the special goals of
electoral equity and efficiency. Laws serving nonelection-related in-
terests that substantially burden ballot access fall within the first tier
of review and presumably will continue to be evaluated under strict
scrutiny.227 To complete the picture, the third tier of review will rou-
tinely uphold laws imposing minor burdens on ballot access that serve
permissible objectives of any kind.228
225. Id. at 2063-67; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89.
226. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818-19 (describing ballot access cases and concluding that
"[t]he abortion right is similar").
227. It is important to recognize that a court's evaluation of the burden created by a
law under this analysis will vary because it is dependent, in part, on the state's purpose in
enacting the law. What constitutes a substantial burden will be determined in light of the
state's objective. Laws imposing very severe burdens on rights will receive strict scrutiny
regardless of the state's goal. Laws resulting in significant but lesser burdens are reviewed
under a balancing test if they further important electoral interests. Laws resulting in the
same significant but lesser burden in the service of some more modest state interest will be
identified as substantially burdening voting and associational rights and will receive strict
scrutiny review. See infra notes 252-254 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text. Dissenting in Clements v. Fash-
ing, Justice Brennan argued that the burden created by the challenged regulation was not
de minimis, and should therefore be analyzed under an intermediate standard of review in
order to strike the proper "balance" between the interests of the state and its current office
holders. Clements, 457 U.S. at 977 n.2, 987 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting). Since Justice Bren-
nan believed "that the State has a vital interest in ensuring that public officeholders per-
form their duties properly.., and that a State requires substantial flexibility to develop
both direct and indirect methods of serving that interest," id., his analysis is consistent with
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(2) Significant Effects in the Context of Regulations Serving Benign
Purposes
The second type of case in which a three-tier approach is adopted
involves a more explicit doctrinal framework. In this context, the
Court concludes that the core of the right, the kind of infringement
that the constitutional guarantee most directly forbids, is defined by
the state's impermissible purpose in regulating the exercise of the
right. Accordingly, strict scrutiny is reserved exclusively for state ac-
tion serving that prohibited purpose. Laws that substantially interfere
with the exercise of the right, but are intended to further a different
purpose, are reviewed under a balancing test. Again, the Court does
not claim to be applying an "undue burden" standard in these cases,
but the reasoning of its opinions demonstrates clear consistencies with
that approach.22 9
a. Freedom of Speech: Content-Neutral, Content-Discriminatory, and
Viewpoint-Discriminatory Laws
Free speech cases are not generally thought of as applying an un-
due burden standard, but a strong argument can be made that they do
so in many circumstances. Certainly, there is no dispute that all laws
directly impacting on an individual's freedom of speech do not receive
the same level of review. The Court reserves strict scrutiny for laws
that discriminate on the basis of the content or viewpoint of the
message being conveyed.230 In contrast, a content-neutral law regulat-
ing the time, place, and manner of speech is subject to a reduced stan-
dard of review, a multifactor balancing test. Under this more
deferential standard, the Court considers whether the challenged law
(1) serves a substantial state interest; (2) is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest; and (3) leaves open ample alternative avenues of
communication.231
the three-tier model presented in the text in that it seeks to apply a middle-tier standard of
review to this kind of legislative decision.
229. This framework is different from the three-tier infringement cases discussed previ-
ously, see supra notes 172-228 and accompanying text, in that the balancing test in the
ballot access and durational residency cases was reserved for laws that serve uniquely legit-
imate purposes. Here, the balancing test is reserved for laws that do not serve uniquely
impermissible or invidious objectives. Laws subject to the balancing test in the former
framework serve goals of special value; laws subject to the balancing test in the current
context serve benign goals of diverse importance.
230. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988).
231. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491 U.S. 781, 789-803 (1989); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-88 (1988).
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Moreover, there should be no question that this latter category of
speech regulations, described as content-neutral laws or time, place,
and manner restrictions, includes laws that "consciously and directly"
regulate protected activity. These are not the kind of incidental re-
strictions on the exercise of fundamental rights that Justice Scalia ex-
empts from his criticism of the "undue burden" standard- in Casey.232
While the words "indirect" and "incidental" are subject to a range of
interpretations, it is difficult to argue that laws banning or substan-
tially regulating loud speakers,2 33 demonstrations, 34 signs,235 leaflet-
ting,2 36 or even spoken speech itself (as in a quiet zone in a library)2 37
do not directly regulate expression. Laws of this kind are not rules of
general applicability that happen to make expressive activity more dif-
ficult. These laws directly regulate and control expressive activity as
the means to accomplish some legitimate state objective.238 Similarly,
232. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(distinguishing a law of general applicability that only incidentally burdens a fundamental
right and, therefore, does not infringe that right from a law that "consciously and directly"
burdens a fundamental right, which will typically be struck down).
233. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78-79 (1949) (upholding ban on use of sound
trucks and loud speakers in residential neighborhood).
234. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing convictions on First Amend-
ment grounds of protestors engaged in peaceful demonstration).
235. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding
ban on the posting of signs on utility poles); Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 521-34 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that total ban on billboards sub-
stantially restricts protected expressive activity without adequate justification).
236. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 153-59 (1939) (invalidating law prohib-
iting the distribution of leaflets).
237. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)
(invalidating regulation purporting to ban all expressive activity in airport including talking
and reading a newspaper); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1972) (not-
ing by analogy in upholding noise ordinance sharply restricting expressive activity near
schools in session that "[a]Ithough a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public
library,... making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would").
238. The Court distinguishes between the regulation of conduct that is commonly asso-
ciated with expression (or is conventionally or inherently expressive) and the regulation of
conduct that might be related to expression in a particular instance but is commonly non-
expressive. Thus, in Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), the
Court explained why licensing regulations governing the location of newsracks used to
distribute newspapers raised a much more serious First Amendment issue than the licens-
ing of typically nonexpressive activities such as constructing buildings or selling soda pop:
[L]aws of general application that are not aimed at conduct commonly associated
with expression and do not permit licensing determinations to be made on the
basis of ongoing expression or the words about to be spoken, carry with them
little danger of censorship. For example, a law requiring building permits is rarely
effective as means of censorship.... [Similarly, n]ewspapers are in the business
of expression, while soda vendors are in the business of selling soft drinks. Even
if the soda vendor engages in speech, that speech is not related to soda; therefore
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some of the provisions under review in Casey might be characterized
as time, place, and manner restrictions on abortion services, but they
nonetheless directly regulate the exercise of the right to have an
abortion.239
Given this variation in the level of review that the Court applies
to laws that directly regulate speech, can it be argued that content- or
viewpoint-discriminatory laws are in some sense "unduly burden-
some" to free speech rights while content-neutral laws are not? Such
an argument cannot be predicated on the relative magnitude of the
laws' effects on speech. Viewpoint-discriminatory laws do not neces-
sarily burden more speech than content-neutral rules; indeed, the con-
trary result is often the case. Thus, if the magnitude of the effect is the
critical concern, a law banning the distribution of all leaflets interferes
with expressive activity to a greater degree than does a law prohibiting
the distribution of communist leaflets.240
The Court's aversion to laws directed at the communicative im-
pact of speech is based not on the effect of the regulation but on the
preventing it from installing its machines may penalize unrelated speech, but will
not directly prevent that speech from occurring.
Id. at 760-61.
Justice Scalia used essentially the same argument to defend his conclusion in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring), that a general ban on
public nudity applied to nude dancing did not violate the First Amendment. Scalia noted:
It is easy to conclude that conduct has been forbidden because of its communica-
tive attributes when the conduct in question is what the Court has called "inher-
ently expressive" and what I would prefer to call "conventionally expressive"-
such as flying a red flag. I mean by that phrase (as I assume the Court means by
"inherently expressive") conduct that is normally engaged in for the purpose of
communicating an idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone else. I am not sure
whether dancing fits that description. But even if it does, this law is directed
against nudity, not dancing. Nudity is not normally engaged in for the purpose of
communicating an idea or an emotion.
Id. at 2466 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
239. To take the most obvious example, requiring a woman to wait 24 hours before she
can obtain an abortion is a form of time regulation roughly analogous to a law requiring
parade permit applicants to submit their permit request at least 24 hours before the dem-
onstration is to take place. Alternatively, a hypothetical law requiring that all applicants
for a parade permit must be read a statement describing some of the problematic effects
that a demonstration can have on the surrounding neighborhood could be described as a
time, place, and manner speech regulation corresponding in form to Pennsylvania's in-
formed consent provision.
240. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 473-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that by subjecting ban on residential picketing to strict scrutiny because it allegedly
exempts labor picketing, the Court encourages city to adopt a "more restrictive" law that
burdens even more speech).
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presumptively unacceptable purpose of such legislation.241 The con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of speech prohibits government from
deliberately suppressing particular messages-at least without some
compelling justification for doing so-without regard to the severity
of the law's effect. The analogy here is to the implicit argument in
Casey that laws adopted for the purpose of hindering a woman's
choice are by their nature unduly burdensome to the exercise of wo-
men's rights and will be held invalid despite their limited effect.242
A content-neutral law, on the other hand, might be adopted for
the invidious purpose of making communication more difficult, but
the state will typically be able to assert a non-speech-related objective
to justify the law. 243 Accordingly, these content-neutral laws, ostensi-
bly serving legitimate state interests, cannot easily be identified as un-
duly burdensome with regard to their purpose. Rather, they must be
evaluated as to their effect to determine if they "unduly constrict the
flow of information or ideas." 244 The Court also considers whether
the law at issue is so poorly tailored that "a substantial portion of the
burden on speech does not serve to advance [the state's] goals," and,
therefore, is unwarranted.245
The burden imposed by a content-neutral law, however, no mat-
ter how egregious it may be, is always balanced against the state inter-
est being furthered by the restriction on speech. The determination
241. The Court has stated on occasion that content discriminatory laws must be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny even when the state's purpose is not the illicit censorship of
ideas. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509
(1991). This assertion is hardly surprising. Denying the state the power to regulate speech
on the basis of its content, regardless of the state's actual or asserted purpose, may operate
effectively as a prophylactic rule to prevent the suppression of ideas. The principle under-
lying the rule against content discrimination, however, remains focused against the sup-
pression of information, messages, and ideas. The essence of the First Amendment is that
"government cannot justify restrictions on free expression by reference to the adverse con-
sequences of allowing certain ideas or information to enter the realm of discussion and
awareness." TRIBE, supra note 168, § 12-2, at 790.
242. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
243. In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), for example, one might argue that the
purpose of the law under review was to control the expressive activity of anti-abortion
groups, but the Court determined that the law was intended to serve the neutral purpose of
protecting residential privacy. Id. at 484-88; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989) (holding that regulation is content neutral even if it affects some
speakers and messages more than others as long as it is justified on grounds that are unre-
lated to the content of speech).
244. TRIE, supra note 168, § 12-2, at 791. For instance, denying speakers the only
practical opportunity to communicate their message is a constitutionally unacceptable im-
pact. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482-84.
245. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
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that a law substantially burdens expression without more is not a suffi-
cient basis for invalidating the law. Even a complete ban on demon-
strations or a prohibition against most speech (as may sometimes be
required in schools, libraries, or hospitals) will be upheld in appropri-
ate circumstances. 246 This balancing test represents the second tier of
review.
The third level of review applies to laws regulating non-speech-
related conduct that are not intended to restrict expression. The en-
forcement of such conduct regulations only raises a First Amendment
issue in the atypical situation in which the regulated conduct happens
to be engaged in for expressive purposes. 247 While the language of
older Supreme Court decisions suggests that laws restricting expres-
sive conduct of this kind should receive serious review,248 the Court's
reasoning and holdings in recent cases belies that implication. Con-
duct restrictions not designed to suppress speech are generally upheld
under very deferential review. A ban on sleeping in parks, for exam-
ple, will be upheld, even when it is applied to expressive slumber,2 49
under far more lenient scrutiny than the Court directs at laws banning
the distribution of leaflets in a park.250
246. See supra notes 234, 237.
247. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (noting that when an individ-
ual expresses an idea through activity other than print or the spoken word, the Court must
"determine whether his activity is sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to
fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments"); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (assuming arguendo that communicative element in conduct of
burning a draft card may be "sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment").
248. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 411 (explaining that Court "must examine with particular
care the interests advanced by [the state] to support its prosecution" of individual engaged
in expressive conduct); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (describing the quality of the govern-
ment interest the state must assert to justify the regulation of conduct engaged in for ex-
pressive purposes as "compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; [and]
strong").
249. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(upholding law prohibiting people from sleeping in certain national parks as applied to
protestors sleeping overnight in a tent city they created to dramatize the plight of the
homeless).
250. This conclusion requires some explanation because the Court has suggested in
recent cases that the test it applies to laws regulating expressive conduct is similar to the
standard of review applied to content neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions. See,
e.g., CCNV, 468 U.S. at 298-99; see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460
(1991). Given the extraordinarily deferential analysis used by the Court to uphold restric-
tions on expressive conduct, such as sleeping in a park in CCNV, or nude dancing in
Barnes, it is difficult to accept the contention that these standards are, or should be,
equivalent. If the Court's analysis in CCNV was applied to an anti-leafletting law, for
example, the law would be upheld on the grounds that if the state can ban the distribution
of noncommunicative litter in the public streets, it can ban the distribution of leaflets there
as well. That argument, of course, would turn traditional First Amendment doctrine on its
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(3) The Three-Tier Purpose and Effect Model and the Casey Undue
Burden Standard
The three-tier model described above, which the Court applies to
certain durational residency statutes, to ballot access regulations
(under recent case law), and to laws restricting speech, bears a rough
correspondence to the joint opinion's "undue burden" analysis in
Casey. But it is not clear that the similarities outweigh the differences.
The joint opinion shares common ground with free speech cases with
regard to the evaluation mechanisms that the Court employs to deter-
mine how a challenged law should be reviewed. Thus, in Casey, as
well as conventional free speech doctrine, the Court directly invali-
dates or applies strict scrutiny to state law that serves an impermissi-
ble purpose-the deliberate creation of substantial obstacles to
obtaining an abortion in the former context and the deliberate sup-
pression of the communicative impact of expression in the latter.251
Further, under both the Casey standard and the balancing test applied
to content-neutral regulations, laws that serve permissible goals are
evaluated as to their impact on the exercise of fundamental rights to
determine if they are excessively burdensome. 252
A parallel doctrinal resemblance exists between both the dura-
tional residency and ballot access regulation decisions and the undue
burden analysis in Casey. In all three cases, when the state's purpose
head. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down ban on leafletting
to reduce litter). The more reasonable interpretation of these cases suggests that laws
regulating conduct for some purpose unrelated to the suppression of expression will re-
ceive a more deferential level of review than will content neutral laws regulating clearly
expressive activity. Certainly laws of the latter kind will typically have a far more egre-
gious impact on speech opportunities and the ability of individuals to express their views,
and to that extent, present greater risks to freedom of speech than do ordinary conduct
regulations. See generally Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing the
Court has "never invalidated the application of a general law simply because the conduct
that it reached was being engaged in for expressive purposes and the government could not
demonstrate a sufficiently important state interest").
251. Laws that serve an impermissible purpose may manifest that illicit objective on
their face, or they may conceal the impermissible purpose through ostensibly neutral statu-
tory language. A discussion of the review of facially neutral laws designed to burden fun-
damental rights is presented in subsequent sections of this Article. See infra notes 290-319
and accompanying text.
252. While excessively burdensome laws will probably be struck down under either
approach, the standard of review will differ depending on the right that is abridged. Con-
tent neutral speech regulations are reviewed under a relatively forthright balancing test,
while abortion regulations are evaluated to determine if either their purpose or effect is
"undue." Whatever ad hoe balancing may occur in the application of the undue burden
standard as it is employed in Casey is implicit and uncertain, if it exists at all. See supra
notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
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is particularly legitimate, the Court demonstrates a greater tolerance
of laws that impose significant burdens on the exercise of fundamental
rights. Even substantial obstacles to the exercise of rights may not be
unduly burdensome if they further uniquely appropriate objectives.25 3
That same substantial burden, however, might justify invalidating a
law serving a different purpose on the grounds that an effect of that
magnitude was undue in light of the state's merely permissible
goals. 2
54
Despite the strength of these comparisons, there is a critical dis-
tinction between the joint opinion and the durational residency, ballot
access, and free speech cases. In Casey, the joint opinion proposes a
two-tier system of review: Laws that unduly burden abortion rights
because of their purpose or effect are struck down; other abortion-
specific laws, the purpose or effect of which are less problematic, are
routinely upheld as minimally rational. The free speech, durational
residency, and ballot access lines of authority recognize the presump-
tive unconstitutionality of unduly burdensome laws, but do not rele-
gate all other claims of infringement to a bottom-tier, highly
deferential standard of review. Instead, some form of balancing test is
applied to laws that serve permissible, or even particularly valid, state
objectives while significantly burdening the exercise of fundamental
rights.255
253. See supra notes 59-65, 192-196, 222-226 and accompanying text. This argument
may also be used to justify certain time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. Without
some mechanism for controlling access to, and the use of, public forums for expressive
purposes, the resulting confusion inherent in an unregulated forum might result in far
fewer opportunities for expression than would be available in a fairly regulated forum. See
infra notes 344-345 and accompanying text.
254. Thus, the one-year residency requirement for obtaining a divorce upheld in Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), see supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text, would be
struck down if it was imposed merely to further administrative convenience goals such as
more efficient record keeping.
The Court's decision in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982), seems inconsistent
with this analysis, since the barrier to ballot access at issue in that case was upheld despite
the fact that the challenged law did not serve the presumptively legitimate objective of
maintaining an effective and meaningful electoral process. The law's objective was the
permissible, but hardly exceptional, goal of keeping officeholders focused on performing
their current job, rather than seeking the greener horizons of higher office. Clements can
be reconciled with the analysis in the text, however, since the Court interpreted the burden
of delay imposed by the law to be insignificant. See supra note 217. Laws imposing de
minimis burdens will be routinely upheld under all the lines of authority discussed in the
text.
255. With regard to free speech doctrine, it is possible that a law would burden speech
to such an extent that most courts would strike it down on the basis of its effect alone
without directing serious attention to the goal the law is intended to serve.
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This discrepancy between the joint opinion's analysis of the in-
fringement of abortion rights and the framework under which the
Court evaluates the infringement of other fundamental rights does not
establish that the "undue burden" standard is artificial and without
support. But it does indicate a substantial gap in the joint opinion's
reasoning that requires further explanation and justification. There is
substantial precedent on which to ground a simple two-tier effects test
that invalidates or strictly scrutinizes unduly burdensome laws and
routinely upholds minor impairments of protected interests. That pre-
cedent, however, suggests a narrow and limited concept of infringe-
ment. The plurality in Casey is clearly proposing a more complex
standard that examines a challenged law's purpose as well as its effect.
There are other established lines of authority that consider a
law's purpose and effect in determining whether rights are infringed
and the appropriate level of review to apply if cognizable infringe-
ments exist. These lines of authority, however, recognize a flexible,
intermediate level of review for laws that significantly interfere with
the exercise of rights but are not so unduly burdensome as to warrant
invalidation or strict scrutiny. 6 These cases share the joint opinion's
attention to the intermingling of purpose and effect in defining what
constitutes an infringement of a right. They differ with the joint opin-
ion, however, with regard to its willingness to uphold the creation of
For a content neutral speech regulation to receive this kind of cursory review, how-
ever, it would have to impose a unique and egregious burden on expressive activity. A law
prohibiting the distribution of all written communication might be an example. A law that
merely created a substantial obstacle to expression would not be unconstitutional per se.
Many content neutral speech restrictions, including limitations on picketing, posting signs,
or the use of loudspeakers, can be reasonably characterized as substantial interferences
with expression. Nonetheless, such laws are subject to a multi-factor balancing test. They
would not be struck down solely because of their effect, as a law that creates a substantial
obstacle to obtaining an abortion would be.
The difference between free speech and abortion doctrine is even clearer with regard
to laws that do not create substantial barriers to the exercise of a right. The joint opinion
suggests that an abortion regulation that significantly interferes with a woman's ability to
obtain an abortion, but does not create a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, will
be upheld as long as the law serves a permissible goal. No balancing of costs against objec-
tives or matching of means and ends is required. In contrast, a content neutral speech
regulation imposing any significant burden on expressive activity will be subject to a multi-
factor balancing test, a standard of review that requires at least some precision in tailoring
to ensure that speech opportunities are not unnecessarily restricted.
See supra notes 172-228 and accompanying text for a detailed description of the dura-
tional residency and ballot access cases regarding the different standards of review applica-
ble to unduly burdensome laws and to laws that significantly burden fundamental rights,
but are not unduly burdensome.
256. See supra notes 192-196, 198-226, 243-246 and accompanying text.
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significant, but not unduly burdensome, obstacles to the exercise of a
right without any balancing of the state and the individual's respective
interests.
This lack of uniformity in identifying and reviewing the infringe-
ment of different rights does not completely undermine the joint opin-
ion's reasoning (and it certainly provides very limited support for the
criticisms of the joint opinion by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia). It
does, however, demand additional analysis. To be fair, one must rec-
ognize that the Court generally has failed to provide any adequate
explanation for the differences that exist among rights. Our under-
standing of what constitutes an infringement of the right to marry and
the standard of review applicable to infringements of that right bears
little resemblance to accepted freedom of speech doctrine or even to
right to travel cases. No justification for these differences exists in the
case law.
Given the controversy surrounding abortion rights, however, this
kind of explanatory failure cannot be tolerated. The undue burden
standard of the Casey plurality is within the range of accepted consti-
tutional doctrine, but that hardly makes the reasoning or the conclu-
sions of the plurality persuasive.
If the level of review applied to laws that are not unduly burden-
some varies depending on the nature of the right that is allegedly
abridged, then the joint opinion must justify its conclusion that abor-
tion rights should be grouped in the category of rights to which the
plurality in Casey assigned it. The joint opinion provides no support
for its conclusion that a law interfering with the exercise of abortion
rights must either be invalidated as unconstitutional if it is unduly bur-
densome or upheld under implicit minimum rationality review if it is
not. Since the review of laws burdening other rights, such as freedom
of speech, includes a mid-level balancing test, the failure to recognize
an intermediate standard for abortion rights must be substantively de-
fended. That defense has not yet been presented.
If the constitutional adjudication of fundamental rights cases is
more complex and indeterminate than the joint opinion suggests, that
failing can be cured at least theoretically by further elaboration of the
"undue burden" framework. The plurality's model fits within the
range of approaches recognized by the Court, but its place in that doc-
trinal continuum requires a stronger foundation than the joint opinion
provides. On the other hand, the reality that the standard of review in
fundamental rights cases varies according to the right at issue and the
nature and magnitude of the burden imposed by a challenged law
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raises unavoidable and perhaps insurmountable problems for the criti-
cism directed at the joint opinion by Justices Scalia and Rehnquist.
C. The Limited Effect Infringement-Minor Burdens and Minimal
Obstacles
While Justices Scalia and Rehnquist's contention that prior fun-
damental rights cases do not support the use of an "undue burden"
standard either directly or by analogy is demonstrably unjustified, im-
portant concerns raised by the dissenting opinions still remain un-
resolved. Justice Scalia argues emphatically that some laws imposing
only minor burdens on rights must receive rigorous scrutiny and be
declared unconstitutional. To prove his case, he uses the example of a
twenty-four-hour waiting period for, or a one-cent tax on, the
purchase of religious books. These restrictions on rights, Scalia sug-
gests, would not be characterized as unduly burdensome, but they
would be' evaluated under rigorous scrutiny and declared
unconstitutional.Z57
Scalia is certainly correct that the laws he cites as examples raise
serious constitutional questions. Further, the discussion of the two-
and three-tier models above does not adequately explain how laws of
this kind should be evaluated. The two-tier model only evaluates the
effect of a law and requires hat minor interferences with the exercise
of a right should be routinely upheld. There is no basis under the
model (other than the exceedingly rare rejection of a law on the
grounds that it is not even minimally rational) for rigorously reviewing
or invalidating a law that only imposes a minor burden on a right. The
three-tier model defines the infringement of rights more expansively
and considers both the purpose of a law as well as its effect. That
permits the Court to apply a balancing test as a second tier of review
to laws serving presumptively (or at least ostensibly) legitimate pur-
poses that have significant, but not egregious, effects on the exercise
of a right. Without additional discussion, however, this broader un-
derstanding of the infringement of rights does not justify the rigorous
review or per se invalidation of a one-cent tax on religious worship.
There is nothing in the three-tier model, however, that precludes
the Court from rigorously reviewing or presumptively invalidating cer-
tain laws that impose only minor burdens on rights, but those deci-
sions would have to be defended and explained. Why should some
laws that only marginally interfere with the exercise of a right receive
257. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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lenient, bottom-tier review while other laws producing the same mag-
nitude of burden are struck down directly or receive strict scrutiny
under the highest tier of review? In what sense can these limited im-
pact laws be determined to be unduly burdensome? Clearly, in order
to resolve whether the undue burden analysis in Casey can be ex-
tended to cover these constitutional challenges, additional analysis of
what constitutes an infringement of a fundamental right is required.
(1) The Burdening of "Equality" Rights-The Right to Vote
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,258 Virginia's annual
$1.50 poll tax, a tax that operated as a precondition to voting eligibil-
ity, was declared unconstitutional. The proceeds of this flat tax were
used to support legitimate local governmental activities, including
public education. While the Court relied on an equal protection anal-
ysis to reach its conclusion,259 Harper and its progeny are currently
accepted as protecting the fundamental right to vote.260 That "the
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned" is the controlling mandate of the case. 26'
If there were any doubts as to the validity of Justice Scalia's mi-
nor burden examples, Harper demonstrates that such doubts are un-
founded. Even a one-dollar burden on the exercise of a right can
violate constitutional guarantees. Harper is a better illustration of the
problem of minor burdens on rights than it is a solution to it, however.
The difficulty with the majority opinion in Harper is that it never
clearly explains why a fee of only $1.50 is so readily found to be a
constitutionally cognizable burden. Certainly, not every regulation
that incrementally increases by $1.50 the cost of engaging in other
protected activities, such as obtaining a marriage license or publishing
a book, will receive strict scrutiny. What distinguishes a poll tax from
minor burdens on other rights?
258. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
259. Id. at 666.
260. While the Court in Harper was clearly bothered by the explicit wealth discrimina-
tion and implicit racial discrimination of the tax, id. at 666 n.3, 668-69, neither of those
concerns would justify invalidating a poll tax enacted today for ostensibly benign reasons.
Current equal protection doctrine does not support the rigorous review of wealth classifi-
cations, see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), nor does it
permit the application of strict scrutiny to facially neutral laws that disproportionately bur-
den racial minorities unless the law can be proven to be invidiously motivated, see, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Thus, the continued vitality of the holding in
Harper must be grounded on a right to vote analysis.
261. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
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Harper may be explained by two rationales that limit its scope.
First, regulations that serve no purpose other than the raising of reve-
nue from the exercise of specific fundamental rights may be presump-
tively invalid. That principle will be discussed in more detail
shortly.262 It is sufficient to note at this point that it is not totally
inconsistent with the undue burden analysis in Casey. The joint opin-
ion recognizes that certain purposes are unacceptable grounds for re-
stricting the exercise of rights. The corollary conclusion-that a law is
unconstitutional if it serves an impermissible purpose, even if it only
minimally burdens a right-is never explicitly stated in Casey, but it
follows reasonably enough from the plurality's analysis of unconstitu-
tional objectives.2 63
Second, as demonstrated by the ballot access cases,264 voting may
be a right with a particularly strong equality dimension to it. Thus,
laws that have the effect of discouraging (or encouraging) particular
groups from exercising the franchise and, thereby, skewing the results
of elections, are suspect and must be rigorously examined. Given the
constitutional objective of obtaining a universal and equal franchise so
that elected officials may truly represent their constituents, even low
financial barriers to voting may be unduly burdensome.265 This expla-
nation is also, arguably, consistent'with the Casey plurality's analysis.
There is nothing in the idea of an "undue burden" standard that pre-
cludes significant variation among rights as to what might constitute
an undue burden. The right to vote, because of the uniquely egalita-
rian nature of its function, may be more sensitive to pecuniary bur-
dens that discourage its exercise by the poor than less equality-
oriented rights such as freedom of speech or the right to an
abortion.266
262. See infra notes 332-340 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. If a law may be struck down as
unconstitutional because it serves the impermissible purpose of deliberately hindering wo-
men from obtaining an abortion, as the plurality recognizes, it is a short conceptual leap to
the conclusion that a law serving an impermissible purpose is unconstitutional regardless of
the magnitude of its impact.
264. See supra notes 112-127, 198-225 and accompanying text.
265. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668-70.
266. While commentators have strongly argued that the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment should reflect basic principles of equality, see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975), the
case law does not reflect that commitment. Instead, under First Amendment doctrine,
speech opportunities that are particularly useful for poor people can be more easily re-
stricted than speech opportunities that are usually only available to the wealthy. Thus, a
law prohibiting the posting of signs on utility poles receives a very deferential standard of
review, see City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), while restrictions on
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(2) Unduly Burdensome Laws That Serve an Invalid Purpose
Not all minor burdens on fundamental rights that invoke strict
scrutiny can be explained as easily as the invalidation of the poll tax in
Harper. Consider Justice Scalia's example of a twenty-four-hour wait-
ing period before religious books can be purchased.267 A twenty-four-
hour waiting period does not run afoul of the Court's apparent oppo-
sition to direct taxes on the exercise of rights. Further, even if one
assumes that an implicit equality dimension to free exercise rights ex-
ists,268 it is not clear that a twenty-four-hour waiting period before
religious materials may be sold threatens to skew an individual's, or
the community's, choice among religious faiths or secular philosophy
the way a poll tax distorts electoral decisions. The stronger and more
generally applicable explanation for the strict scrutiny of a twenty-
four-hour waiting period before religious books can be sold is the
Court's suspicion that the law is intended to further a constitutionally
impermissible purpose. That suspicion alone, regardless of the magni-
tude of the burden imposed by the law, is a sufficient predicate for
strict scrutiny review.269
the money that can be spent to influence political and electorial decisions are subject to
exacting scrutiny, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).
Similarly, the argument that the right to have an abortion should be grounded on
equal protection principles has been suggested by commentators, see Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979), but the Court's cases demonstrate
little concern for equality. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding legis-
lation denying funding of abortions for indigent women).
267. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2232 (1993) (noting that "the Free Exercise Clause 'protect[s] religious observers against
unequal treatment"' (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
148 (1987))). While unequal treatment among religious groups may help a court determine
that state action violates the Free Exercise Clause, inequality of treatment should not be an
essential aspect of a free exercise claim. See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 97-99. The
Smith case, of course, takes the contrary position and emphasizes formal inequality of
treatment as the predicate to a free exercise claim. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
269. One of the primary reasons for subjecting a facially discriminatory law to strict
scrutiny is to determine whether the law is invidiously motivated, as its discriminatory lan-
guage suggests, or whether it furthers some important state interest that could not be ad-
vanced through some less suspicious means. This rationale for strict scrutiny review is
described succinctly in John Hart Ely's classic work Democracy and Distrust. Ely's expla-
nation is directed at the review of suspect classifications, but it is equally applicable to strict
scrutiny review of a law that is allegedly designed to discourage the exercise of a funda-
mental right:
The goal the classification in issue is likely to fit most closely, obviously, is the
goal the legislators actually had in mind. If it can be directly identified and is one
that is unconstitutional, all well and good: the classification is unconstitutional.
But even if such a confident demonstration of motivation proves impossible, a
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a. Classifications Reflecting Impermissible Objectives
i. Post-Smith Free Exercise Rights
As noted previously, the Supreme Court decided in Smith to re-
strict the scope of strict scrutiny review under the Free Exercise
Clause to only those laws that deliberately burden the practice of reli-
gion.270 Neutral regulations of general applicability that incidentally
disrupt religious practices would be routinely upheld under a deferen-
tial standard of review.271 The Court did not indicate in Smith
whether the magnitude of a burden specifically and exclusively di-
rected at a religious practice would affect the standard of review to be
applied in such a case. And, indeed, there is virtually no precedent on
the question. One assumes, however, as Justice Scalia's example in
Casey suggests, that almost any burden that is narrowly (and presuma-
bly purposefully) directed at religious practices would be strictly
scrutinized.272
classification that in fact was unconstitutionally motivated will nonetheless ...
find itself in serious constitutional difficulty. For an unconstitutional goal obvi-
ously cannot be invoked in a statute's defense. That means, where the real goal
was unconstitutional, that the goal that fits the classification best will not be invo-
cable in its defense, and the classification will have to be defended in terms of
others to which it relates more tenuously. Where the requirement is simply the
Court's standard call for a "rational" relation between classification and goal, that
will seldom matter: even if the goal the classification fits best is disabled from
invocation, there will likely be other permissible goals whose relation to the clas-
sification is sufficiently close to be called rational. The "special scrutiny" that is
afforded suspect classifications, however, insists that the classification in issue fit
the goal invoked in its defense more closely than any alternative classification
would. There is only one goal the classification is likely to fit that closely, how-
ever, and that is the goal the legislators actually had in mind. If that goal cannot
be invoked because it is unconstitutional, the classification will fall. Thus, func-
tionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit,
turns out to be a way of "flushing out" unconstitutional motivation ....
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvEw 146
(1980).
Of course, if a discriminatory law can only be understood to serve one purpose, and
that is an impermissible one, strict scrutiny would seem to be unnecessary. The law should
be struck down without further analysis. See infra note 275.
270. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79.
271. Id.
272. The Court's recent opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye strongly supports
this assumption. Although the burden on plaintiffs' religion in that case was substantial,
the language used by the Court in striking down the ordinances imposing that burden em-
phasized the purpose of the offensive laws rather than their effect. Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2222. Thus, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared
that "if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Id. at 2227 (citation omitted).
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The likely irrelevance of the magnitude of the burden in post-
Smith free exercise cases is, in part, a necessary consequence of the
distinct nature of the right of religious freedom. Unlike many other
fundamental rights, religious liberty does not protect a particular kind
of activity, such as voting, marriage, travel, or abortion, from state
interference. Rather, freedom of religion protects any activity that is
performed for a particular reason-that is, when the activity is an ex-
pression of the actor's religious beliefs. There is nothing intrinsically
religious about many activities we recognize to be religious practices.
For instance, the personal decision to fast on a particular day may be
either religious or secular, and it is the individual's motive that brings
this dietary decision within the Constitution's coverage. 273
For rights that are defined by the nature of the activity that con-
stitutes the exercise of the right, the government will typically regulate
the protected activity in order to avoid or promote certain conse-
quences. Accordingly, laws that restrict the exercise of these rights
can always be justified in terms of the activity's effects. Moreover, at
least some activities that constitute the exercise of virtually any right
can be performed in unacceptable circumstances (hence the recogni-
tion that no right is absolute). This means that there is almost always
a potentially legitimate basis for regulating the exercise of any activ-
ity-defined right. Judicial review of such regulations will inevitably
involve some form of balancing even if, under close scrutiny, the eval-
uation is heavily weighted in favor of upholding the right.2 74
The free exercise of religion is different because the protection it
provides is directed at the individual's motives, not her actions. Thus,
a law directed at a religious practice (as opposed to a law directed at a
practice whether or not it is religious) is a law directed at the individ-
ual's religious motives and beliefs. But religious beliefs, unlike ac-
Indeed, Kennedy repeated this admonition several times, explicitly warning that "[a] law
burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo
the most rigorous of scrutiny ... [and it] will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases." Id.
at 2233.
273. Id. at 2227 (condemning laws directed at practices "because of their religious
motivation").
274. While strict scrutiny review does not directly call for a weighing or balancing of
interests, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some balancing is implicit in the applica-
tion of this standard. Obviously, the inquiry into whether a state interest is compelling
involves an evaluation of the state's concerns to determine if they outweigh the constitu-
tional right at issue. The requirement of narrow tailoring also helps the Court to determine
the importance of the state's objective in that underinclusive laws, by their nature, under-
mine the state's claim that it is attempting to advance an interest of the highest order. See
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2232-33.
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tions, are absolutely protected by the Constitution, or at least are as
close to being absolutely protected as anything gets. Indeed, it is diffi-
cult to imagine a legitimate interest that a state could assert to justify
the prohibition of an activity only-when the activity is engaged in for
religious purposes.275 Thus, laws purposefully directed at religious
practices are understood to reflect animus and hostility toward the
underlying religious faith. Since these are the only kinds of laws sub-
ject to Free Exercise Clause review after Smith, and virtually all such
laws involve invidious, anti-religious purposes, the effect of these laws
will rarely need to be considered by a reviewing court. Not even mini-
mal burdens can be justified by religious hatred and intolerance.276
Understood in this way, the Smith framework for reviewing free
exercise challenges is not inconsistent with the "undue burden" stan-
dard endorsed in Casey. The joint opinion in Casey can be read to
suggest that a law intended solely to prevent women from exercising
their right to choose whether to have an abortion or not is unduly
burdensome and unconstitutional notwithstanding the limited impact
of the law. The burdens imposed by such laws do not further a legiti-
mate state interest and as such are unwarranted and unjustified. Simi-
275. The Court seems reluctant to accept this conclusion, although the reasons for its
hesitancy are unclear. In the free exercise area, for example, it is accepted doctrine that
"[t]he Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibit-
ig, or rewarding religious beliefs as such." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
Accordingly, a law that directly infringes a person's right to hold a religious belief is uncon-
stitutional per se without any additional inquiry or analysis. Id. at 626-27. It would seem
to logically follow from these premises that a law enacted for the purpose of punishing or
discouraging a religious belief is also categorically unconstitutional, particularly when the
law serves its illicit purpose by singling out a religious practice for prohibition. Yet in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the majority opinion distinguishes between a law that
targets religious beliefs, which is "never permissible," and a law that restricts practices
"because of their religious motivation," which must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.
It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind this distinction. If a law restricts an
activity that is performed for religious reasons because the activity is performed for reli-
gious reasons, then the law can only be understood as one that targets religious beliefs and
it should be unnecessary to evaluate the state's justification for the law before striking it
down. Leaving aside the unique circumstance in which a state may argue that it must
restrict religiously motivated conduct in order to comply with the Establishment Clause,
there can be no constitutionally permissible justification for prohibiting an activity because
it is performed out of religious conviction.
To be fair, the Court acknowledges that a law targeting activities because they are
religiously motivated can only survive strict scrutiny "in rare cases." Id. at 2233. One can
only wonder, however, what such a rare case might look like. See generally McDaniel, 435
U.S. at 629-42 (Brennan, J., concurring).
276. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2233; supra notes
272, 275.
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larly, a law designed to prohibit people from engaging in an activity
solely when the activity is performed for religious reasons serves no
legitimate state purpose and may be characterized as unduly burden-
some regardless of the magnitude of its effect.
In his dissent in Casey, Justice Scalia implies that Smith and Casey
cannot be reconciled when he argues that a law imposing a tax of only
one penny or a twenty-four-hour waiting period on the sale of reli-
gious books would be unconstitutional. While that conclusion will al-
most always be true for laws deliberately burdening religious activities
and is much less likely to be true for laws deliberately regulating abor-
tion services, the comparison is one of apples and oranges. Singling
out religiously motivated expression (or any religiously motivated
practice) for taxation or regulation is unconstitutional regardless of
the magnitude of the burden imposed, because of the obvious invidi-
ous purpose behind such a classification. Regulating the right to
marry, the right to vote, or the right to have an abortion raises differ-
ent inferences because these activities each have particular character-
istics that may legitimately require specific regulatory attention.
The more important difference between the "undue burden"
standard of the joint opinion and the narrow scope of free exercise
protection adopted by the Court in Smith is that some laws indirectly
interfering with religious practices may be invalidated under an "un-
due burden" standard while they would be upheld under Smith's hold-
ing.277 Admittedly, this might not often be the case. Since Sherbert v.
Verner278 was decided in 1963, the Court ostensibly committed itself to
review all laws that unduly burden free exercise rights under strict
scrutiny.279 In the great majority of free exercise cases reaching the
Court, however, the claims of petitioners have been rejected. 280 Thus,
despite the lip service paid to strict scrutiny protection for religious
freedom in judicial opinions, the Court's actual behavior suggests that
277. For example, the military's uniform dress requirement, upheld against a free exer-
cise challenge in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), constitutes a neutral law of
general applicability. Accordingly, the enforcement of such laws to prevent an Orthodox
Jew serving in the military from wearing a yarmulke would not raise a free exercise issue
under Smith. If an undue burden standard was explicitly applied to free exercise claims,
however, there can be little doubt that Justice O'Connor, who dissented in Goldman, id. at
528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), would invalidate this application of the military dress code
on the grounds that it unduly burdened the religious freedom of military personnel of the
Jewish faith.
278. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
279. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 888-89.
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it was seldom willing to conclude that an incidental restriction on reli-
gious practices was unduly burdensome. 281
There is a significant difference, however, between seldom and
never. An undue burden standard provides that all the laws subject to
strict scrutiny under Smith will receive rigorous review, as will certain
other laws that have an unacceptably egregious effect or suspicious
purpose. Thus, the implication by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Casey
that the plurality's standard provides too little protection to funda-
mental rights2 2 seems embarrassingly misdirected. Not only is the
scope of the protection provided by the undue burden standard
broader than Scalia recognizes, but it extends constitutional protec-
tion well beyond the limits of the doctrinal model Scalia himself em-
braces in Smith and other cases.
iL Content- and Viewpoint-Discriminatory Speech Restrictions
The review of content- and viewpoint-discriminatory speech re-
strictions suggests the same kind of analogies to an undue burden
analysis as the review of religion-specific regulations. In the over-
whelming majority of cases, laws that classify on the basis of the con-
tent or viewpoint of speech are directed at the communicative impact
of expression. 8 3 That objective-to restrict or suppress the message
being communicated by expressive activity-is usually impermissible
and always suspect.2 4 Under accepted First Amendment doctrine,
freedom of speech is sufficiently sensitive a right that all laws serving
such a purpose are, in a sense, unduly burdensome. Even if the im-
281. Id. at 876-85.
282. Justice Scalia chastises the plurality for arguing that the "undue burden" standard
is a generally applicable principle, not limited to abortion. In doing so, Scalia contends, the
authors of the joint opinion "show their willingness to place all constitutional rights at risk
in an effort to preserve what they deem the 'central holding in Roe."' Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The adoption of an "undue
burden" standard as the basis for identifying laws that infringe certain rights, however,
does not preclude the Court from recognizing a different framework for other rights. Nor
does it limit the Court's discretion in identifying particular kinds of right-burdening regula-
tions as presumptively undue. More importantly, the only alternative to the undue burden
standard apparently endorsed by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia as a way to avoid placing
"all constitutional rights at risk" would deny the existence of many rights and dramatically
reduce the scope of the few rights that remain. It is at least an open question whether
applying the undue burden standard to an expansive array of inclusively defined rights
provides less protection to personal liberty than does a constitutional model that provides
rigorous protection to a constricted range of narrowly defined rights. See infra notes 355-
363 and accompanying text.
283. See TRINE, supra note 168, § 12-2 to 12-3, at 789-804.
284. Id.
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pact on a particular message is relatively light, a law that singles out
and deliberately burdens the content or viewpoint of speech will re-
ceive the same strict scrutiny the Court applies to laws that discrimi-
nate on their face against a specific religious faith.285
The parallel between the constitutional protection provided to
speech, religion, and abortion rights is limited, however. First
Amendment doctrine recognizes that a law serving unacceptable pur-
poses may infringe freedom of speech or freedom of religion despite
the law's limited effect on the exercise of the targeted right. As the
Casey plurality implies, laws furthering impermissible objectives are
unduly burdensome to the right to have an abortion.286 Past that doc-
trinal point, the speech, religion, and abortion analogy ends abruptly.
Free speech doctrine requires courts to consider the effect of
speech regulations even if the law is not directed at the communica-
tive impact of expression. Laws serving legitimate state interests can
infringe free speech rights if their negative effect on expression out-
weighs the state's justification for restricting protected activity. As
noted previously, the scope of this protection is more extensive than
the protection provided abortion rights by the joint opinion in
Casey.287 Content-neutral laws that do not substantially burden ex-
pression may still be unconstitutional if they are poorly tailored and
further unimportant objectives. 288 Under the plurality's analysis in
285. See Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2404-05 (1992)
(stating content discriminatory tax on expression is unconstitutional even though the
amount of the tax is minimal).
286. See infra notes 293-296 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 255-256 and accompanying text. Despite this significant differ-
ence between speech and abortion rights, both of these doctrinal frameworks recognize
that laws can infringe rights solely in terms of their effect. A regulation may not be in-
tended to suppress the communicative impact of expression nor designed to hinder women
seeking abortions. Such a law may be intended to serve clearly permissible goals. Never-
theless, the effect of the law may be so egregiously burdensome to the exercise of the right
that, at a minimum, some serious standard of review must be applied to determine if a
burden of that magnitude is justified. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 797-800 (1989) (stating that speech regulation need not be least restrictive alternative,
but government cannot burden more speech than is necessary to advance its interests);
Baird v. Department of Pub. Health, 599 F.2d 1098, 1102 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that neu-
tral state licensing requirements may be unconstitutional if they unduly burden right to
have an abortion). Free exercise rights are distinct from these other protected interests
under current law in that the right can only be infringed by deliberate and invidious bur-
dens directed at religious practices. The effect of a law, without that singular purpose,
cannot infringe the right and needs no justification.
288. In United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1983), for example, the govern-
ment argued that a law prohibiting the display of banners or the distributing of leaflets on
the grounds of the Supreme Court in Washington was constitutional because the restric-
tions had "only a minimal impact on expressive activity." There were more than "suffi-
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Casey, in contrast, all laws that do not substantially interfere with the
right to an abortion will be routinely upheld as long as the law serves a
permissible purpose. Unlike the three-tier model of free speech doc-
trine, an abortion regulation is either unduly burdensome and uncon-
stitutional or it is valid. There is no opportunity for balancing state
interests against real, but not sufficiently substantial, burdens imposed
on the right.2 9
b. Direct Inquiry Into Legislative Purpose
i. Neutral and Ambiguous Laws Serving Unconstitutional Objectives
In many instances, a law is challenged not because it employs a
problematic classification, strongly suggesting that the law serves an
impermissible purpose,290 or because its effect on the exercise of fun-
damental rights is too severe, but solely because of evidence that the
legislature that enacted the law did so to further a constitutionally un-
acceptable objective.291 In these situations, adequate proof of the leg-
islature's intent may establish the infringement of a right and require
the invalidation of the law. Indeed, in some cases no balancing or
other form of scrutiny should be required.292 The law is unconstitu-
tional even if it imposes a comparatively minor burden on protected
interests.
The plurality in Casey seems to suggest such an approach when it
states that "a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to
cient alternative areas" within the general vicinity to allow speakers ample opportunity to
communicate their views to the public. Id. at 180. In striking down the challenged speech
restrictions, the Court did not contest this contention. The prohibition was unconstitu-
tional, despite its limited impact on expressive opportunities, because the restrictions lim-
ited more speech than was necessary to further the state's interests in preserving order and
decorum. Id. at 182.
289. Even if one agreed with the joint opinion that the 24-hour waiting period does not
constitute a substantial obstacle to women obtaining an abortion, one might argue that the
emotional, economic, and medical burdens imposed by this regulation far outweigh
whatever purported benefit an additional opportunity for reflection allegedly provides.
Whatever the merits or weaknesses of this argument may be, the important point is that
courts are not required to resolve this issue under the undue burden standard. The deter-
mination that an abortion regulation does not constitute an undue burden ends the Court's
inquiry.
290. A law that discriminates on its face against the content or viewpoint of expression,
for example, is directed at the communicative impact of speech. It is presumed to serve the
unacceptable purpose of silencing the speaker's message or ideas.
291. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217,2226 (1993) (stating that even if a law is arguably neutral on its face, if the object of a
law is to restrict an activity because the practice is performed for religious reasons, the law
is invalid unless it meets strict scrutiny). See generally Brownstein, supra note 80.
292. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
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strike at the right itself," will be upheld as long as it does not substan-
tially interfere with the exercise of the right to have an abortion.293
Similarly, the plurality indicates that the state's interest in protecting
potential life cannot serve as a generally legitimate purpose foreclos-
ing any further inquiry into legislative goals. Any attempts to further
the state's interest in potential life "must be calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it.' '294 The clear implication of such
language is that "unnecessary" regulations that are solely intended to
frustrate the ability of a woman to exercise her decision to have an
abortion are unduly burdensome and, therefore, unconstitutional. 295
The application of such a principle could not be tested in Casey, how-
ever, since all of the regulations reviewed in that case explicitly and
exclusively regulated the proVision of abortion services and did so for
what the Court determined to be legitimate purposes. 296
Using the purpose analysis suggested in Casey as a basis for ex-
amining the legislature's intent in adopting facially neutral abortion
regulations (or laws that directly burden abortion services for uncer-
tain reasons) would hardly be a unique undertaking. Despite the
Court's repeated admonitions about the problems inherent in con-
ducting inquiries into legislative intent,297 the case law has recognized
this approach to identifyihg infringements on rights in particular cir-
cumstances. For example, in interpreting and applying the Establish-
ment Clause, the Court has determined that some state objectives
regarding religion are presumptively invalid. If the purpose of a law is
exclusively or predominately to promote religion or a particular reli-
gion, it violates the Establishment Clause and is unconstitutional.2 98
The Court has applied this secular purpose standard to the setting
aside of a moment of silence for prayer or meditation in a public
school,2 99 to the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments (with a
secular disclaimer in small print) in a public school classroom, 3° and
to a statutory requirement prohibiting the teaching of evolution unless
293. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
294. Id. at 2820.
295. Id. at 2821; see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 21-22, 59-78 and accompanying text. As noted previously, the
plurality's description of the object of Pennsylvania's abortion regulations can be disputed.
297. See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 44-52.
298. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-94 (1987). The Court often describes this
requirement using negative terms. Thus, a law is said to violate the Establishment Clause
if it lacks a secular purpose.
299. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985).
300. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980).
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it is accompanied by instruction in "creation science."'301 In each case,
purported secular benefits of the state's action could not justify the
challenged activity. While the effect of the state's action might be dis-
puted, the dominant religious purpose of the law was a sufficient basis
for finding an Establishment Clause violation.30 2
Another line of authority in which courts determine that a consti-
tutional guarantee is infringed by examining the legislature's purpose
involves the review of alleged pre-condenmation downzoning under
the Takings Clause. State and federal courts regularly hold that local
governments cannot enact zoning laws to restrict the uses of property
available to an owner in order to depress the condemnation price the
state will ultimately have to pay when it acquires the land.30 3 These
zoning laws do not constitute a regulatory taking in terms of their ef-
fect, since the owner is not denied all economically viable uses of his
property. However, the use of state power for the illicit purpose of
reducing the market value of property to avoid the payment of just
compensation can constitute a taking, or a deprivation of property in
violation of due process, in its own right.30 4
While there are a variety of other examples of circumstances in
which illicit purpose alone is sufficient to define the infringement of a
constitutionally protected interest,305 the judicial review of laws based
301. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 578.
302. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that creation
science law is unconstitutional because, "[w]hatever the academic merit of particular sub-
jects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state officials to pick and
choose among them for the purpose of promoting a particular religious belief"); Wallace,
472 U.S. at 56 ("[N]o consideration of the [effects or entanglements criteria of the Lemon
test] is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose."); Stone, 449 U.S. at
45-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority ignores secular benefits resulting
from study of Ten Commandments in holding that posting of Ten Commandments serves
exclusively religious purpose).
303. See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 68 nn.202-203 and cases cited therein.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(holding that school board's action violates First Amendment if disapproval of teacher's
protected expression is found to be "motivating factor" in board's decision to dismiss him).
It is an open question whether the Court would accept evidence that the legislature's
intent was to target or suppress a religious faith as the sole basis for applying strict scrutiny
to a facially neutral law challenged on free exercise grounds. The Court uses evidence of
the legislature's intent in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye to determine that the city's
anti-ritual slaughter ordinances, far from being neutral, were directly aimed at suppressing
the Santeria religion. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2230-31 (1993). However, that evidence does not stand alone. The Court also points
to the language used in the challenged ordinances, their design, and their discriminatory
application to establish that the law unconstitutionally targets a particular religion. Id. at
2227-30.
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on direct inquiries into legislative intent has serious limitations. As a
practical matter, judicial concerns relating to comity, the potential ad-
verse impact on the candor of legislative deliberations, and the diffi-
culty of determining the institutional intentions of a deliberative body
discourage courts from accepting proof of impermissible purpose as
the primary basis for invalidating a law.30 6 From a conceptual per-
spective, however, it is relatively simple to justify striking down a law
that serves an unconstitutional objective, particularly if one adopts an
undue burden standard. All the negative effects resulting from a law
designed to accomplish an unconstitutional goal are unwarranted and
are, in that basic sense, undue.
ii. Neutral Laws Serving Objectives That Invoke Strict Scrutiny-The
Problem of Symbolic Speech
The previous discussion demonstrates that a facially neutral stat-
ute imposing a relatively minor burden on the exercise of a right may
be challenged on the grounds that the law was adopted to serve an
impermissible purpose. Proof of such a problematic purpose will
sometimes, but not always, require the invalidation of the statute. In-
deed, the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this situation
will probably vary depending on the nature of the constitutional right
that is at issue. An examination of the way that laws burdening sym-
bolic speech are evaluated illustrates the uncertain consequences of
this kind of purpose-based constitutional challenge.
Laws of general applicability that on their face regulate conduct,
not speech, may be challenged as violating the First Amendment if the
person engaged in performing the prohibited conduct claims to have
been doing so to communicate a message.307 In reviewing what are
ostensibly conduct regulations in this circumstance, the Court purport-
edly conducts a three-step inquiry. The law will be upheld "if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that in-
It is also unclear whether a law intended to serve the invidious purpose of suppressing
a religious faith is categorically unconstitutional or whether it must be evaluated under
strict scrutiny. See supra note 275.
306. See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 44-52.
307. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991) (demonstrating
that application of statute banning public nudity raises First Amendment issue when it is
applied to expressive conduct of nude dancing).
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terest. '' 30 8 If the second step of this test is answered in the affirmative,
however, as we have seen, the Court adopts a very deferential stance
in applying the remaining steps of this standard.30 9 This is the bottom
rung, the lowest level of review under the three-tier model.
For our immediate purposes, however, the more interesting ques-
tion is what occurs if the second step is answered in the negative; that
is, if the governmental interest is found to be related to the suppres-
sion of free expression. Indeed, what happens if the suppression of
expression is determined to be the law's primary purpose? While a
law serving this kind of presumptively invalid purpose must be rigor-
ously reviewed, it is not clear that the purpose of suppressing speech
always requires the law's invalidation. Rather, it may be argued that a
finding that the challenged law is intended to suppress the communi-
cative impact of the regulated conduct should result in strict scrutiny,
not per se invalidation.310
Strict scrutiny is applied because freedom of speech is not abso-
lute. It is recognized that some communications can cause so much
damage to the public interest that they must be suppressed. Thus, for
example, a law prohibiting anyone from encouraging prospective con-
scripts to resist the draft must be evaluated to determine if it furthers
the arguably compelling interest of facilitating the state's need for mil-
itary personnel and is narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal.311
The need to evaluate the state's justification for restricting this
message continues regardless of whether the message is communi-
cated through speech or conduct. Accordingly, if the courts deter-
mine that the legislature designed a law prohibiting people from
burning their draft cards to silence the draft resistance message com-
municated by this symbolic act, it still remains to be determined
whether the prohibition of that message can withstand strict scru-
tiny.312 The importance of the state's interest and the degree of tailor-
ing of the challenged law remain to be addressed.
308. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
309. See supra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410-12 (1989) (stating that since a statute
prohibiting flag burning regulates expressive conduct "because of the content of the
message [being] conveyed," it must be subject to "the most exacting scrutiny").
311. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
312. The Court did not reach this issue in United States v. O'Brien because it deter-
mined that the federal statute prohibiting the willful and knowing destruction of one's
draft card was unrelated to the suppression of expression. United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 375 (1968).
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Thus, the constitutional case law appears to distinguish between
unacceptable purposes that require the invalidation of the challenged
law and problematic purposes that require a law to be reviewed under
strict scrutiny. An exclusively religious purpose requires the invalida-
tion of a law under current Establishment Clause doctrine. Determin-
ing that no secular purpose for the law exists ends the court's
inquiry.313 In reviewing laws that restrict symbolic speech, however, a
finding that the challenged law is intended to suppress the message
being communicated by the regulated conduct leads to rigorous
scrutiny.314
The undue burden standard in Casey appears to parallel Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine more closely than it does most symbolic
speech cases. If the legislature enacts an abortion regulation, not to
inform the woman's choice, or to promote her health, or to serve any
other permissible objective, but only to hinder and deter women from
having an abortion, the law is unduly burdensome and unconstitu-
tional. No further inquiry or review is necessary. The limited nature
and specificity of the right at issue, the right to have an abortion, and
the correspondingly limited goals that the state can reasonably assert
as being furthered by restrictive abortion laws, allow the Court to
equate an infringement of the right with constitutional invalidity.315
While the joint opinion only endorses this approach for abortion-spe-
cific laws, since those are the only kind of regulations at issue in the
case, the plurality's emphasis on state purpose strongly suggests that
the same analysis should apply for facially neutral, but invidiously mo-
tivated laws.
313. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) ("[T]he First Amendment re-
quires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion."); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (noting that if a statute violates any
of the three principles of the Lemon test, including the requirement that the law must have
a secular purpose, it will be struck down).
314. There is an obvious counter-intuitive aspect to this distinction. One would not
ordinarily assume that the government purpose of suppressing the content of speech is less
violative of constitutional values than the government purpose of promoting religion. This
comparison, however, misses the point of the distinction. Religious purposes are not more
invidious than the goal of suppressing speech; they are, however, more difficult to justify in
secular, that is, constitutionally acceptable terms.
Justifying a law that serves only a religious purpose is a particularly complicated prop-
osition. Ultimately, it requires the conclusion that the values of the religion or religions
that the law is intended to promote deserve support either as a matter of recognized reli-
gious conviction or because those religious tenets coincide with the faith of the majority of
the community. Since the Establishment Clause prohibits government from determining
matters of religious faith and truth, or favoring one faith over another, the analysis eventu-
ally becomes circular and the justification must ultimately fail.
315. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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There is one symbolic speech context, however, that tracks, and
indirectly affirms, the Casey plurality's purpose analysis. If symbolic
speech is being suppressed for absolute as opposed to instrumental
reasons, then strict scrutiny is not required. In this circumstance, the
restricted expression is not prohibited because it will cause some de-
rivative harm, but rather because the speech is intrinsically harmful.
It is allegedly immoral, unaesthetic, or offensive in and of itself. The
clearest examples of this kind of symbolic speech restrictions are the
flag burning cases, Texas v. Johnson316 and United States v. Eich-
man.317 In striking down laws prohibiting flag burning, the Court de-
termined that one of the goals of such statutes was to prevent a
communicative symbol, the flag, from being used to express a disa-
greeable and offensive message-that the ideals of nationhood and
national unity typically represented by the flag are false and without
foundation.318
When symbolic speech is suppressed because the message being
communicated is immoral or offensive, the question of purpose is di-
rected at the state's ultimate objective. If the goal of prohibiting this
kind of "bad" speech is constitutionally permissible, as it is with re-
gard to obscene expressive conduct, the challenged law will be upheld.
Conversely, if the state's purpose is impermissible, as was true in the
flag burning cases, the law will be invalidated. When speech is sup-
pressed because its very expression is immoral, concerns about precise
tailoring and the compelling nature of the state's interest are either
irrelevant or are subsumed within the question of the legitimacy of the
state's purpose. The limited nature of the symbolic expression and the
narrow range of justifications for suppressing it make the issue of the
legitimacy of the state's purpose dispositive.319
316. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
317. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
318. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 413. It can be argued that the statutes challenged in the flag
burning cases, particularly the statute at issue in Johnson, discriminated on their face
against offensive expression and as such they are not strictly relevant to the analysis of
neutral laws in the text. The law under review in Eichman, however, demonstrates that
legislators will at least attempt to draft neutral statutes to suppress expressive conduct that
communicates an offensive message, Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315, even if they are not always
successful in doing so.
319. The Court in Johnson concluded that the Texas flag burning statute at issue in the
case was content based and must be subject to strict scrutiny. The application of that stan-
dard, however, never progresses past the initial question of the legitimacy of the state's
interest. Texas, and those Justices who dissented to the majority's decision, in essence
viewed flag burning as an intolerable act of political blasphemy-the desecration of a sa-
cred symbol. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Since the
First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of expression because society deems
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The nature of the right to have an abortion and the essential justi-
fications for prohibiting abortions are similarly limited. Many laws
are proposed to hinder, prohibit, or criminalize abortions to further
the goal of discouraging what some legislatures believe to be intrinsi-
cally and egregiously immoral conduct.320 When the decision to have
an abortion is prohibited on that ground, the only remaining question
for the Court is to decide whether or not that state purpose is a consti-
tutionally adequate basis for restricting the exercise of the right. Once
the plurality in Casey determined that it was not, no further scrutiny
of laws intended to serve that purpose would be required. 321
(3) The Arbitrary Burden-Nominal Taxes, Flat Taxes, and Administrative
Fees
As the above discussion demonstrates, Justice Scalia's dissent in
Casey correctly recognizes that a law may directly and consciously im-
pose relatively minor burdens on the exercise of fundamental rights
and still be invalidated as unconstitutional.322 Laws that burden rights
having a significant equality dimension to them and laws that serve
impermissible purposes may be struck down despite the limited mag-
nitude of their effect. Scalia's error is his assumption that such results
it to be offensive, accepting this argument would be tantamount to recognizing a special
First Amendment category of unprotected speech for flag burning. Once the Court re-
fused to recognize such a "juridical category," id. at 417, there was nothing left for the
majority to say other than that the flag burning statute was unconstitutional as applied to
expressive conduct. Johnson demonstrates that when the object of a statute directly of-
fends constitutional principles, a court may avoid the specific application of strict scrutiny
review by simply stating that the state's asserted purpose cannot justify the infringement of
the right at issue.
The more recent case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), is not
inconsistent with this analysis. The Court in R.A.V. applies strict scrutiny to a content-
discriminatory statute regulating unprotected speech, "fighting words," that constitute hate
speech. However, it does so because the city attempted to justify its ordinance in instru-
mental terms. In response to the claim that the challenged law served the compelling inter-
est of protecting the basic rights of victimized groups, the Court was obliged to determine
whether the use of a content based statute was necessary to the accomplishment of that
goal. Id. at 2549-50. If St. Paul had attempted to justify its law on the grounds that the
message of hate speech is intrinsically immoral or offensive, the ordinance would have
been struck down without further analysis.
320. See, e.g., Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp.
1422 (D. Guam 1990), aff'd, 962 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992)
(describing the religious and moral purpose of law prohibiting abortions); B.J. George, Jr.,
State Legislatures Versus The Supreme Court: Abortion Legislation in the 1980's, in ABOR-
TION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW 23-25 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 3d ed.
1986).
321. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
322. Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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must be inconsistent with the use of an undue burden standard to
identify the infringement of rights.
There remains one other circumstance, however, in which the
Court may invalidate even a one-penny burden on the exercise of a
right. While Justice Scalia uses the narrow example of a one-cent tax
on the sale of religious books-a burden that immediately suggests
impermissible if not invidious purposes-the problem of the "nomi-
nal" tax extends far beyond free exercise rights. Governments di-
rectly and consciously impose taxes or fees on a variety of activities
involving the exercise of rights. A modest tax on secular speech, for
example-a fee that must be paid as the precondition to obtaining a
parade permit-is an obvious example. If Scalia's free exercise exam-
ple in his dissent was intended to be read expansively and to represent
the common understanding of how all fundamental rights cases are to
be reviewed, a nominal tax on obtaining such a permit should be eas-
ily recognized by all courts as unconstitutional regardless of the
amount of the exaction. Yet the one thing that is clear on this issue is
that there has been no reasoned consensus on how permit taxes of this
kind are to be reviewed. 32
Indeed, the same term in which the Court decided Casey, it
granted certiorari in Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement324 to
resolve "[w]hether the provisions of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution limit the amount of a license fee assessed
pursuant to the provisions of a county parade ordinance to a nominal
sum."132s Further, the judgment of the Court in Forsyth County was
roundly criticized by a dissent that claimed the majority opinion failed
to authoritatively decide the basic question before it.326 Justice Rehn-
quist wrote the dissent in which Justice Scalia and two other Justices
joined.
Prior to this decision, in confronting the issue of parade permit
fees, lower federal courts had struggled to interpret two antiquated
and ambiguous cases from the 1940s. Cox v. New Hampshire327 up-
held a license fee intended to reimburse the city for the cost of ad-
ministering a permit system and supervising the orderly conduct of
demonstrations. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,28 on the other hand, in-
323. See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Mar-
ketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257 (1985).
324. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
325. Id. at 2405 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2406-07.
327. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
328. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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validated the application of a general solicitation license fee to evan-
gelical missionaries disseminating religious messages and materials.
The Court in Murdock distinguished this "flat license tax" from the
fee upheld in Cox on the grounds that the latter was a regulatory mea-
sure to defray expenses imposing a fee of a nominal amount.32 9 In
light of this precedent, some federal courts concluded that any permit
or license fee reflecting a city's attempt to offset its legitimate admin-
istrative expenses would be constitutional, while other courts insisted
that only a nominal fee might be imposed for this purpose.330
The Court's opinion in Forsyth County did not entirely eliminate
this confusion. The specific licensing scheme at issue was invalidated
because it conferred too much discretion on administrators in fixing
the amount of the fee, and it impermissibly allowed applicants expres-
sing unpopular messages to be charged higher fees because of the ad-
ded costs of maintaining order at their events.331 The majority
opinion and the dissent can also be read to agree, albeit indirectly and
in dicta, that a flat tax on the exercise of constitutional rights such as
freedom of speech would be unconstitutional, even if it was nominal
in amount, but neither opinion states this principle explicitly.
The majority opinion comes closest to doing so. Justice Black-
mun explained that "[t]he tax at issue in Murdock was invalid because
it was unrelated to any legitimate state interest, not because it was of a
particular size. '332 This conclusion strongly implies that arbitrary
(flat) taxes on the exercise of fundamental rights for revenue enhance-
ment purposes are unacceptable. Justice Rehnquist's dissent more
ambiguously characterizes Murdock as condemning "a flat tax on pro-
tected religious expression. '333 Since the tax in Murdock was one of
general applicability that covered all soliciting,334 the focus of Rehn-
quist's interpretation must be on the nature of the tax, not on its
direction.335
329. Id. at 116.
330. See, e.g., Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130,1136 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 275 (1991) (holding that greater than nominal fees permitted if reason-
ably related to legitimate administrative expenses); Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign
v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1521-23 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986) (hold-
ing that only nominal fee permitted). See generally Neisser, supra note 323, at 258 n.3.
331. Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2400-04.
332. Id. at 2405.
333. Id. at 2406 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
334. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106, 115 (1943).
335. Since Justice Rehnquist supports the majority holding in Smith, he presumably
does not think the tax in Murdock is unconstitutional because it incidently burdens reli-
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There was a less clear consensus on whether an administrative or
regulatory user fee would be constitutional, even if it imposed a sub-
stantial burden on potential speakers. The four dissenting Justices
concluded, on the authority of Cox, that such fees were acceptable if
they were applied in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.336 The ma-
jority did not reach this issue, but it did reject the contention that
Murdock had established the principle that "only nominal charges are
constitutionally permissible. '337
What can we infer from this decision and its precedent with re-
gard to the propriety of an "undue burden" test? It appears that even
a nominal flat tax on the right to worship or the right to speak or,
perhaps, the right to engage in any constitutionally protected activity
will be invalidated. That conclusion may not have been obvious
before Forsyth County was decided,338 but it seems to be supported by
a majority of the Court today. What is far less certain is that this
conclusion undermines the "undue burden" analysis of the joint
opinion.
The constitutional defect of a flat tax can be described in a variety
of ways. One reason that even a nominal flat tax on protected activity
is unconstitutional is that it serves an impermissible purpose-using
the individual's commitment to the exercise of constitutional rights as
a way to raise revenue for the state's treasury. That objective may be
presumptively invalid, and as such the tax itself is, by definition, un-
duly burdensome. 339 Alternatively, one can say that the burden of a
tax of this kind serves no legitimate or reasonable purpose. There is
no connection between the existence or amount of the tax and the
gion. His explanation of why the tax is invalid is more likely grounded on the arbitrary
burden it imposes on protected activity.
336. Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2405-06 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
337. Id. at 2405.
338. In 1990, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,386-
87 (1990), see supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text, the Court emphasized that the
flat tax in Murdock was invalidated because it operated as a prior restraint on expression.
That explanation seems to prove too much, however, since it would apply with equal force
to any permit fee related to expressive activity. No matter how the fee was calculated, it
would still operate as a prior restraint to bar the speech of those who did not pay it. Thus,
the rationale for invalidating a flat tax on protected activity remained uncertain at this
time.
339. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113 (stating that "a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a
privilege granted by the Bill of Rights" is unconstitutional because "[a] state may not im-
pose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution").
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nature of the right that is subject to taxation. Thus, the tax is arbitrary
and capricious and, therefore, constitutes an undue burden.3 40
A strong argument can be made that both of these kinds of con-
stitutional failings, an impermissible purpose or an arbitrary and ca-
pricious governmental decision, would be subsumed under the undue
burden standard as it is set out in Casey, although the joint opinion
may fairly be criticized for not being explicit on this point. As noted
previously, the plurality causes considerable confusion when it defines
the purpose aspect of the undue burden standard in terms of the in-
tent to create a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking
abortions. By using substantial obstacle language in its discussion of
legislative purpose, the plurality leaves itself vulnerable to the chal-
lenge that even invidiously motivated or clearly capricious laws will be
upheld since the unwarranted or deliberately obstructionist burdens
they impose are not "substantial" enough.341
Notwithstanding this failure in exposition, the substance of the
"undue burden" standard can easily accommodate the invalidation of
capricious, unwarranted, or impermissible burdens no matter how mi-
nor they may be. None of the abortion regulations upheld in Casey
are the equivalent of an arbitrary flat tax (or an irrational twenty-four-
hour waiting period on the sale of religious books for that matter).
There is no direct conflict between the plurality's defense of a twenty-
four-hour waiting period before a woman can obtain an abortion and
the constitutional consensus that an arbitrary tax on protected expres-
sion would be invalid. The twenty-four-hour waiting period upheld in
Casey may be controversial, both because of its impact and because it
implies that women seeking abortions have not already given in-
340. See Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2405; see also supra note 332 and accompanying
text.
341. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. If the repeated references to unaccept-
able purposes in the joint opinion are to have any real meaning, however, and if the undue
burden standard is to withstand the criticism directed against it, an undue burden cannot
be so narrowly defined. Virtually any significant burden on a right may be undue, even if it
is too small to create a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right, if the burden serves
no legitimate or relevant purpose. The choice is between a reading of the joint opinion
that is analytically sound, but, on occasion, imperfectly written and a reading of the joint
opinion that is all but senseless. Reading the opinion in its entirety, the position of the
plurality is sufficiently clear that abortion regulations are unduly burdensome and will not
be upheld if they exist primarily to hinder the exercise of abortion rights and for no othe
relevant reason. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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formed and serious attention to their decision,342 but it can be justified
on regulatory grounds.3 43
Similarly, the review of regulatory or user fees in Forsyth County
is also consistent with the analytic approach of the joint opinion in
Casey. Unlike the disfavored flat tax, this kind of an offsetting ex-
pense fee serves an obvious and legitimate state interest in financing
the administrative framework that is necessary for the streets and
parks to be efficiently used for both expressive and nonexpressive
purposes.344 While these fees clearly burden access to traditional pub-
342. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise-Inevitable and Impossible, 1992
U. ILL- L. REv. 921, 940 (1992) ("The twenty-four-hour waiting requirement sends a pow-
erful message that is degrading, condescending, and paternalistic ... [because] [i]t assumes
that women make rash decisions, and ... imputes women's competence as moral and
practical decision-makers."); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GEN-
DER & L. 119, 143-45 (1992); BARBARA MILBAUER & BERT N. OBRENTz, THE LAW
GrvTrn: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 300-01 (1983) (arguing that
waiting period increases cost and inconvenience of abortions but the "real" costs of such
requirements are "psychological and physical"); Nancy A. Nolan, Comment, Toward Con-
stitutional Abortion Control Legislation: The Pennsylvania Approach, 87 DIcK. L. REv.
373, 390-92 (1983) (describing lower court decisions invalidating waiting periods); LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CRASH OF ABsoLUTEs 203-04 (1990) ("Apart from
their value as propaganda, laws imposing such waiting periods seem to be written in the
belief that they may pass constitutional muster where an outright prohibition would not,
while at the same time they will act as an absolute obstacle for at least some women who
might otherwise obtain legal abortions.").
343. See Dworkin, supra note 58, at 408-11. Dworkin argues that it does not violate the
Constitution for a state to adopt abortion regulations that promote the goal of moral re-
sponsibility. Regulations of this kind operate to encourage citizens to "treat decisions
about abortion as matters of moral importance.... [to] recognize that fundamental intrin-
sic values are at stake in their decision, and ... [to] decide reflectively, not out of immedi-
ate convenience but out of examined conviction." Id at 408. The state is prohibited,
however, from coercing a woman not to have an abortion before the third trimester, either
directly through outright prohibitions or indirectly by adopting burdensome regulations
that preclude her from making or exercising her own choice. Id. at 410. While Dworkin
leaves open the issue of whether a 24-hour waiting period constitutes so severe a burden
that it must be struck down as unconstitutionally coercive, his analysis strongly suggests
that there is at least a legitimate regulatory objective on which waiting periods can be
grounded.
The fact that a waiting period can be justified by reference to legitimate regulatory
objectives, however, does not mean that the offered justification is persuasive, that it out-
weighs the burden the requirement imposes on many women, or that the waiting period
should be upheld as constitutional. A court might accept as rational the state's attempt to
ensure that the decision to have an abortion is careful and deliberate, but still strikes down
waiting period requirements because of their impact on women. See, e.g., Akron Ctr. For
Reprod. Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1208 (6th Cir. 1981), aff'd in relevant part,
462 U.S. 416, 449-51 (1983).
344. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941); see also Neisser, supra
note 323, at 347-49 (arguing that permit fees are more like taxes than user fees but recog-
nizing that they are consistent with the First Amendment if they are carefully limited to
cover only administrative expenses).
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lie forums, there is even an argument that they are presumptively
valid in that without reasonable time, place, and manner constraints,
and the money needed to enforce them, the utility of the streets and
parks for expressive purposes might be significantly reduced.345
Administrative fees serving a legitimate, and perhaps preferred,
state purpose can nevertheless be invalid if they unduly burden free-
dom of speech. A fee structure that requires higher payments from
groups creating greater security risks by espousing unpopular causes
may unduly restrict the access of these groups to traditional public
forums and requires more stringent review. 346 Similarly, it may be ar-
gued that very high fees based on gratuitous and unnecessary ex-
penses (particularly those that make no exception for groups with
limited financial resources) create substantial obstacles to free expres-
sion and warrant serious review even if they are content-neutral in
their application.347 The multi-factor balancing test the Court applies
to content-neutral regulations requires that ample alternative avenues
of communication be available before such restrictions on speech may
be upheld.348 The majority's statement in Forsyth County that the
Murdock decision does not hold that "only nominal charges are con-
stitutionally permissible" 349 in the setting of permit fees should not be
taken out of context. There is no basis for concluding that it supports
a more lenient standard of review for permit fees than would be ap-
345. The Court makes this point in both general and specific terms in Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). From the broadest perspective,
[c]ivil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an or-
ganized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost
in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ulti-
mately depend.
Id. at 574.
More specifically, the Court quoted with obvious approval the observations of the
state court that licensing regulations served the laudable purpose of preventing the confu-
sion caused by "overlapping parades or processions." Id. at 576. Obviously, if two differ-
ent demonstrations attempt to use the same route at the same time, the resulting chaos is
likely to detract from the message each group is trying to communicate.
346. See Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (1992)
("Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
simply because it might offend a hostile mob.").
347. See Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1523-24 (11th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986); Neisser, supra note 323, at 313-16, 335.
348. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989).
349. Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2405.
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plied to other content-neutral regulations that burden free speech
rights.350
Despite the apparent ease with which the review of user fees for
parade permits can be explained under an undue burden standard, the
constitutionality of user fees is likely to vary significantly depending
on the fundamental right that is burdened. The general applicability
of the undue burden standard does not suggest uniform conclusions as
to whether these fees will be upheld. While flat taxes on the exercise
of fundamental rights may be consistently problematic, user fees are
more like regulatory burdens and require a ight-by-right evaluation.
It must be reiterated that what constitutes an undue burden on
the exercise of one right may not constitute an undue burden on the
exercise of a different right. In part, this is simply a consequence of
considering a law's purpose as well as its effect in determining
whether a law unduly burdens the exercise of a right. What are legiti-
mate and rational regulations vis-A-vis one right may be irrational or
invidious restrictions on a different right.
There is no obvious analogy, for example, between user fees for
parade permits and a similar financial burden imposed on women
seeking abortion services at private medical facilities. Presumably the
state could license all medical clinics, including those that provide
abortion services, and review their quality under a system that charges
the clinic a fee to reimburse the state for its administrative expenses.
The clinic would probably pass this cost on to its clients.351 It is un-
likely that a fee directed at the women seeking abortions themselves,
however, could be justified as a user fee as opposed to an arbitrary
tax.3 52
350. Indeed, it may be argued that alleged user fees should be more rigorously re-
viewed than time, place, and manner regulations. See Neisser, supra note 323, at 286-87,
292-300, 329-51.
351. See generally Baird v. Department of Pub. Health, 599 F.2d 1098 (1st. Cir. 1979)
(upholding licensing statute applicable to abortion clinics); Birth Control Ctrs. v. Reizen,
508 F. Supp. 1366, 1381-85 (E.D. Mich. 1981), affd in part and vacated in part, 743 F.2d 352
(6th Cir. 1984) (upholding licensing statutes applied to abortion clinics despite contention
that cost of compliance will increase cost of abortion services); Westchester Women's
Health Org. v. Whalen, 475 F. Supp. 734,740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that regulations
of abortion clinics that may increase the cost of an abortion are not unconstitutional).
352. A comparison cannot easily be drawn between parade permit fees based on a
city's administrative expenses and an administrative overhead fee charged at a public hos-
pital that provides abortion services. While the state must allow its streets and parks to be
used as public forums for expressive purposes, the state may prohibit its public hospitals
from providing abortion services. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490,507-11 (1989). If prohibiting all abortions services at public hospitals is neither unduly
Inconsistencies and uncertainty in the application of the undue
burden standard are unavoidable because there is no common founda-
tion underlying the various rights that the Constitution protects.
Thus, for example, while a license fee to cover the city's administrative
costs may be a rational imposition on the right to speak in a tradi-
tional public forum, allocating the costs of running elections to each
voter through a poll tax or electoral user fee would almost certainly be
unconstitutional even if the amount of the tax was still only $1.50.
Despite the fact that both rights are instrumental to the effective oper-
ation of democratic self government, the right to vote has a stronger
equality dimension to it than is recognized in free speech jurispru-
dence. Thus, fees that may discourage less wealthy persons from exer-
cising the franchise will receive more rigorous scrutiny than
comparable fees that have the effect of discouraging poor people from
engaging in expressive activities in a traditional public forum.353
I. The Nature of Constitutional Infringements and the
Scope and Meaning of Fundamental Rights
The analysis of what constitutes an infringement of a fundamental
right described above is complex and indeterminate. I offer it for
three reasons. First, and least important, it is a necessary foundation
for the joint opinion's holding in Casey with regard to abortion rights.
The virtue of that rationale depends on one's own judgement as to
whether the position of the joint opinion in Casey is worth defend-
ing.354 If it is, some attempt must be made to ground the plurality's
reasoning in traditional fundamental rights jurisprudence. This Arti-
cle does that. The argument that the undue burden standard is artifi-
burdensome nor unconstitutional, an excessively high fee for the provision of abortion
services at a public hospital must also be constitutional.
353. See supra note 266.
354. Obviously, one may endorse some form of undue burden standard for abortion
rights in theory and still reject the way that the joint opinion in Casey defines and applies
that standard. As a doctrinal matter, the plurality's conclusion that significant, but not
substantial, burdens on the right to have an abortion will be upheld as long as they ration-
ally serve some legitimate state interest can be challenged on the grounds that all signifi-
cant burdens on the exercise of a fundamental right should be balanced against the weight
of the state's interest to determine if the burden is justified. See supra notes 255-256 and
accompanying text.
With regard to the specifics of the Casey decision one may argue, for example, that the
plurality understates the impact of the 24-hour waiting period requirement and that this
provision should be struck down as an undue burden. See supra note 342 and accompany-
ing text.
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cial and without precedential support is demonstrated to be
erroneous.
Second, and more important, the undue burden standard and the
analytic framework supporting it help to explain a great deal of case
law that is otherwise difficult to understand in doctrinal terms. With
regard to this second point, I respectfully urge the reader who is justi-
fiably disturbed by the fluid and ad hoc nature of the analysis
presented here not to make the mistake of shooting the messenger.
The complexity of existing fundamental rights case law is neither my
fault, nor for that matter is it the fault of the authors of the joint opin-
ion. The question before us is whether an undue burden standard,
directed at both the purpose and the effect of the challenged law, ade-
quately (and usefully) describes how the Court has been operating
when deciding fundamental rights cases. If the answer to that ques-
tion is "yes," as I think it is, responsibility for whatever faults there are
in that approach is going to be fairly widespread.
Of course, in one sense, my answer to this question is a highly
qualified "yes." I have taken a certain amount of license in interpret-
ing what the plurality in Casey means by a undue burden standard,
and in extending the plurality's reasoning to resolve issues never men-
tioned in the joint opinion. I have no way of knowing whether what I
have written is what the authors of the joint opinion intended.
What is certain, however, is that an undue burden standard can
be used to resolve the specific issues about abortion rights addressed
in the joint opinion in Casey. Further, the doctrinal roots of that stan-
dard, or at least one interpretation of that standard, can be firmly
grounded in the fundamental rights case law. The standard is mallea-
ble. The nature of what constitutes a constitutionally cognizable bur-
den varies among the fundamental rights. Moreover, different levels
of review apply to laws that regulate but do not impose undue bur-
dens on the exercise of rights. What is constant, in determining what
constitutes the infringement of a right, is the lack of constancy-the
recognition that for each right certain purposes and effects are unac-
ceptable, while other purposes and effects are either routinely upheld
or subjected to some form of open-ended balancing test. The "undue
burden" standard does not explain how this framework will operate
for each right, but it does forthrightly acknowledge that the Court is
regularly making these kinds of choices in reviewing laws that are
challenged as abridging rights.
The third and primary reason for recognizing, and even defend-
ing, an undue burden standard is that there may be no other approach
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that provides sufficient protection to the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution without unreasonably preventing the other branches of
government from performing their constitutionally assigned functions.
The inescapable reality of the last forty or fifty years of constitutional
litigation is that it is in the nature of rights that they pull the courts in
opposing directions. On the one hand, rights should be defined cate-
gorically, and violations of rights should be subject to a rigorous stan-
dard of justification. That kind of principled rights jurisprudence
promotes important values of certainty, uniformity and predictabil-
ity.355 On the other hand, the complexity of human society makes it
extraordinarily difficult to describe those interests that should be insu-
lated from majoritarian decision making in such a structured way.
The broader the range of interests the Constitution is interpreted
to protect, the more acute this problem becomes. As the scope of
constitutional rights becomes more inclusive, as the nature of "reli-
gion" that the Free Exercise Clause protects is defined more expan-
sively,356 and as courts are pressed to disregard tradition in defining
rights of privacy and personal autonomy,357 the conflict between state
action and the exercise of rights becomes more common and less
avoidable. Given the scope of activity for which constitutional protec-
tion is sought, courts are understandably reluctant to define rights as
generic classes of behavior that can only be the subject of regulation
in the most compelling of circumstances. The conventional under-
standing that all conflicts between rights-related activity and state ac-
tion must be resolved under strict scrutiny review simply immunizes
too large an area of human activity from democratic deliberation and
regulation.
355. The value of rigorous bright line rules in protecting freedom of speech, such as the
requirement that content or viewpoint based restrictions on speech must receive strict scru-
tiny, is particularly well established. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.03 (1984) (explaining the benefits of
definitional or categorical balancing over an ad hoc or contextual balancing approach);
TRIBE, supra note 168, § 12-2, at 792-94. As the Court has recognized, the use of "broad
rules of general application" avoids "unpredictable results and uncertain expectations."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974).
356. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)
(explaining that Free Exercise Clause is not limited to persons who adhere to "a tenet or
dogma of an established religious sect"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-67
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (limiting exemption from military service to only those con-
scientious objectors who worship a supreme being violates Establishment Clause).
357. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing right to marry);
Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (adjudicating claim that withdrawal of
job offer in response to plaintiff's marriage to a person of her own sex violates right of
intimate association, religious freedom, and substantive due process).
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In blunt terms, the adjudication of rights requires more flexibility
than the categorical definition of rights protected by strict scrutiny re-
view provides.3 58 One way of dealing with the problem is to identify
and prioritize sub-classes of rights and to apply a more lenient stan-
dard of review to those laws that abridge what are designated as lesser
or less valuable rights. Thus, for example, a separate standard of re-
view has been applied to laws that restrict commercial speech.3 59 This
approach is useful in certain circumstances, when the nature of the
right is susceptible to being fragmented and broken down into sub-
categories of activity.360
For many rights, however, such as the right to marry or the right
to have an abortion, the nature of the right is unitary. With regard to
other rights, such as freedom of speech, even after we have identified
all the categories of lesser and unprotected speech that merit reduced
First Amendment protection, the scope of what remains as fully pro-
tected expressive activity is intolerably broad. At least, it is intolera-
bly broad if all laws that limit such speech must receive strict scrutiny.
In these and other cases some framework of review more sensitive to
reasonable regulatory concerns must be implemented.3 61
Ultimately, it seems clear that one way to achieve the necessary
flexibility that an expansive rights jurisprudence requires is to focus
on what constitutes an infringement of a right. By examining the pur-
pose and effect of the state's action that burdens the exercise of the
right, and determining whether particular burdens require rigorous re-
view, ad hoc balancing, or, perhaps, no review at all, the Court can
most carefully craft the scope of constitutional guarantees. Using this
358. It should be emphasized that an expansive interpretation of fundamental rights
doctrine does not preclude the use of strict scrutiny to protect particular rights against
specific forms of infringement. The point is that strict scrutiny cannot be relied on to re-
solve all claims relating to the abridgment of rights. Other, more flexible approaches must
also be utilized.
359. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (describing distinct standard of review to be applied to laws restricting commercial
speech).
360. The right of freedom of speech has been broken down to include various catego-
ries of lesser protected speech, see, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial
speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent speech); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamatory speech). There is considerable dispute, of
course, as to the identity, value, and legitimacy of each of these categories of expression
and the specific standards of review applied within each category.
361. See, e.g., TRIE, supra note 168, at 794 (noting that "when government does not
seek to suppress any idea or message ... there seems little escape from [the] quagmire" of
ad hoc balancing).
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approach, the process of defining what the Constitution protects can
be accomplished with considerable precision.
Moreover, by recognizing that constitutional infringements must
be identified and described by looking at both the purpose and effect
of a law, the Court's understanding of what a right is changes signifi-
cantly. Instead of a one-dimensional view of rights that is discussed
solely as an individual interest, rights are defined, from the perspec-
tive of infringement, in terms of the interaction between the individual
and the state. The motives and actions of both the state and the indi-
vidual set the parameters of what the Constitution protects. Rights
become more intrinsically social and collective in their
interpretation. 362
Despite these virtues, the adoption of an expansively applied un-
due burden standard is hardly a panacea for the protection of funda-
mental rights. It contains more than its fair share of risks and
problems for people who support an expansive and inclusive recogni-
tion of constitutionally protected interests. Judicial flexibility in iden-
tifying what constitutes an infringement can substantially reduce the
scope of rights, as the joint opinion in Casey itself demonstrates. Even
the modification of an undue burden standard to include the balanc-
ing of significant, but not "substantial," burdens against the state's in-
terests to determine if the burdens are justified leaves rights
vulnerable to unnecessary restriction. Ad hoc and subjective balanc-
ing is far more conducive to judicial deference to the legislature than
are categorical rules of review.3 63
362. See Dworkin, supra note 58, at 405-11 (describing how collective values of the
community relating to the sanctity of human life may justify abortion regulations that en-
courage reflection and deliberation in reaching the decision to terminate a pregnancy).
363. See supra note 355. The risk that ad hoc balancing will inevitably result in exces-
sive deference to the legislature is illustrated by Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521, 524-25 (1951):
The historic antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its pur-
pose was to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on mat-
ters within the range of political interest.... Absolute rules would inevitably lead
to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules.
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in
national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the com-
peting interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing
dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved.
But how are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not subject
to quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into asking, who
is to make the adjustment?-who is to balance the relevant factors and ascertain
which interest is in the circumstances to prevail? Full responsibility for the choice
cannot be given to the courts. Courts are not representative bodies .... Their
judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
The alternative to an undue burden approach, however, may
even be more limited and restrictive. If the only choice is between
protecting the exercise of a right against all burdens under strict scru-
tiny review or interpreting the interest at stake as something other
than a right and providing it no constitutional protection at all, the
latter option may be selected in far too many circumstances. It may
be implicit in the framework offered by the critics of the "undue bur-
den" standard that rights are rarely recognized, although they receive
aggressive protection in those few circumstances when they are found
to exist.36 That approach may be successful if a very limited regime
of rights is all that one believes the Constitution protects. If one as-
pires to a more open-ended and expansive vision of rights, however, it
may be that the price to be paid to implement that vision is a commit-
ment to judicial flexibility in determining what constitutes the in-
fringement of a right.
Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches
that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become em-
broiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing
between competing political, economic, and social pressures.
Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the situa-
tion before us of necessity belongs to the Congress.
364. In an important sense, a case like Smith represents the classic danger of subordi-
nating the question of when a right is infringed to a commitment to strict scrutiny review.
Confronted with the inherent difficulty of applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to
all laws that burden the practice of any person's religious faith, the Court in Smith chose to
maintain the exclusive applicability of strict scrutiny review by reducing the protection
provided by the Free Exercise Clause to those few situations in which a religious faith is
targeted for suppression. The Court defined the right by identifying those circumstances in
which strict scrutiny review was unquestionably appropriate, when no real balancing of
interests would be necessary.
The problem with this approach is not only that it sharply reduces the protection pro-
vided to freedom of religion. Smith is an inadequate response to the real problems created
by an expansive definition of rights because it determines the scope of constitutional guar-
antees by using criteria that are unrelated to the needs of individuals and the value of
personal liberty. A court adopting an undue burden standard or some other flexible model
of review, in contrast, might still limit the scope of a right, but it would reach that decision
by examining the impact of a challenged law on the individual seeking to exercise the right
and the state's purpose in enacting that regulation. Smith sacrifices the rights of individu-
als to promote a vision of the proper role of constitutional courts. Whatever defects there
are in an undue burden standard, it correctly recognizes that the role of the courts must be
determined by the nature of the rights that the Constitution protects and not the other way
around.
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